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Art. 1.—THE ENGLISH IN THE LEVANT.

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3. *Historical Manuscripts Commission; Hatfield Papers.* Parts IV to XIII. H.M. Stationery Office, 1892–1915.
4. *The Principal Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the English Nation.* By Richard Hakluyt. New Edition. Twelve vols. MacLehose, 1903–1905.
5. *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches.* By J. von Hammer. Pest: Hartleben, 1828.
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8. *The Early History of the Levant Company.* By M. Epstein. Routledge, 1908.

THE early history of the English in the Mediterranean falls into two well-defined periods. The first, which forms the subject of this article, is concerned with sporadic attempts to create a Levant trade, which eventually became concentrated and effectively continuous in the Levant Company or Company of Turkey Merchants. This period covers the years 1553 to 1603, and is notable, chiefly, for the difficulties experienced by the London merchants and their agents in Constantinople. The material is to be found mainly in the despatches of those agents, addressed to William Cecil, Lord Burghley, and to his son Robert, Lord Salisbury, as yet unpublished, and in the despatches of the Venetian ambassadors at

the Sublime Porte, addressed to the Doge and Senate. The second period runs from the year 1603 to 1651; it begins in the illegal, fortuitous and unofficial operations of the pirates, continues through Mansell's official expedition in 1620, and ends with Blake's successful establishment of Great Britain as a sea-power in 1650.

Burghley, in pursuit of his far-sighted commercial policy, encouraged and fostered every effort of the instinctive national tendency to expand. He bent his mind to the extension of the trading markets of England; and it is hardly too much to say that the history of modern British commerce begins with him. Burghley and the statesmen who worked with him clearly grasped the possibilities of England's island position. The policy of 'diffusus in orbe Britannus' was to be carried out by the opening of new 'vents' or markets for English goods. For Burghley, with singular lucidity and prescience, had already enunciated the fundamental doctrine of modern economists: 'It is manifest,' he says in a memorandum on the importation of wines, 'that nothing robbeth this realme of England but when more merchandise is brought into the realme than is carried forth,' because 'the balance must be payd with money.'

For the furtherance of this policy of foreign trade it was necessary to foster the mercantile marine, the ultimate source of sea-power; for in peace it feeds trade, and in war it alone can feed the navy. The essentials of a mercantile marine are men, ships, sea-craft, and, when these have been secured, the erection of trading companies for the use of them and the exploitation of foreign markets. On the matter of men and sea-craft Burghley argued that there were three ways of breeding the one and learning the other—fishing, the carrying trade, and piracy. Piracy, though a good school, was abhorrent to the merchant, who was, in the last resort, the chief factor in Burghley's scheme; the carrying trade was still non-existent, though it would come with the development of his policy; fishing, therefore, was the great school 'in which men are made meter to abide stormes and become common mariners than by sailing in ships to Roone or Burdeaux.'

Burghley fully grasped the fact that the wealth of a nation lies in its trade. The spectacle of Spain, whose

policy aimed at amassing actual treasure, did not impress him. He no doubt was pleased if Drake could seize the *Flotta;* but he knew that all the riches of Peru would not make England so securely rich as a flourishing oversea trade; and so he bent his efforts to the creation of negotiable goods and the opening of markets for venting the same. Nor did the close restrictive policy which aimed at fostering native shipping by Navigation Acts, such as those adopted by Venice and Spain, meet with his approval. He was all for developing the healthy growth of the mercantile marine, nourished on the natural food of exchange and barter. So the question of foreign markets claimed his attention; and he set himself to encourage private venture, and to erect upon that foundation the fabric of the great trading companies, the Merchant Adventurers, the Muscovy Merchants, the Levant Company and, later, the India Company.

It is with the Levant Company that we are here concerned. Undoubtedly, the richest field for commerce in the 16th century was the Mediterranean; it was the trade route for oriental merchandise, and also the producer of sugar, currants, sweet wines and oil. Both the Orient and the Levant were good markets for woollens, kersies, leather and tin, thus furnishing the outward and the homeward cargoes. This rich trade had hitherto virtually been a Venetian monopoly. Sir William Monson has recorded the reasons why England did not embark earlier upon traffic in the Levant. He says there was not enough English shipping; that the danger from Barbary pirates was prohibitive; and, lastly, that the trade was already in the hands of Venice. But the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, which eventually transferred the oriental trade-route from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, and the disastrous effects of the League of Cambrai (1510), gradually undermined Venetian commercial supremacy. Venetian trade to England slowly dwindled; in 1532 the last 'Flanders Galley' put into Southampton; and in 1587 the last Venetian argosy was cast away on the shingles at the Needles. The Levant trade thus became open to competitors at the very time when England was starting on her commercial career.

In common with all the commercial developments of

the British Empire, the Levant trade began, in a purely fortuitous fashion, with the enterprise of private individuals, whose efforts were eventually supported by the Government and finally consolidated into a trading company. The industrious Hakluyt has preserved records of these early voyages, which show us English merchants trading to Sicily, Crete, Chios, Cyprus, Beirout and Tripoli in Syria, between the years 1511 and 1553. There was an English consul at Chios; there were English factories in Crete. The Levant voyage took, on an average, from ten to eleven months out and back. A typical ship was the 'Mathew Gonson' of London, of three hundred tons burthen, with a crew of one hundred hands, including six gunners and four trumpeters. In 1531 we find a London merchant, John Gresham, trading goods to the value of 12,000 ducats; as the silver ducat was worth five shillings and the purchasing power of money at least ten times what it is to-day, this meant a venture of about 30,000*l*. Sometimes the agents of English merchants would take passage in a foreign ship, Portuguese or Italian; and in 1553 John Locke relates how the Venetian ship in which he was travelling was hove-to in rough weather to save the Captain's cat which had gone overboard, for, says he, 'the Italians esteem their cats as in England we esteem a good spaniel.'

In that same year Anthony Jenkinson made the first English attempt to trade with the Turk. Jenkinson was in Aleppo when Suleiman the Magnificent made his entry; and from that enlightened Sovereign he obtained a safe-conduct and leave to trade everywhere in the dominions of the Great Turk, on the same conditions and with the same privileges as those conceded to the French and the Venetians; the importance of this formula will become apparent presently. In 1566 Chios, which had hitherto been in the hands of the Genoese, became Turkish; and the comment of English traders on this event demonstrates the friendly relations which then existed between them and the Turk.

It would seem, however, on the testimony of Hakluyt, that, after the year 1550, the whole Mediterranean trade of England had been slowly declining until, in the year 1575, the enterprise of two English merchants revived and launched it on a fresh and far more vigorous career.

In that year Sir Edward Osborne, ancestor of the Dukes of Leeds, and Mr Richard Staper resolved to attempt the 'renewing and increasing of an ancient and commodious trade into diverse places in the Levant Seas.' To that end they despatched two agents, John Wight and Joseph Clements, by way of Poland to Constantinople, where Joseph remained eighteen months, to procure a safe-conduct from the Grand Seigneur for Mr William Harborne, then factor for Sir Edward Osborne, 'to have free access into his Highness' dominions.' The presence of these English agents escaped the eagle eye of the Venetian ambassador, who would certainly have done all he could to upset their projects, in defence of Venetian trade in those parts. We do not know how or with whom the English agents negotiated, but they were successful, and Clements returned to London with a safe-conduct for Harborne. In July 1578 that gentleman, accompanied by Clements, left London overland, as Walsingham feared that the Venetians might find out what was going forward. He travelled by way of Hamburg to Poland, where he and his party donned Turkish dress and attached themselves to the caravan of the Turkish ambassador, in whose suite they reached Constantinople on Oct. 28. We have no report of Harborne's negotiations, but, by March 1579, he had obtained a letter from Sultan Murad III addressed to that 'cloud of most pleasant raine, and sweetest fountaine of noblenesse and vertue,' Elizabeth, 'ladie and heire of the perpetual happinesse and glory of the noble Realme of Englande,' in which the Sultan states that he has granted to Harborne and two others the right to trade freely in his dominions on the same footing as the French and Venetians. In return he asks for a like privilege for his subjects; the probability of such traffic is revealed by the phrase 'whether they come by sea with their ships, or by land with their waggons and horses.'

The question of the Levant trade was already occupying the attention of Burghley; and the Sultan's letter was no doubt submitted by Osborne and Staper to the Lord High Treasurer, who, in pursuit of his commercial policy, was ready to help all such enterprises. In October 1579, the Queen's answer to the Sultan's letter was drafted. In it the 'invictissima et potentissima

defensatrix' of the Christian faith against all 'idolaters,' requests that the privilege granted to Harborne, Osborne and Staper 'may not be so narrowly restrained to two or three men only, but may be enlarged to all our subjects in general.' The Queen further begs for the liberation of some of her subjects, slaves in Turkish galleys. This letter was entrusted to Master Richard Stanley and conveyed by him to Constantinople in the 'Prudence' of London.

Hitherto there had been only two foreign flags recognised or admitted in Turkish ports—the Venetian and the French. The French was the covering flag for all foreigners trading in Turkey; and foreign merchants received their passports through the French Embassy. The Venetians sailed under their own flag, and were directly under the protection of the Venetian ambassador at the Porte. France was extremely jealous of her prestige as protector of all Europeans, except Venetians, in the East—a position secured by treaty between Francis I and Suleiman. The appearance of an English agent seeking to establish commercial relations with Turkey seemed to the French ambassador, M. de Germigny, to threaten his master's honour; while the avowed object of the Englishman was an overt challenge to Venetian interests. We shall find that, from the outset, the French and Venetian ambassadors combined to thwart the representatives of England.

Harborne set to work at once to secure a proper opening for English trade by the recognised method of 'capitulations' conferring definite privileges, such as already existed in the case of Venice and of France. But a firman granting capitulations could only be secured through strong interest at Court. The English agent soon found that the pashas of the Divan and the high functionaries of the Court, through whom alone he could hope to reach the Sultan, were divided by greed, ambition, jealousy; if he secured the help of one party he roused the antagonism of the other. Harborne elected to work towards his end through the Grand Vizir, Sokolli Pasha, and the all-powerful tutor to the Sultan, Seadeddin, the historian and soldier. This combination made an enemy of the terrible Uludschali—'Occhiali,' as the Italians called him—the High Admiral or Capudan Pasha.

The Venetian, French and English diplomatists freely employed the usual methods of bribes, in addition to the various political and commercial arguments which they were able to marshal in their support. On Harborne's arrival de Germigny suspected that the question of the flag would be raised by the newcomer. He remonstrated with the English agent, pointing out that hitherto the French flag had proved sufficient cover for English traders. Harborne declared that his mission, and the letters he brought, were concerned with the liberation of English slaves. De Germigny offered to present the letters and support the appeal. Harborne replied that he would take time to consider that offer. He went straight to the Grand Vizir and succeeded in extracting a promise that capitulations should be granted to England. When de Germigny heard this, he set in motion the Capudan Pasha, the Grand Vizir's rival, who was annoyed because Harborne had not sought his aid in the usual manner, and also because all captured slaves were his property, and Harborne was seeking the release of some. The French Ambassador urged that no valid assistance could be expected from a woman, especially when she was so far away, and without any fleet to speak of.

But Harborne was successful. Though de Germigny reported home in April that 'the Englishman will accomplish nothing,' by June he was forced to admit that there had been great progress. As a matter of fact, by the beginning of June, concessions, which virtually amounted to formal capitulations, had been arranged and signed by the Sultan. They were embodied in thirty-five clauses, drawn up by Sokolli, Grand Vizir, but signed by his successor Ahmed Pasha. In substance they conceded free trade to the English under their own flag. The capitulations were accompanied by a letter from the Sultan to the Queen. But, as so frequently happened at the Porte, the matter, though apparently settled, was suddenly upset by de Germigny, who succeeded in procuring the revocation of the sign manual, and also obtained a letter addressed to his master, Henri III, promising that only on French intercession would the Sultan enter into an alliance with England. Harborne, however, by this time was on his way home with his

capitulations and the letter. That he had the capitulations with him is proved by the fact that a copy exists among the Foreign Office Papers at the Record Office. After consultation with the Levant Merchants and with Burghley, he returned once more to Constantinople with letters from the Queen, in which she speaks of the capitulations as a *fait accompli*. Harborne found, however, that such was not the case. The firman had been recalled, and the whole question was still open. He set out for England once more, *re infecta* so far as a treaty of commerce and capitulations for the Levant Company were concerned.

Meanwhile the promoters of the Levant trade, Osborne, Staper and other London merchants, had obtained from Elizabeth letters patent dated Sept. 11, 1581, erecting the Levant Company. The Company was a chartered 'regulated' Company, as distinguished from a chartered 'Joint Stock' Company; that is to say, it was an unlimited-liability concern, which admitted apprentices, and each member of which traded in his own bottoms. The membership was limited to twelve; the new members were elected by the original founders; the Crown had the right to name two members; the duration of the patent was seven years, but the Crown reserved the power to revoke; the privilege granted was a monopoly of trade with Turkey; the penalty for infringement, confiscation of ships and goods, half to the Crown, half to the Company; the Company guarantee not less than 500*l.* of dues per annum to the Customs. Osborne was the first Governor. The arms of the Company were the arms of England with a red cross over the same.

There was, however, another branch of English Mediterranean trade which had sprung up in much the same fortuitous way as the Levant venture—the trade in currants and sweet wines from the dominions of the Venetian Republic. In 1575, Elizabeth, at the request of the Earl of Leicester, had granted to one Acerbo Velutelli, a Florentine merchant, with whom she had already had monetary dealings, a patent of monopoly for the import of currants. On the strength of this monopoly Velutelli levied, under the title of licence-money, a charge of 5*s.* 6*d.* on every hundredweight of currants imported. So long as the currant trade was chiefly in the hands of Venetians

and the impost fell on them, no complaint was raised, though of course the tax was borne by the consumer. But, when the embargo on English ships in Spain forced English merchants to seek new outlets for their tonnage, and directed their attention to the currant trade, they complained that Velutelli's licence-money put them at a disadvantage with the Venetian merchants, because they had to pay Venetian export dues, in addition to the English import charges. Their petition for relief succeeded. Velutelli was ordered to levy this licence-money on foreigners only. Thereupon the Venetian merchants induced their Government to raise the tariff both on exports and imports. Negotiations between the two Governments proved abortive; and in 1582 or '83 Velutelli's patent was revoked, and a monopoly for the import of currants, sweet wines and oil was granted to Edward Cordell, Edward Homborn, Paul Bayning and others for six years. The patent was to hold only so long as Venice maintained her hostile tariff. This was the origin of the Venetian Company, which was later amalgamated with the Levant Company.

The Levant Company's original charter expired in 1588. The merchants appear to have been rather disappointed with the progress of their venture; and, in spite of Harborne's encouragement, they did not apply for a renewal. The charter of the Venetian Company ran out in 1589; and there seems to have been some clash of interests which induced both Companies to desire amalgamation. The Venetian Company was hampered by oppressive imposts at Venice; the Levant Company by heavy charges for the maintenance of the ambassador at the Porte. Moreover, there was a dispute as to the spheres of the two Companies. Sweet wines formed a large part of their commerce; and both claimed to trade with Crete, the chief home of sweet wines—the Venetian Company because that island belonged to the Signory of Venice, the Levant Company because it lay in the Archipelago.

Both Companies, therefore, resolved to petition for fusion. The Turkey merchants supported their plea on the ground that the ambassador maintained by them had rendered most valuable service to the Crown of England not only commercially but also politically by

thwarting the efforts of the King of Spain to conclude a truce and then a peace with the Sultan, which would have set free large forces for service in the West. The plea was fully justified, as the history of English ambassadors at the Porte will presently disclose. This attempt to erect a monopoly of all Mediterranean commerce in favour of a few traders roused the opposition of some 'outside' London merchants, who claimed admittance. The Companies resisted, and urged that it was quite possible to kill a trade by 'overcharging' it with too many participants. Burghley took the opinion of Sir John Hawkins and William Brough, both navy men, who naturally favoured the enlargement of the Company, in order, as they argued, to increase the number of ships available for attack and defence.

The new Charter was accordingly issued in January 1592. Its duration was to be twelve years; and it was renewed, for fifteen years, in 1601. Elizabeth's death (1603) voided this Charter; and the Levant trade fell into a state of chaos, aggravated by the creation of the East India Company in 1600. Finally, a new, and this time a perpetual Charter was issued in December 1605. The chief characteristic of this Charter was that it broke up the narrow monopoly of a comparatively few merchants; and 119 names were enumerated as forming the nucleus of the new Company. Moreover, that number could be increased by the admission of any English subject who was a merchant and over twenty-six years of age, on payment of 25*l.* as entrance fee, which a few months later was raised to 50*l.* The new Company still continued to meet the charges for the ambassador and the present to the Porte. The Company guaranteed 4000*l.* a year to the Crown. With the grant of the perpetual Charter of 1605 the Levant Company was launched on its long history, which closed only in 1828; and we must now turn back to follow the history of the English ambassadors at the Porte down to the year 1603, which concludes the first period in the history of English sea-power in the Mediterranean.

Even before the creation of the Levant Company by the charter of 1581, the Crown had granted credentials to Harborne as ambassador, and had addressed to the

Sultan, to the Grand Vizir, and to the Capudan, letters commendatory. With these and with the present, Harborne embarked in the 'Susan,' a ship of three hundred tons, seventy hands and thirty-four guns, in November 1582. He was delayed by stress of weather and did not leave England till January of the following year. After considerable trouble at Majorca, where he suspected the Spanish of a design to seize the ship, and after touching at Palermo, where Harborne seduced the Venetian consul, Merzè, to leave the service of the Republic and enter his at an annual salary of 126*l.* 7*s.* and four suits of clothes, he reached Constantinople in March 1583. The Venetian ambassador, Morosini, reports his arrival. We must bear in mind that the attitude of the Republic was hostile to English commercial enterprise, and further that Morosini was indignant at the defection of the Venetian consul at Palermo. The 'Susan' arrived at the Seven Towers, but was delayed there some days owing to the French ambassador's hostile representations to the Capudan who commanded the port. The Grand Vizir, however, overrode this opposition, and

'on Good Friday the ship was towed in, about the hour when all good Christians were celebrating the Divine Office. Suddenly, when the "Susan" was off Seraglio Point, a great noise of artillery was heard, with a continual music of trumpets and drums, and other signs of rejoicing, to the great grief and pain of the faithful. When the Ambassador landed, not a Christian went to escort him to his house, nor raised his hat when he passed. Even the Turks call him a Lutheran. That same evening the Ambassador gave a banquet on board, with fireworks, salvoes of artillery, music and a great uproar. But they nearly paid the penalty of their sins, for a rocket fell back into the ship close to the powder magazine and set it ablaze.'

Harborne was lodged in a house called Rapamat, on the slope of the hills of Pera, where the other Embassies were and are. He made his offering to the Grand Vizir and other pashas in order of precedence, and on May 3 was received in audience by the Sultan. To him he delivered the Queen's present—a clock set with gems and pearls, ten pairs of jack-boots, two lap-dogs, twelve lengths of Royal cloth, two lengths of bleached linen

and thirteen pieces of silver-gilt—produced his credentials and kissed hands; he then attended the banquet in Divan, and thus formally took his place among the diplomatic agents accredited to the Porte.

His position, like that of the Venetian ambassador, was a double one; he was paid by the Levant Company to act as their commercial agent and consul-general, and he was accredited, but not salaried, by the Crown as English ambassador. His financial position was often trying. The Queen was extremely parsimonious, while the Company was at times in difficulties and remiss in payment. We know that the French ambassador received a salary of 10,000 ducats, and two per cent. on all French goods brought into Turkey; the Venetian 8000 ducats of gold, and the *cottimo*, or one per cent. on all Venetian goods entering Turkey; the Imperial ambassador had 16,000 dollars a year. 'I am allowed 3000 ducats,' wails Barton, Harborne's successor, 'and yet as much required at my hands as at theirs.' 'I had not in all my household sixpence of money to pass the water,' Barton says again, 'so miserably am I treated by the Company as not to have had a penny allowance from them this twelvemonth.'

The ambassador's diplomatic duty was, if possible, to win the sympathy of the Turk for the English, and for the Protestant group of European nations; also to prevent the conclusion of a truce, or a peace, with Spain which would relieve that country from the standing menace of a Turkish attack on its Italian possessions, and would thereby allow Philip to concentrate his whole forces on the western conflict. In discharging this mission, the ambassador was aided by the fact that he could always point to Elizabeth and, later, to Henri IV (until he reverted) as the champions of Protestantism and the natural enemies of Spain and the Pope; further, he could urge that by favouring England, the Turk would help to keep Spain busy, and would thus secure a free hand in the prosecution of the Persian war, which was a standing menace to his oriental frontier. Consequently the question of creed assumed a diplomatic importance which explains the frequent allusion to Elizabeth as the bulwark against 'idolaters,' and the resentment of the French ambassador when his

master Henri III was described as one. Furthermore, Philip was hampered in his negotiations for a truce with the Turk by his piety and his pride. He could not bring himself to make the first advances; and, instead of sending a fully-accredited ambassador to the Porte, he chose to work through mere agents, whose efforts Harborne and Barton and Lello easily rendered abortive. Nor, as his Catholic Majesty, could he well seek truce or peace with the head of Islam; the mere rumour that he had concluded a truce in 1581 brought a message from Pope Gregory XIII, to the effect that, as the King of Spain had come to terms with the infidels, the Pope could no longer sanction the tax on the clergy and on ecclesiastical property, and that in expiation for such an offence, Philip must turn all his attention to crushing heretic England.

On the commercial side, the ambassador appointed consuls, and was expected to foster English trade in the Levant, securing concessions, protecting merchants, administering justice between co-nationals and redeeming slaves. As a matter of fact, the English Levant trade was not very flourishing during the earlier life of the Company; and, though some business was carried on in the Archipelago and in Syria, comparatively few ships visited Constantinople itself. The Venetian ambassador, in opposing the establishment of an English embassy in Constantinople, pointed out to the Grand Vizir that in one whole year only one English ship, and that a small one, had reached the Golden Horn; 'moreover,' he added, 'she carried more guns than goods, which fully proves her real intent to go pirating on her home journey.' The English, he said, would not get return cargoes, for they were well supplied with wool and leather, Turkey's chief exports; the presence of the ambassador was, therefore, useless, and merely jeopardised the Franco-Turkish alliance. Morosini was, of course, acting on instructions from home and urging a hostile suit; but he was not altogether wrong in his estimate of English trade at that date. The truth is that the English were beginning at the wrong end; their sea-power in the Mediterranean could not develope from the eastern half. The midland sea is, comparatively, a narrow sea; and the trade-route through it was exposed

to hostile attacks all the way to the Levant. It was essential that the development should begin in the West and spread eastward by a series of stations where the fleets could shelter and refit; the same necessity had governed Venetian development, when, after the Fourth Crusade, she was forced to approach the East by the stations of Corfu, Coron (in Messenia), Candia and the Islands. As a matter of fact the historical development of English sea-power in the Mediterranean has moved from West to East by Tangiers, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and Egypt, and is still obeying that trend.

The presence of the English ambassador and his diplomatic and commercial activities at once ranged against him the representatives of France and Venice. Every device was adopted by Morosini and de Germigny to damage the social and diplomatic position of Harborne. The fact that he was the Company's agent, as well as the Queen's representative, gave the Frenchman the pretext to declare that he was no ambassador, merely a merchant; and, thus prompted, the terrible Uludschali publicly insulted Harborne by saying, 'Just look at this fellow who wants to stand on an equality with France and Venice.' As heretics, the English were represented by the Catholic ambassadors as pariahs, outside the pale of European nations; and again Uludschali remarked, 'They're a bad lot, these Lutherans.'

The upshot of the whole matter, however, was a success for Harborne. The capitulations, implying the covering flag for English traders, were confirmed; and the Grand Vizir told de Germigny that it was useless for him to endeavour to upset the English ambassador; while the Sultan himself declared that he 'would never expel the foes of his foes,' the Pope and Spain.

In August 1584 de Germigny was recalled because of his failure over the covering flag and the English capitulations; and Jacques Savary de Lanscome was appointed his successor. But before leaving, de Germigny was able to deliver a parting shot at his rival, by inducing the new Grand Vizir to declare that he would undo the work of his predecessor and reopen the whole question of the English capitulations. Morosini, too, was recalled at the expiry of his ordinary three years' service, and was succeeded by Lorenzo Bernardo. Harborne remained

to face his new opponents and to consolidate, if possible, his initial successes.

Harborne's position was, indeed, far from secure. English trade at Constantinople languished; the opportunity to upset the Levant Company's business seemed favourable, had the new French ambassador been a man of diplomatic ability. But de Lanscome was not that; French historians note that his embassy was most disastrous for French interests in the near East. He arrived at Constantinople on March 29, 1586, and, in the very act of his official entry, succeeded in putting himself wrong with the Turks. When approaching the city, surrounded by a brilliant group of State officials, he was asked what he thought of it; he replied that it struck him as so magnificent that the Lord of it must be Lord of the whole world, and added that much of the Sultan's grandeur was doubtless due to his alliance with the King of France, who was now ready to place at his disposal 60,000 harquebusiers. The pashas burst out laughing and said, 'The Sultan is accustomed to lend, not to receive aid'; and with that they spurred on their horses and left him. Clearly de Lanscome did not understand the Porte, and was not the man to oust Harborne, who lost no opportunity of ingratiating himself with the leading pashas. His position improved. He was able to do much for English slaves in Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis, and even secured favourable orders from the Sultan on the subject, though his activities in that direction brought him into violent conflict, and even to blows, with the Capudan. But Bernardo reported that it was clear the Turks were pleased with the English *entente*, as a counterpoise to Spain while they were engaged in the Persian war. The preparations for the Armada were known to the Turks, but its destination was still doubtful; it might be aimed against Islam; and in that case English help would be of the greatest service. That was the trump-card Harborne was always able to play in the diplomatic game.

There is testimony, moreover, from an unexpected quarter as to the growing prestige of England's sea-power, even before the defeat of the Armada established it beyond doubt. In conversation with the Venetian ambassador at Rome, the Pope said that he had news

that the Armada was ready; 'but so too are the English,' continued his Holiness.

'Elizabeth is certainly a great Queen, and were she only a Catholic, she would be our dearly-beloved. Just look how well she governs; she is only a woman and only mistress of half an island, and yet she makes herself feared by Spain, France and the Empire.'

In this satisfactory position Harborne left the Embassy. He set out on his homeward journey early in August 1588, and was succeeded by Edward Barton, who had already been employed on English business at Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. At the time of Harborne's departure Barton must have been in Constantinople, or near it, for his first despatch is dated Aug. 15, 1588. Barton's task was less difficult than his predecessor's. He had not to create, but inherited a position at the Porte. During the course of his Embassy his hands were strengthened, diplomatically, by the defeat of the Armada and the enhanced prestige of his country, as well as by the succession of the Huguenot, Henri IV, to the French throne; while, commercially, the 'vent was now open and thoroughly cleared,' to use Faunt's phrase, though as yet there was no great traffic passing through it. In the process of consolidating the position of English ambassador at the Porte, Barton was opposed, of course, by de Lanscome, whom he finally routed. He was also concerned to thwart the renewed efforts of Spanish agents, the two Marigliani and Ferrari, to secure a truce; and in this, too, he was successful. He could point to the disastrous results of earlier truces, which had allowed Spain to seize Portugal undisturbed, and, if renewed, would enable Philip to attack, and possibly crush, France. The death of Henri III, and the recognition by the Huguenots of Henry of Navarre as King, had seriously shaken de Lanscome's tottering position. Barton could now urge that he no longer spoke for France, but only for the Guises and the League; that Henri IV was, to all intents and purposes, King of France, and, being a Protestant, was the natural ally of Elizabeth, the enemy of Spain, and therefore of necessity the friend of the Turk. So vigorously did Barton press the point that in August 1590 de Lanscome was told by the Grand Vizir

that 'Neither your King nor mine desires you to be ambassador any longer.' As a matter of fact, Henri IV was sending de Lanscome's nephew, François Savary de Brèves, to represent him at the Porte, with the intention of ousting de Lanscome, who clung to his post in spite of the Grand Vizir. Barton and de Brèves put their heads together for his final undoing; and this is how they accomplished it.

There was at Constantinople a certain renegade Englishman, Anthony Lane, passing as a Frenchman under the title of the Baron de la Saye. This adventurer had been to Rome, and, on representing that he could procure the return of renegades to the fold, he secured letters of commendation from the Pope through the Cardinal Santa Severina, who managed oriental affairs for the Vatican. With these letters he went to Venice, where he showed them to the French ambassador, M. de Maisse, who sent him on to Constantinople with instructions to place himself at Barton's orders. Barton thus relates his own proceedings:

'You may perceive there is nothing meant in all this practice for the furtherance of Christianity, so that the papers would have come to no good use; which I well pondering, and taking occasion to do some good service against those who wish Her Majesty's country and friends ill, I counterfeited a letter in Italian from Cardinal Sancta Severina, who has charge of all the affairs of the Levant for the Pope, having one of his seals with me, and directed the same to Lancosmo [Lanscome], by which I recommended the Pope's letters to him as if indeed they had been sent to him from the Pope, and I made Anthony Lane to affirm that he had a commission to deliver the same to Lancosmo; which device was not only the cause of his future troubles but also matter against the Spanish ambassador; by which I hope I have done no harm but rather, in my opinion, good service to Her Majesty and to the furtherance of the Christian Religion.'

The upshot of the affair was that the incriminating letter was seized by the Turks and de Lanscome consigned to the Tower of the Black Sea, 'where,' says Bernardo, 'he does not lose heart, but has taken to writing as the only relief for his restless spirit.' Meanwhile letters arrived from Henri IV, informing the Sultan that he intended to appoint de Brèves as his

ambassador and begging that de Lanscome might be handed over to Barton and de Brèves for deportation. The ambassador, about the beginning of 1593, was suddenly taken from the Tower of the Black Sea and delivered to Barton and de Brèves. By them he was placed on board a ship bound for Marseilles, whose master had orders to consign him to the Governor of Toulon. The ship was hurried out of Constantinople, but lay for months off the Island of Marmora, whence de Lanscome eventually made his way to Italy and Rome.

The apparent union of the French and English ambassadors seemed to present a powerful combination. But there were causes at work, some of which tended to weaken Barton's position, while others brought him into conflict with his French colleague. English trade remained intermittent, and the Company were behindhand with the payment of the ambassador's salary, while the Queen showed herself tardy in sending credentials and the present. The interests of France and England, moreover, began to assume opposing complexions. In addition to friction over the coral fisheries on the Barbary coast, war-clouds were gathering to the north of Turkey. The tribute due from the Empire was in arrears. The dragoman of the Imperial ambassador had been arrested, and the embassy archives seized. It was in the interests of Henri IV to encourage a Turkish attack on the Empire. He was candidate for election as King of the Romans; and his influence at the Porte might count as a make-weight in his favour. 'The League made me King,' he said; 'who knows but that the Turk may make me Emperor?' Elizabeth, on the contrary, had no desire to see the Turkish forces directed towards Central Europe. Her whole object was to induce the Sultan to threaten, if not to attack, Spain or the Spanish dominions in Italy.

The conversion of Henri also produced a further cleavage between France and England, which was reflected on the Bosphorus. Barton urged that Henri's return to the Roman fold left his mistress the only bulwark of the Protestant creed, which he represented as a kind of Islam, and therefore the sole European ally of the Turk. The delicate question of the covering flag and the complete emancipation of English traders

from French protection was still unsettled, and tended to become more acute. Harborne had already secured the right of the English to fly their own flag; but Barton made a further claim, that the Flemings, whom Elizabeth had taken under her protection, should come under the 'consulage' of the English ambassador at Constantinople. This was an attack, not merely on French prestige at the Porte, but also on the emoluments of the French ambassador, whose salary was augmented by a five per cent. *ad valorem* duty on all goods introduced into the Turkish Empire under his consulage.

These various causes contributed to bring about strained relations between Barton and de Brèves. Times were ticklish for the representatives of foreign Powers at the Porte. War had been declared by Turkey against the Empire. The Imperial nuncio, von Krekwitz, had been arrested, loaded with chains, and brought into the Turkish camp outside Constantinople. The Christian Powers were naturally suspected of sympathy with their co-religionists; and their ambassadors were in danger. All usual channels of access to the Sultan were closed, but Barton hired a boat, and, with the help of a negro eunuch in the Seraglio, succeeded in presenting a petition to the Sultan himself, as he was sitting in his Kiosk by the water-side—'a thing which no one remembers to have happened before to a diplomatic agent,' says the Venetian. The Sultan's answer was favourable; nevertheless Barton was arrested by the Grand Vizir. Luckily, at this juncture, the ship bringing the Queen's present sailed into the harbour; and Barton was able to smooth the whole matter over satisfactorily.

In obedience to his instructions to secure, if possible peace between the Sultan and the Emperor, Barton joined the Turkish army and was present at the battle of Erlau. He was subsequently accused of having borne arms against Christians, but that was not the case. Soon after his return to Constantinople, Barton died and was buried on one of the Prinkipo Islands. Henry Lello, who had been acting as consular agent, was immediately appointed to fill his place.

The Sultan Murad III had died in 1594, before the outbreak of war with the Emperor; and, during Barton's lifetime, the customary present to the new Sultan had

not reached Constantinople regularly. Without it there was no hope of getting the capitulations confirmed. The Levant Company in London frequently urged upon Cecil the necessity of sending the present, but the Queen was slow to move where it was a question of spending money. Lello had to wait for credentials and the present before he could ask for an audience, establish his position as ambassador and demand the renewal of the capitulations.

In August 1599 the 'Hector' reached the Dardanelles with both essentials. She also brought a cargo of woollen cloth, as the Levant Company desired to open a trade in such goods. The Venetian ambassador reports that English cloth is very popular with the Turk, 'on account of its excellence and appearance,' and adds that the English will open factories throughout the entire Turkish Empire. The 'Hector' lay some days at Prinkipo, to clean up and dress; and then, on Sept. 10, she sailed in and dropped anchor off the Sultan's Kiosk. The chief gardener, the Bostangi Pasha, induced the Sultan to come down to his summer-house to see the arrival; and Lello reports that 'the sound of our English trumpets gave him so much pleasure as those about him say they have never seen him so delighted in any Christian Prince's strength and defence.' The present included a coach for the Sultana, plate for the Sultan, webs of English cloth, and, above all, Master Thomas Dallam's famous organ, 'very cunningly designed, which serves as a clock and can play several airs by itself.' Lello thinks the instrument 'will give the Grand Seigneur great content if any of his people can maintain the use thereof.'

Lello kissed hands on Oct. 4; and Dallam, who had come out with his organ-clock to show the Turks how to work it, attended him, dressed in 'a fair cloak of strange green silk.' The whole ceremony, as described in Lello's despatch, gives a vivid picture of the state maintained by the Levant Company's agent and Queen's ambassador. He went to audience attended by twelve gentlemen on horseback, vested in cloth of gold and silver, a gentleman usher, two pages in white damask, twenty men in livery gowns, twelve merchants, discreetly apparelled merchant-like in black, and himself attired as richly as he might. Arrived at the open

courtyard of the palace, in presence of the Grand Seigneur, his Pashas and Councillors, Lello declared Her Majesty's pleasure, salutations and requests, and touched on the peace between France and Spain, 'which they all seemed to dislike.' After a brief interval the banquet was announced. When it was over, the Sultan sent to summon Lello to his presence, but first he and his suite were clothed with vestments out of the Treasury; there were hardly enough to go round. In company with the Vizirs, Lello entered the presence, where he found the Sultan seated on a cushion of red satin, richly embroidered with pearls, and all the chamber draped with red satin, embroidered with gold. Lello again repeated the object of his mission; and the Sultan graciously answered that he would receive satisfaction of all he desired.

But, though Lello expressed himself as satisfied with the result of his audience, he soon found that the attempt to renew the capitulations raised once more the questions of the covering flag and the 'consulage of foreigners,' and brought him into direct collision with de Brèves. By the earliest capitulations the freedom of the flag had undoubtedly been conceded, and with it the consulage of the English. But the growing trade of the Flemings, and the fact that Elizabeth had assumed their protection, made it seem desirable that they should be brought under English consulage in the Turkish Empire. Lello, moreover, was seeking to expand the original capitulations by a clause which provided that all future concessions should be incorporated in the capitulations. De Brèves offered a stubborn resistance to the English consulage of Flemings, and endeavoured to wreck Lello's position. He fastened on the reported use of the word 'idolater,' when the English ambassador was discussing Henri IV's conversion; and he refused Lello's invitation to meet the Venetian ambassador at an entertainment given on board the 'Hector.' By the use of bribes he won over the Grand Vizir; and, in spite of the Sultan's promises, Lello's mission was in danger of shipwreck.

But de Brèves' power was on the wane. The conversion of his master irretrievably weakened his position. He himself asked leave to retire. In September 1600 Lello announces the speedy arrival of a new ambassador; 'God grant he may be of a Christian-like mind, for it is

expected that the present one (de Brèves) will surely turn Turk, being already married according to Turkish law,' or, in the picturesque language of the day, 'will capitulate his soul to the devil by becoming an accursed Mohametan.' Lello had from the first enjoyed the support of Cicala Sinan, Capudan Pasha, throughout the whole dispute with de Brèves over the consulage of Flemings; and, when the question came up for final consideration in Divan, Sinan expressed the opinion that the English were better friends to the Porte than any other Power. He carried the Divan with him; and the Grand Vizir reported the issue to the Sultan and explained the conflict between the French and English capitulations. The Sultan finally ordered that the Flemings, not being specially mentioned in the French treaty, should now sail under the flag and the consulage of England. On May 23, 1601, Lello reported his victory to Salisbury.

To have secured the covering flag and the consulage of English and Flemish traders was a diplomatic triumph for the three English ambassadors, Harborne, Barton and Lello. It is doubtful, however, whether the Levant Company was in a position to reap the benefit. In London the Company was in a state of transition between the period of temporary charters and its final consolidation under a perpetual charter in 1605. The Company, moreover, was remiss in supporting the embassy financially, and the Queen would not hear of any expenditure; the chief monetary support of the ambassadors was derived from the dues paid by the English shipping entering or clearing Turkish ports. There were serious thoughts of abandoning the Levant trade; only Staper, Harborne and a few others counselled perseverance. Moreover, the East India Company had been created in 1600; and it seemed that the interests of the two ventures must clash over the trade-route through the Mediterranean.

The question was further complicated by the rapid growth of piracy in the Mediterranean. The defeat of the Armada and peace with Spain had deprived a number of bold spirits—'the sea-sharkers,' as they were called—of their main legitimate source of livelihood and diversion in harrying Spanish shipping. These men, bitten with the buccaneering spirit of the Drake period, refused

to return home, and took to piracy in the Mediterranean, where they were supported by the Turkish Beys of Algiers and Tunis. They preyed on French, Venetian, and even occasionally on English shipping, ran their prizes into Turkish ports, and disposed of them there. The English got a bad name in the Levant—'good sailors and better pirates' was the general comment—and the Venetian ambassador confirms the same in more cautious language. 'The English,' he says, 'are wont to navigate with great security because, apart from their seamanship, they fit out their vessels excellently, and never let themselves be tempted to take such cargo as would hamper the handling of the ships or hinder them from fighting if occasion offered'; and, though this praise doubtless applied to the merchant service, these same merchantmen were strongly suspected of a readiness to snap up booty where they could; they were accused of carrying more 'murtherers' than goods. It is certain that the Crown, in the reigns of Elizabeth and James, set its face against piracy. Burghley had pointed out that all such enterprises were intolerable to the genuine merchant; and Lello promised the Venetian ambassador at the Porte that the Queen would hang the pirates when she caught them, and, if no other way could be found to stop the mischief, would revoke the Levant Company's Charter rather than allow these scoundrels, under shelter of it, to molest the Republic. The question of piracy, in fact, led to the reopening of diplomatic relations between England and Venice. Scaramelli was sent as envoy to lay the matter before the Queen; from her and her council he received abundant promises, though Elizabeth made the characteristic remark, 'I would not be discourteous to the Republic, though in the question of privateers I would have you know that this kingdom is not so scant of men but what there may be found a rogue or two among them.' But the whole question of piracy belongs to the second phase in the growth of English sea-power in the Mediterranean.

HORATIO F. BROWN.

Art. 2.—THE ETHICS OF PRUSSIAN STATECRAFT.

1. *La Morale Politique du Grand Frédéric d'après sa Correspondance.* By Commandant M. H. Weil. Paris: Plon, 1917.
2. *La Guerre de Sept Ans. Histoire diplomatique et militaire.* By Richard Waddington. Tome V. Paris: Firmin Didot, [1917].
3. *Les Dessous du Congrès de Vienne, d'après les documents originaux des archives du Ministère Impérial et Royal de l'Intérieur à Vienne.* By Commandant M. H. Weil. Paris: Payot, 1917.

'NOT every one can pursue the same policy,' said Frederick the Great to the Emperor Joseph II; 'that which does for me would not do for you; I have sometimes ventured on a political lie.' 'What's that?' asked the Emperor, laughing. 'It is,' replied the king, also laughing heartily, 'the invention of a piece of news which I knew would be discovered to be false within twenty-four hours, a matter of no consequence, since before then it had produced its effect.'

The Prince de Ligne, who recorded this conversation, was by universal consent the most perfect type of the great gentleman of the 18th century, famous alike for his wit and for a charm and courtesy of address which was no mere surface polish, but a genuine expression of character. It is, then, the more significant that he discovered in Frederick's attitude nothing that was not admirable. As a faithful servant of the House of Habsburg, indeed, he deplored that 'the preponderance of the Empire and the closeness of Bohemia to Silesia' interfered later with the sentiment which the great king had conceived for the young Emperor during this first interview; but there is a note of admiration in his epigrammatic account of Frederick's subsequent behaviour to him. 'You will remember, Sire,' he concluded his letter to the king of Poland, 'their correspondence on the subject of Bavaria, their compliments, the explanations of their intentions, explanations always given with politeness; and how from one politeness to another the king advanced into Bohemia.'*

* 'Correspondance du Prince de Ligne.' Ed. 1859, p. 57.

In his admiration for the politic qualities of Frederick the Prince de Ligne expressed the general sentiment of his age, an age—as Carlyle chose to describe it—'of seething diplomacies and monstrous-wigged mendacities.' The age admired him, not for any originality in the cynicism of his pose, but because he was the most perfect exponent of its own philosophy, which represented a reaction from the bloodthirsty hypocrisies of the 17th century. It admired him, above all, for the same reason as that which led Carlyle to hold him up to admiration at a later day, namely because, accepting this 'Lapland-witch' world as he found it, he 'knew what he meant in it,' and, keeping his aim star-clear before him, earned the only title to its praise—success.

It is not to be supposed that there was anything essentially new in the moral standards of 18th-century politics, based as these were on the principle that in affairs of State 'interest ought to outweigh every other consideration, regardless of justice.'* This 'Reason of State,' according to the learned Bielfeld, was no more than the maxim *salus populi suprema lex*, which had been adopted by all peoples ancient and modern; and, if we confound the interests of peoples with those of princes, we may admit that it had been ruthlessly applied ever since, in the 15th century, the conception of the State had begun to take shape. It was in the Italy of the Renaissance, which invented both the conception and the name, that 'statecraft' was first systematised; and its rules and maxims had begun to affect the practice of all Europe even before the publication, in 1515, of Machiavelli's 'Prince.' Nor was the immense influence of this wonderful book due to anything novel in its principles or want of principles; for Machiavelli merely held up the mirror to the world in which he lived, a world in which Might was Right, and the *virtù* which was esteemed the most admirable of human qualities had nothing in common with virtue.

This was the view of the great jurist Albericus Gentilis, according to whom the merit of Machiavelli was that he told the naked truth about princes—for the

* Count Ludwig von Cobenzl, quoted in Sorel, 'L'Europe et la Révolution française,' i, p. 19.

instruction of the peoples.* Bacon, on the other hand, praised Machiavelli's method without any reference to his motives. It is only men of large experience in affairs, he says, who ought to discuss them, and 'it is for this reason that we give thanks to Machiavelli and writers of this kind, who openly and without dissimulation set out what men are wont to do, not what they ought to do.'† Wicquefort, whose treatise on the ambassador and his functions became a text-book of 18th-century diplomacy, says the same thing in almost the same words: 'Machiavelli nearly everywhere says what princes do, and not what they ought to do.'‡

The records of princes known to the generations of these writers certainly bear out the truth of this. The motto of Louis XI, 'qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare,' seemed in the 16th century to have become that of all sovereigns and their ministers. Before the 'Prince' was published, Thomas Cromwell had studied in Italy the politic arts which he devoted to the service of Henry VIII. Henry's Most Christian contemporary, Francis I, was no less ready than the new Defender of the Faith to subordinate religion to the Reason of State. As Voltaire put it, he 'burnt Lutherans in France and paid them in Germany'; and he used the Church patronage secured to him by the new Concordat with Rome to set up that vast system of diplomatic espionage and intrigue which, as the *Secret du Roi*, was to be developed by Louis XV with a passion that almost amounted to madness. Charles V was so completely Machiavellian that there were those who, regardless of dates, held that the author of the 'Prince' had taken him as his model. Catherine de Medici not only studied Machiavelli herself, but was believed to have prescribed the 'Prince' as the political text-book for the education of her sons, Charles IX and Henry III. Mary Queen of Scots, most fascinating of dissemblers, had learned in the same school. Queen Elizabeth, in diplomatic fence with James VI of Scotland, declared roundly that she could 'put to school your craftiest counsellor,' which was true even in that

* 'De legationibus libri tres.' Ed. 1585, Lib. iii, cap. ix, p. 110.
† 'De augmentis scientiarum.' Ed. Louvain, 1652, p. 503.
‡ 'L'ambassadeur et ses fonctions.' La Haye, 1680, i, p. 174.

age of crafty counsel. King James, in his turn, though he resented Sir Henry Wotton's famous pleasantry, piqued himself on a statecraft that was certainly not scrupulous, and he handed on the worst part of the Machiavellian tradition to his Stuart successors. In them it was reinforced by the contemporary influence of the Court of France, the political morals of which under the Bourbons were no improvement on those under the Valois. Cardinal Richelieu regarded the maxims of Machiavelli as 'indispensable,' and he certainly acted on them. Of his successor Mazarin, another churchman, it was said that as a statesman he had one fault—that he was *always* a rogue.* It was at his suggestion that Gabriel Naudé wrote his 'Considérations,'† of which Voltaire said that 'the maxims of the Parisian make those of the Florentine seem mild,' but which was none the less so highly thought of that an enlarged edition was published so late as 1752.

But, in the end, it was Louis XIV who, by the magnificence of his pose and the prestige of his conquests, gave a general vogue to the idea that the monarch, as the vicegerent of God, stands above the moral law. Henceforward every princeling in Europe applied to his own case the Grand Monarque's formula 'L'État c'est moi,' with all that this was held to involve. It involved, among other things, the confounding of personal ambition with the reason of State. Machiavelli had praised the instinct of acquisition as laudable in itself; the 17th century began to conceive aggrandisement as not only the right but the duty of princes, 'since the weaker are at the mercy of the stronger, and the only frontiers of a State are those necessary to its own conservation.'‡ The principle which was to swell into the 'Weltmacht oder Untergang' of the Pan-Germans was already articulate—the principle that a State when it

* Don Luis de Haro, quoted in the 'Anti-Machiavel,' ed. 1740, p. 119.

† 'Considérations sur les Coups d'Etat.' The original edition (Paris, 1639) consisted of only twelve copies. It was reprinted at Rome in 1714. The dedication was to Cardinal De Bagni, a papal diplomatist, whose servant and librarian Naudé was. Naudé advocates political assassination as a justifiable *coup d'état*, and he is 'not afraid' to praise the Massacre of St Bartholomew as a master-stroke.

‡ Céleste, 'Louis Machon, apologiste de Machiavel.' Quoted by Sorel, *op. cit.*, i, p. 20.

ceases to expand begins to perish. The old political conception of unity and ordered interdependence, never effectively realised, had disappeared in the dreadful anarchy of the Thirty Years' War; and it was only a thinker here and there who, like Leibnitz, still valued as an ideal the legal fiction of the Holy Roman Empire. The Continent of Europe had, like the Italy of the 15th century, broken up into warring political groups, whose only hope of stability depended upon the balance of power among them. The analogy was, indeed, recognised; and the champions of the rival faiths of Christendom modelled their conduct on the example of 'atheistical' Italy. As to the general scope of their policy, that already foreshadowed the 18th century. Frederick William, the great Elector of Brandenburg, enlarged piously in his 'Political Testament' on 'the true virtues of a righteous ruler'; but in a sort of codicil to this testament he pointed out that the House of Austria was tottering to its fall, set out his own claims to the Duchy of Silesia, and developed in great detail a plan for seizing it by force the moment the death of the Emperor should be announced.* Beneath the mask of the 17th-century piety we already recognise the features of 18th-century diplomacy—'naked aggression veiled by genealogical pedantry, the struggle for the balance of power, the assertion of the *raison d'état* as the plea for all crimes.'†

In the vocabulary of the 18th century, 'philosophy' took the place of 'religion,' 'reason' that of 'faith,' and 'virtue' that of 'righteousness.' But, so far as political morals were concerned, the effect was much the same. Diplomacy, adjusting its language to the new fashion, merely invented a fresh jargon to disguise a realism offensive to the new canons of good taste; its exquisite politeness was but the reflexion of the elaborate manners of a society in which the slightest affront meant a challenge; and in the universal game of deception, of which the rules were perfectly understood, nobody was really deceived. The social prestige of sovereigns was exactly proportioned to their power; and power was

* Ranke, 'Preussische Geschichte,' ed. 1878, i, ii, p. 518.

† Temperley, 'Frederick the Great and Kaiser Joseph. An episode of War and Diplomacy in the 18th century,' 1915.

calculated in terms of the taxable and conscribable 'souls' at their disposal. States were in fact estates, subject to all the rules of succession of private property; and sovereigns were great landlords (*Landesherren*, as the Germans still say), who strove to extend and round off their properties by judicious marriages, by exchanges, by buying reversions, and if need be by force.

The development of this unblushing *Realpolitik* had not taken place without protest. Machiavelli himself, after being patronised while alive by several Popes, was condemned when dead by another; and the 17th century, if it produced apologists, produced also indignant attacks upon him. The labours of diplomatists, moreover, had gradually evolved a mass of principles and precedents governing the intercourse of States, which jurists were busy building up into a system of public law; and amiable theorists, like the Abbé de St Pierre, saw in this the germ of a new Christian Republic which should realise at last the dream of perpetual peace. Clearly a political conscience was at work; and when, in 1740, there was published at The Hague, under the ægis of Voltaire, a drastic criticism of Machiavelli's 'Prince' and of the whole principle which it represented,* by a writer whose exalted rank was thinly disguised under the veil of anonymity, this was hailed as the dayspring of a new and nobler age. 'We congratulate our century,' wrote the editor of a French edition of Machiavelli's works published two years later, 'on seeing at last a system so pernicious, and so detestable, refuted in a fashion so thorough, so well reasoned, and so superior, that there is every reason to presume that it is about to fall into all the contempt and all the execration which it deserves.'† The anonymous author of the 'Anti-Machiavel' was Frederick the Great.

Of this essay in criticism Carlyle says that 'treatise

* 'Anti-Machiavel ou Essai de critique sur le Prince de Machiavel. Publié par M. de Voltaire.' La Haye, 1740. In this edition Frederick's text was much altered by Voltaire. The publisher, Jean van Duren, almost immediately issued another edition, with both Voltaire's version and Frederick's original, under the title 'Anti-Machiavel ou Examen du Prince,' etc.

† 'Oeuvres de Machiavel, nouvelle édition, augmentée de l'Anti-Machiavel et d'autres pièces.' La Haye, 1743, 6 tom. 12mo. Only extracts from the Anti-Machiavel are given in this.

fallen more extinct to existing mankind it would not be easy to name.' This contemptuous estimate is not deserved, for the 'Anti-Machiavel' is far more than a mere student's exercise in the application of abstract moralities. Though the whole argument rings the changes on the theme that honesty is the best policy even for princes, its youthful idealism is tempered by a keen sense of realities, and often there is revealed in it already the Frederick of the future. 'Princes,' he says, 'who look upon their people as the body of which they themselves are the soul, will be sparing of the blood of their subjects'; and 'war is an extreme resource which ought never to be used except in desperate cases.' But a prince's army is, none the less, 'his residence, his interest, his duty, his glory'; and he agrees with Machiavelli that he ought to lead it in person.

'I admit (he says) that there are unhappy circumstances in which a prince has no choice but to break his treaties and alliances; but he ought to quit them like an honest man, by giving timely warning to his allies, and above all he should never go to this extreme without being forced to do so by consideration for his people's good or by dire necessity.'*

The later Frederick peeps through more evidently in his remarks on the usefulness of treaties. It is a fact, he says, that treaties are seldom carried out in full and often broken, but they are none the less useful, if only in ensuring for a time the neutrality of a possible enemy.† As for the maxim that princes are under no obligation to keep their word, 'it is very bad policy on their part to be cheats and to dupe the world. They will only dupe it once, and lose thereby the confidence of all the princes.' 'A prince,' he said, 'is like a man playing cards with honest men and sharpers; in order not to be swindled he must know how he is being cheated, without himself having to cheat.'‡

The completeness with which Frederick violated every one of the moral maxims of the 'Anti-Machiavel' the moment he was in a position to put them in practice suggests that this display of dove-like innocence was but a serpentine device for putting the world off its guard; and this suspicion is strengthened by the fact that the

* Ed. 1740, p. 120. † *Ibid.*, p. 65. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

publication of the book at The Hague was announced in Berlin just eight days before its author invaded Silesia without warning.* However this may be, the Frederick whom at the present time it is important to study is not the critic of Machiavelli but the aptest of his pupils, as revealed in his acts, in his correspondence, and in his own later apologies for his methods. This study is important because the vast prestige of his success not only strengthened for a time in all Europe an evil tradition in politics, but established it so strongly in the counsels of Prussia, that it has survived the influences that elsewhere have tended to weaken if not to destroy it, and has thus become the inspiration, both in their aims and in their methods, of those Powers with whom the idealism of the rest of the world is waging a war of life and death. It is for this reason that, at this supreme crisis, a debt of gratitude is owing to the two eminent French scholars whose labours have made more accessible the material for the critical understanding of the political methods of Frederick the Great.

Their books differ greatly in scope and method. M. Waddington's monumental work, of which the fifth volume has now appeared, is a brilliant study of the Seven Years' War, based on a mass of fresh materials gathered from the archives. It is largely concerned with Frederick's campaigns, which are described in great detail yet with a masterly breadth of treatment; but the author has not overlooked the characteristic of Frederick's statecraft, which has remained that of Prussia ever since, namely, what Commandant Weil describes as 'the combined and often parallel action of more or less secret diplomatic negotiations and military operations.'

Commandant Weil's 'Morale politique du Grand Frédéric' is a reprint, with an introduction and running comments, of the bulk of the first two of the thirty-five published volumes of Frederick's political correspondence. It has a more limited object than that of M. Waddington, and it covers an even shorter period, namely, from Frederick's accession to the throne on

* 'Nouvelles privilégiées de Berlin.' No. lxx. Jeudi, 8 Décembre, 1740. 'A la Haye chez Jean van Duren est imprimé Examen du Prince de Machiavel avec des Notes historiques et politiques, *in octavo*.' Frederick crossed the frontier of Silesia on the 16th.

May 31, 1740, to the autumn of 1742. But, as M. Weil says,

'the friend of Voltaire, the author of the Anti-Machiavel, was never more perfidious, more audacious, more lucky, and more clever, but also more unscrupulous and therefore more interesting to study, more fertile in stratagems and Machiavellism, than during the strange period which extends almost from the day of his accession to the preliminaries of Breslau and the treaty of Berlin, with the interlude of the conclusion and breach of the Act of Klein Schnellendorf.

'For the rest, he so little modified his principles, he remained so consistent with himself, that when, in 1775, he wrote the preface to the "Histoire de mon temps" he only developed and accentuated the ideas which he had first enunciated in June 1742, when he tried to explain to his friend Jordan why he had thought good to make peace and abandon his Allies.'

It is impossible here to follow the intricacies of Frederick's policy even during these two years; it must suffice to illustrate its character by particular instances and quotations. The invasion of Silesia itself involved the tearing up of every treaty signed by Prussia for sixteen years past, including the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction by means of which the Emperor Charles VI had fondly hoped to secure the peaceful succession of his daughter Maria Theresa to the undivided inheritance of the House of Habsburg. In this respect Frederick set a precedent which, as the world knows well, has been faithfully followed by his successors. To his servants and intimates he laid bare his motives with great candour. On Nov. 1, 1740, he wrote to Count Podewils:

'I give you a problem to solve. When one has an advantage, ought one to profit by it or not? I am ready with my troops and everything. If I don't take advantage of this, I hold in my hands a good thing which I don't know how to use. If I do take advantage of it, they will say that I am clever enough to avail myself of the superiority which I have over my neighbours' (Weil, p. 51).

The great thing, he said, was to occupy Silesia before the winter, which could then be spent in negotiation; 'we shall negotiate with success when once we are in occupation,' a dictum which might profitably be studied

by those who, during the present war, have shown a tendency to be beguiled by the German proposals to open negotiations for peace 'based on the military situation.' Podewils, in reply, pointed out that the ancient rights of the House of Brandenburg in Silesia had long since been exchanged for trifles (*bagatelles*) by solemn treaties, but he added that means could always be found for reviving these rights. Frederick's answer is an epitome of his whole attitude and policy. 'The matter of right,' he said, 'is the concern of the Ministers, it is yours; it is time to work at it in secret, for the orders to the troops have been given.'

The principle on which he based this and all his other political actions is given in another letter to Podewils, written on May 12 of the following year from Breslau:

'It is a very dangerous thing to play the part of an honest man among rogues; to be scrupulous with deceivers is a desperate counsel, and one of which the success is mighty doubtful. What, then, is to be done? War and negotiation: that is precisely what your humble servant and his Minister are doing. If there is anything to be gained by being honest, we will be honest men; and, if it is necessary to deceive, let us be rogues.'

In these confidential notes to his own servants the real Frederick appears undisguised, but it is only in his correspondence with his fellow-sovereigns and their ministers that his duplicity is revealed in all its artistic completeness. His most perfidious letters, indeed, have so perfect a ring of sincerity that one would be tempted to think that when he wrote them he was for the moment sincere, with the sincerity of a great actor performing a part, were it not for the fact that he would often write two or more letters, equally sincere in appearance, in a different sense to different people at the same time. There can be no doubt that in this respect his diplomacy was as masterly as his strategy. He had entered alone on his great adventure, and he had to deceive the Powers as to his intentions until he could embroil them with one another, range them in opposite camps, and take sides with those who were prepared to offer him the best price. He began by proclaiming aloud the purity of his intentions. Ten days before he crossed

the frontier he wrote to Maria Theresa to assure her that his only object was, while asserting his just rights, to succour the House of Austria and save it from ruin. Six days later he was instructing his envoy at Munich to urge the Elector of Bavaria to press his claims to the Austrian succession and take up arms, but to urge this so cleverly 'that it will not seem that I intend openly to support the Court of Bavaria against that of Vienna.' It was only if Austria proved obstinate that he intended to join an alliance against her.

Meanwhile he courted both France and her rivals the maritime Powers, and attempted by exciting their jealousy to make them outbid each other for his friendship. In June 1740, immediately after his accession, he wrote to Truchsess von Waldburg, his representative in Hanover, bidding him 'affect in the presence of the French Ministers and creatures a great cordiality towards the English Ministers, even if there isn't really much.' In a letter to his envoy extraordinary in Paris, Colonel von Camas, he enclosed a personal note to Cardinal Fleury, couched in terms of the most flattering friendship:

'I write to you with the same sincerity with which you have written to me. A frank revelation of the heart demands a like revelation. I earnestly desire that you may see into the depths of mine, and read there all the sentiments of esteem.'

'Study the expression of his face,' he instructed Camas, 'and see what impression my letter is likely to make. You will do your best to get round him (*le cajoler*).' He had no intention, as he was to say later, of allowing himself to be hoodwinked by an ecclesiastic. As for the maritime Powers, 'the English are playing the fool and the Dutch the poltroon,' he wrote to Podewils; 'let us profit meanwhile by surmises and hoodwink them both at once.' Podewils reported that the English had a conscience about the Pragmatic Sanction. 'Let us lull them to sleep,' replied Frederick, 'and do our best to make them believe that we will agree to everything.' A few days before, on Jan. 30, 1741, he had written to King George II to assure him that he still looked upon him as his ally, and that he regarded it as his own duty not to have anything secret or hidden from him.

Thus the game went on. To tell the truth, as M.

Weil remarks, all the Powers were equally engaged in it; all were busy negotiating with both sides, with the exception of Russia, which alone categorically upheld the guarantee of the integrity of Austria which all had signed. But Frederick was their master in duplicity. On March 18, 1741, he concluded a secret treaty with France; on the 24th he wrote to Truchsess von Waldburg 'to win over Hanover, and Great Britain if possible.' 'You can protest,' he said, 'that up till now I have my hands free, not having concluded any alliance with France.' This was so far true that the formal alliance was not signed until June 4. Frederick saw reason to prefer that of England, and he instructed Podewils to drag out the negotiations with France pending the arrival of the English 'charlatan.' 'Meanwhile,' he said, 'you will continue to negotiate secretly with England and Russia in order to take the course most profitable according to the circumstances of the moment.' That was on April 13. On May 6 he was assuring Cardinal Fleury, on his word of honour, that he had his hands entirely free; on the 30th he instructed Podewils to keep the French ambassador in play (*vous devez chipoter avec Valory*) until the courier from Vienna should arrive; if the Austrian offers were not acceptable, he was to conclude with France. The offers were not acceptable; the secret treaty of alliance with France was signed; and, pending the effective intervention of the French troops, it was now the turn of the English mediator, Lord Hyndford, to be kept in play. 'Leave no stone unturned (*remuez le vert et le sec*) to deceive and dupe the Englishman,' Frederick had written to Podewils on May 31; 'I will give him a very good reception, and hope to dupe him.' The episode of Klein Schnellendorf proved his success.

This episode, for which even Carlyle thought it necessary to apologise, is interesting at the present moment as illustrating the Prussian conception of the interdependence of diplomacy and strategy. Early in September 1741 Frederick was held up on the line of the Neisse, which he wished to cross in order to lay siege to the fortresses of Neisse and Glatz. In these circumstances he had recourse to the now thoroughly hoodwinked Hyndford, through whose good offices it was arranged, on Sept. 25, that, in return for the cession

of Lower Silesia with Neisse, Frederick should allow the Austrians under Neipperg to march away unmolested and himself retire from the war, though without appearing to do so. On the strength of these preliminary conferences Frederick was allowed to cross the Neisse unopposed on the 26th. On Oct. 2 he wrote to Fleury that Austria had offered him terms which he had refused. 'I have stolen (*dérobé*) the passage of the Neisse from M. de Neipperg,' he added. On the 9th he met Neipperg himself at the château of Klein Schnellendorf, and there, in the presence of Hyndford and of diplomatic representatives of Austria, agreed to what they believed to be the formal preliminaries of peace, in exchange for the immediate surrender of Neisse. To hoodwink them the more completely he went so far as to give the Austrians some perfectly sound advice as to their conduct of the campaign against his allies the French. The Convention was, as usual, to be kept strictly secret, and Frederick refused to sign it, persuading the simple-minded *coquin d'Anglais* that his own signature as mediator was sufficient, since it was appended 'on his word as a King.' This enabled him to deny the very existence of the agreement, and to do so with every sign of genuine indignation, when it had served its turn and the leakage of the secret threatened to become inconvenient. To cover its traces he wrote to Fleury, on Oct. 29, a letter which M. Weil justly describes as a *chef d'œuvre* of Machiavellism. The artful and perfidious Court of Austria, he said, had made him the most advantageous offers if he would desert his allies, help to expel the Elector of Bavaria from Bohemia, and vote for the Duke of Lorraine as Emperor.

'I leave you to judge what answer had to be made to so ridiculous a proposal.... Your correspondent, my dear Cardinal, may be a heretic in religion, but I assure you that he is not one in politics, or in friendship, or in gratitude.'

Frederick had on a previous occasion assured the Cardinal that he made a religion of his treaty obligations. The truth of these professions was put to the test when, in March 1742, he began to believe that it would be to his interest to make a separate peace. There were still hesitations, but these were due, not to any lingering reverence for the principles of just dealing which he

himself had loudly proclaimed, but to the changes and chances of the political and military situation. To the last he protested that he was bound to France by an 'indissoluble attachment,' and that 'the Most Christian King with an ally so faithful as the King of Prussia has no occasion to yield to any one.' Within a month of this last effusion he had signed at Breslau the preliminaries of a separate peace, the definitive treaty being executed at Berlin on the 28th of the following month and ratified on Aug. 12. Frederick had gained all that he had set out to gain; and it was less than nothing to him that he left his allies floundering in a sea of troubles.

Frederick knew well that this peace was but a truce; he set to work at once to render it as stable as possible and at the same time to prepare for the next war. To Podewils he pointed out the necessity for 'habituating the Cabinets of Europe' to the new situation in which the war had placed Prussia, which could be done, he believed, by a display of 'a great deal of moderation and gentleness toward all our neighbours.' It was the policy of Bismarck in the years following 1871. But Europe had studied Frederick in his part of serpent too closely to believe in this new pose of dove-like harmlessness. His very virtues as a ruler, ruthlessly directed to the efficiency of the State, excited the justifiable distrust of neighbours who, remembering his former exploits, watched with misgiving the increase of his wealth and the monstrous growth of his armies. In the end a powerful coalition was formed against him; but Frederick, true to his principle of the 'offensive defensive,' on Aug. 25, 1756, suddenly poured his troops into Saxony, and so opened the Seven Years' War.

It is impossible here to do more than mention a struggle in which Frederick displayed once more all the extraordinary qualities of his genius both as a general and a statesman. M. Waddington's latest volume deals with the final phases, including the discreditable episode of Lord Bute's attempt to persuade Russia to press the war and so force Prussia to make peace, an intrigue which Frederick defeated by playing on the vanity of the feeble-minded Peter III.* Peter reigned just long enough to save his hero from destruction, but the

* See Waddington, v, chap. viii.

accession of Catherine II made no essential difference in the relations of Russia and Prussia. In the new Empress, who mounted the throne over the body of her murdered husband, Frederick could recognise a genius akin to his own. Peter III, as the French diplomatist Bérenger reported home, 'was an extravagant enthusiast who, in contempt of all decencies, exposed grossly the designs he had of hurting us'; Catherine 'delivers herself over astutely to our enemies while assuring us of her sisterly affection.' She had, indeed, as Lord Buckinghamshire reported home from St Petersburg, no intention of breaking with Prussia, which might have forced the latter to an *entente* with France, and so have increased the influence of this nation in the affairs of Poland. Thus was foreshadowed that sinister partnership which, cemented by the common crime of the partition of Poland in 1772, was to cast its shadow over Europe almost to the eve of the present war.

Frederick had denounced as 'appalling treason' the suggestion mooted in St Petersburg in 1741 that Prussia should be partitioned. The partition of Poland, which he himself first suggested to the Empress Catherine, seemed to him justified by every reason of State. The acquisition of West Prussia, Ermeland, and the districts of the Netze and of Kulm would join the dissevered halves of his monarchy and weld it into a compact whole; the anarchy of the Republic was a nuisance and a menace to its neighbours; and, above all, the Poles were now too weak to offer resistance. If Russia and Austria could be persuaded to agree, the thing would be easy. In the Empress Catherine he found a willing accomplice; Maria Theresa, whose conscience was a troublesome reality, made foolish moral objections, but in the end, as Frederick put it, 'she wept, and took her share.' Thus was consummated an act of which, thirty-four years later, Friedrich von Gentz said that it was 'incomparably more destructive to the higher interests of Europe than previous acts of violence,' since it originated in that very 'union of regents' to which the world had hitherto looked as 'a beneficial barrier against lawless power and the passions of an individual oppressor.'*

* 'Fragments upon the Balance of Power.' Eng. ed., 1806, p. 76.

Without sharing Gentz's views as to 'the old magnificent constitution of Europe' which Frederick had thus done more than any one else to undermine, we may agree with him that the precedent of Poland encouraged beyond measure that 'partitional spirit' which was to dominate European politics until the rise of the spirit of nationality, which was in its turn to develope a new doctrine of conquest. Catherine II turned from the partition of Poland to that of Turkey, of which the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774 marked a fresh stage. In 1777 Joseph II, less scrupulous than his mother, thought to take advantage of the extinction of the elder line of the House of Wittelsbach to follow in the case of Bavaria the precedent set by Frederick, thirty-six years before, in the case of Silesia. The resulting war, that of the Bavarian Succession (1778–1779), in which Frederick took the field for the last time, illustrated once more to perfection all the characteristics of 18th-century statecraft as practised by its supreme master.* Even the French Revolution, which broke out ten years later, did not interrupt the tradition. In the troubles of France the partitioning Powers saw at first only a golden opportunity for completing the absorption of Poland and continuing that of Turkey; it was not until revolutionary France had herself turned aggressor that an effective coalition against her was formed. As for the French revolutionists, as Sorel has clearly shown, they accepted in full the traditional principle of the Reason of State; and the world knows well how the revolutionary gospel of peace was soon turned into the revolutionary doctrine of conquest. Frederick the Great was dead, but it was his teaching and example that still inspired the idealists of the Revolution. In 1792, Vergniaud, the greatest orator of the Gironde, thus urged his countrymen to war:

'Do not lose the advantage of your situation; attack, since everything now gives presage of a happy issue. If in the Saxon war Frederick had temporised, his successor would now perhaps be only margrave of Brandenburg. He attacked, and to-day the King of Prussia holds, with the Emperor, the political balance which has slipped from our hands.'

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* See Temperley, 'Frederick the Great and Kaiser Joseph,' cited above.

And out of the Revolution sprang Napoleon 'fully armed, as Minerva from the brow of Jove.' He too had studied in the school of Frederick and his masters; and his diplomatic methods, utterly devoid of scruple, did not differ from those of his models. 'The kidnapping of the Duke of Enghien on neutral territory,' says Sorel, 'his summary condemnation and execution, were in reality a trap followed by an assassination; the invasion of Rome, the arrest of the Pope, the seizure of the Vatican archives, form the conclusion of the series.' As *coups d'état* they would have won the commendation of Gabriel Naudé.

The success, not the wickedness, of Napoleon produced a sort of moral reaction in Europe. The Governments allied against him needed a binding principle, and they affected to find it in that old 'public law' of Europe which, as Sorel scornfully remarks, had been known only 'through the declamations of publicists and its breach by the sovereigns.' This attitude was, indeed, in part sincere; and it is significant that it was most sincere in those countries where, as in Great Britain, diplomacy was 'hampered,' as Metternich put it, by the pressure of an articulate public opinion. But the extent and depth of this political conversion could not be gauged until the cause which had produced it was removed; and it is for this reason that a particular interest attaches to the revelation of the inner life of the Congress of Vienna given to the world by the publication of the reports of the Austrian secret police during its session, now admirably edited by Weil in two stout volumes.

To our knowledge of the serious work of the Congress these reports contribute little or nothing, for the throwing open of the archives has long made accessible the proceedings of the inner councils of the Powers, of which at the time only broken rumours circulated in Vienna and were duly recorded by the agents of the Government. But, as a revelation of the mental and moral background of the Congress, they are invaluable; and it is with political morals, rather than with policies, that we are here concerned. From this point of view the revelation is anything but edifying. In these documents—intercepted letters, reports by high-placed spies of intimate conversations and secret conferences, records of the comings and goings of any one, however exalted or

humble, who seemed worth watching—there is no sign of any change of heart. It is the revelation of a political world which has learned nothing and forgotten nothing. Hardly anywhere is there any mention of the interests of the peoples, still less of their will; but there is much talk of 'souls' to be won or lost by this Power or that.

There was, indeed, a parade of principles. Talleyrand, that veteran dissembler, preached his new gospel of legitimacy in and out of season, and thus attached to the interests of France all the little potentates who feared the insatiable appetite of Prussia and the vague ambitions of the Emperor Alexander. The mediatised princes of Germany raised in chorus the cry of 'Liberty'; but for them the word meant only the restoration of their microscopic sovereignties. The Pope, through Cardinal Consalvi, exalted once more the ideal of the Holy Roman Empire as 'the centre of political unity,' but all his practical efforts were directed solely to safeguarding his own temporal sovereignty as an Italian Prince.* The Emperor Alexander, inspired by the Pole Czartoryski and the Greek Capo d'Istria, talked of the rights of nationalities, but to his favourite of the moment, the Princess Bagration, he confided his true attitude in the matter of Poland: 'Poland is ours; I hold it with 200,000 men; we shall see who will drive me out.'† As for the Prussians, they too affected a lofty idealism, as the champions of Germanism and of constitutional freedom. When their claim to the whole of Saxony threatened to lead to immediate war with Austria, they proclaimed their intention of appealing to the German people. Their Government was at work on the new Prussian Constitution; and the people would turn to the Power whose institutions were most in harmony with the spirit of the age. The moment war broke out, the Constitution would be published; and in Saxony the masses at least would know on which side to be in what would be a war between democracy and aristocracy.‡

Poor *Turnvater* Jahn and the idealists of the *Tugendbund* were really deceived by this pose, the hypocrisy of

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* See Weil, 'Les Dessous,' i, p. 209, No. 254, and ii, p. 227, No. 1670.

† *Ibid.* i, p. 206, No. 252. Cf. Anstett's statement, p. 510, No. 746.

‡ *Ibid.* i, p. 690, No. 1073.

which they were later to discover to their cost; but not so the cynics of Vienna, who were not in the least impressed when the Prussians 'acted the holy apostle and complained that doubt should be thrown on the purity of their intentions.'* 'Prussia,' said the old Prince de Ligne, 'has a great appetite.' The pious feebleness of Frederick William III, indeed, placed him beyond all suspicion of Machiavellism; but, as the Prince de Ligne said, 'he leaves everything to his Ministers, and in them the spirit of Frederick reigns absolutely.'† Their object, as every one knew, was solely the aggrandisement of Prussia and her predominance in Germany. This was the policy of Frederick the Great, the policy which later Bismarck was to carry to a victorious conclusion; and it is one of the strangest ironies of history that the defeat at Vienna of Prussia's aims on Saxony, and her establishment on the Rhine instead, should have in the end done more than anything else to contribute to this result. As for the political principle upon which, from first to last, Prussia has acted, this is vividly illustrated in these records by a retort of Humboldt to the Bavarian General von Wrede, who had appealed to 'God and Right.' 'You invoke God,' said the Prussian, 'and mix up religion with an affair which men alone ought to decide. We have nothing more to say to you.'‡

It cannot justly be said that at Vienna the attitude of the Prussians was in this respect singular. The *chronique scandaleuse* of the Congress, which forms a large part of these volumes, must not detain us, save to remark that it reveals an amazingly low standard both of public and private morals. An insatiable thirst for frivolous and low pleasures, a petty personal ambition, an almost naive personal vanity—these are the qualities which, to judge by these confidential reports, distinguished the exalted personages upon whom the future of the world's order depended. 'I was invited to come to an assembly of just men,' complained the King of Denmark, 'and I find myself lost in a labyrinth.'§ Some just men there were of course. Castlereagh, for instance—at whom Vienna mocked because of the *gaucherie* of his

* Weil, 'Les Dessous,' i, p. 633, No. 964.
† *Ibid.* i, p. 161, No. 197.
‡ *Ibid.* i, p. 648, No. 996.
§ *Ibid.* i, p. 403, No. 559.

manners and his habit of walking arm-in-arm with his wife—laboured single-mindedly for what he considered to be the interest of Europe, namely, a lasting peace based on a 'just equilibrium,' and so did much to establish that new and higher tradition which, on the whole, determined the moral standpoint of 19th-century diplomacy.* But in this 'European' attitude he was practically isolated, in spite of the lofty pretensions of the Emperor Alexander, who became a byword even in Vienna for falseness and immorality. 'It has needed more than twenty years,' wrote the Marquis de Bonnay, 'to open the eyes of the sovereigns with regard to revolutionary France. How many years will be needed to make them realise the folly and the curse of their rival ambitions?' †

'I have watched every day,' Castlereagh wrote home, 'the astonishing tenacity with which all the Powers cling to the smallest point of separate interest.' This tenacity was apparent from the first, and these reports are full of expressions of fear that the Congress would break up even before it had properly assembled. 'God grant,' wrote the Swedish envoy Loewenhjelm to his brother, 'that the members of the Congress won't act like the Fathers of the Council of Nicæa, who decided the question of the Trinity with their fists.' ‡ Of such invocations of Providence there are not many in these reports; but one other may be cited as summing up the whole spirit of the Congress. It was when the return of Napoleon from Elba once more threatened everything with ruin that the diplomatist Treitlingen, in a letter to the Princess of Turn and Taxis, expressed the pious hope that Providence might still bless the more important efforts of the Congress. 'God grant,' he said, 'that just indemnities will be assigned to the House of Your Most Serene Highness.' §

It is not germane to our purpose to criticise the settlement of Vienna. Opinion at the Congress itself expected at one time no more than another Peace of Amiens, a mere interlude in the 'bellum omnium contra

* See Professor C. K. Webster's admirable study on 'England and the Polish-Saxon Question at the Congress of Vienna.' (Spottiswoode, 1913.)

† Weil, 'Les Dessous,' i, p. 538, No. 783.

‡ *Ibid.* i, p. 336, No. 453. § *Ibid.* ii, p. 397, No. 2049.

omnes.' Out of the labyrinthine intrigues of the Congress there was in fact, however, evolved a system which did ensure an unprecedented period of peace. But it was none the less true that this system contained all the germs of future war; and to the reasons for this not all at the time were blind. In concluding this all too short account of these interesting volumes we may quote in this connexion an appreciation of the work of the Congress given by the Hanoverian diplomatist von Reden in conversation with the Papal nuncio:

'To judge by the partitions sanctioned among the Powers, without any regard to the geographical position of the countries, to the moral and other idiosyncracies of the nations, or to the imprescriptible rights of the peoples, it appears that the sovereigns have merely done a deal (*marchandé*), and thus by a purely arbitrary process assigned to their Empires the territories which happened to suit them.' *

This is the one piece of evidence in all these reports that there was anywhere any realisation of the fact that the weakness of the work of the Congress of Vienna lay in the survival of the old 'partitional spirit' and in the total neglect of the new forces which were to determine the history of the 19th century.

However short-sighted and unjust the treaties of Vienna may have been, they did at least provide Europe with an authoritative code of International Law; and, however narrow and reactionary the Alliance which sponsored them, this at least tended to encourage a new sense of the community of interests between the members of the European body politic. During the 19th century a new standard of political ethics as between State and State was gradually established. To exaggerate the change would be absurd in view of the events of recent years; but that change there has been is proved by the all but universal reprobation evoked by the Prusso-German methods in diplomacy and war, methods which in the 17th and 18th centuries would have surprised nobody and shocked very few. The change is in the fundamental conception of the relations between States.

* Weil, 'Les Dessous,' ii, p. 569, No. 2405.

The inventors of the old systems, as Mr Denys P. Myers * puts it, 'operated on a theory of innate enmities, which is now obsolete by intervening disproof.' Diplomacy was considered only as part of the mechanism of war, whereas before the outbreak of the present war its main concern had come to be with the mechanism of peace. The object of foreign policy, indeed, remained and remains, not abstract justice, but the advantage of the State; but it has become increasingly evident that the permanent advantage of one State cannot be based upon injustice to another. It is only within the last fifty years, says Mr Myers, that there has been any general conception of a policy of fairness as something inuring to the good of the State in the long run; and the diplomatist is still essentially an advocate whose duty is to make the weaker case seem the stronger. But in general we have advanced greatly from the time when a Gabriel Naudé could define the duties of an ambassador as 'to spy out the actions of foreign princes, and to dissemble, cover and disguise those of his own master.' When, in the middle of the last century, the Comte de Garden defined diplomacy as, *inter alia*, 'the art of reconciling the interests of peoples one with another' he was not so much proclaiming an ideal as announcing a change.

The 'to be or not to be' of this new ideal of international relations is the fundamental issue of the present war. When we speak of Prussian militarism, we do not mean the Prussian military power, but the whole spirit of Prussian policy, which has remained unaffected by the new ideas, stereotyped in the traditions of the 18th century, and firmly grounded in the principle of Frederick the Great that 'Distrust is the mother of security.' For Prussia-Germany, as is now only too clear, diplomacy has remained only a part of the mechanism of war, which is for her 'the father of all things.' Her diplomacy during the years of peace was, as we now realise, but a preparation for the day of war; she spread the network of her secret agents over every country in the globe, with an efficiency which the chiefs of the Secret du Roi

* See his 'Notes on the Control of Foreign Relations,' in the 'Recueil de Rapports,' issued by the 'Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable,' Part III (The Hague, 1917). This is a brilliant criticism of the suggested 'democratic control' of foreign policy.

would have envied; in her dealings with foreign Powers she took for her maxim Frederick's 'Let us lull them to sleep'—and she succeeded. In carrying on the war itself, too, she is true to the Frederician tradition in the cunning combination of diplomacy with military operations. At Brest-Litovsk the Bolshevik negotiators, blinded by fanatical devotion to a crude political and economic creed, fell into a trap similar to that prepared for the Austrians at Klein Schnellendorf, and with far more disastrous results. The repeated peace manœuvres, nicely timed to suit the exigencies of the military situation, differ in form only from the similar manœuvres of Frederick. He addressed himself to monarchs and their ministers, in letters admirably calculated to disarm suspicion; the German Chancellor, as the times require, addresses himself to the peoples, in speeches of which the apparent candour and moderation are calculated to hide from the simple and ignorant the fact that they commit him to nothing. Their object is the same—to sow doubt and distrust in the ranks of their opponents, and so to weaken their power of military resistance.

It is to the credit of the democracies in arms that this false coin has gained so small a currency among them. Let them look to it that they persevere until the cry for peace from the enemy rings true, which it will never do until he realises that his great adventure has failed. For the free peoples are engaged in a life-and-death struggle 'with principalities and powers, and the rulers of darkness in high places'; and upon their steadfastness the future of the world's order depends.

WALTER ALISON PHILLIPS.

Art. 8.—THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIVE RACES.

MANY and diverse are the problems which present themselves to a political officer in the course of his work among the natives of Africa. The greatest of these, although it is sometimes relegated to the background as not calling insistently for immediate solution, is the question as to what is the final goal to the attainment of which all the energy which he sees exerted in the interests of the natives is directed. Is it our object so to establish the conditions now existing that they shall last for ever? Or, if not, what conditions are we trying to establish?

Races have been conquering each other since the dawn of history; and the practical results, in course of time, have been that the conquered race either fused with the conquerors, or was exterminated, or at length recovered its liberty. During the more recent past, the civilised nations of Western and Central Europe have conquered—or, it would be more accurate to say, gained dominion over—the coloured races of the world on a scale which has no parallel in history, so that full independence is to-day enjoyed by but few of those groups of human beings to whom we apply in common parlance the term 'native.' Not only have the groups 'dominating' and 'dominated' become far larger, but there is a greater divergence between their mental and physical characteristics than was to be found in earlier historical times. These differences have been accentuated by the appearance from time to time in history of great leaders of thought, and of the founders of religion. The lines of cleavage have thus become so pronounced that the fusion of European with native races has now become impossible without causing racial deterioration.

In the past, when the principle of *væ victis* was accepted, the conqueror might destroy, enslave or export the conquered to his own advantage. Such a principle is not tolerated to-day; it is not only opposed to our moral ideals, but it is obviously impracticable, owing to the vast populations involved; moreover it is generally recognised as economically unsound. If we cannot fuse with or exterminate the dominated races, what then is

going to happen to them in the future? Is it to be supposed that a large proportion of the human race will remain for ever in a state of tutelage, subject to a minority of other human beings, like themselves in all but mental equipment? Can it be conceived that the present abnormal conditions will be tolerated without demur by the dominated, or even be sanctioned by public opinion generally among the dominating races, if it were understood that they are to continue indefinitely?

Such an hypothesis is, I think, inconceivable; and it may be assumed that, history repeating itself, the dominated races will strive after and some day accomplish their emancipation. It is certainly possible to delay the process, and perhaps to retard it very greatly, but only at the cost of suspicion, and finally of hostility, between the rulers and the ruled. It is also possible, and in my opinion infinitely more politic, to assist and guide the dominated races towards an evolution which will secure friendly relations, profitable to both sides, during the process, and will result in the permanent establishment of such a nexus as exists between members of a federation rather than that which holds between conqueror and conquered. This can be done by adopting a policy which, by affording opportunities for the emergence of the native leader, and scope for the employment of his natural abilities and ambitions, tends to re-establish normal conditions of racial growth in the body politic of the dominated race.

There are two different systems, either of which may be adopted by a European government for the control of a native race. I am referring, of course, only to those areas where the native populations enormously exceed the European population, as is the case in West Africa, and not to such places as Barbados, where the conditions are quite different. One of these may be termed 'Direct Rule,' the other 'Indirect Rule.' A third, or intermediate system, a kind of mixture of the other two, may also exist, and indeed is sometimes, as we shall see, necessary; but we need not linger over this. The essential distinction is that between 'Direct' and 'Indirect Rule.' The intermediate system is only a halfway house on the road to one or the other.

By 'Direct Rule,' then, I mean that form of administration which places the government of the country entirely in the hands of European officials, minor posts only, such as clerkships, being filled by natives, while the policing of the country is entrusted to European officers, with coloured subordinates in government employ, wearing government uniform. This system necessarily entails either the abolition of the Emirs and Chiefs, or their retention as figure-heads only; and the abolition of native Courts of Justice, or such curtailment of their powers as to render them of little use. In short, it means replacing the native leader by the European official with his native staff. The underlying policy of this system is the establishment of European institutions and modes of life and thought among the natives as rapidly as possible.

By 'Indirect Rule' I mean a system of administration which leaves in existence the administrative machinery created by the natives themselves. It recognises the Emirs, Chiefs, and native Councils, native Courts of Justice (Mohammedan or pagan), native Police controlled by a native executive, as real living forces, and not as curious and interesting pageantry. It brings European influence to bear on the native indirectly, through his chiefs, and not directly through European officials; and under it the European, keeping himself a good deal in the background, leaves the mass of native individuals to understand that the orders which come to them emanate from their own chiefs rather than from the all-pervading white man. The underlying policy of this system is to assist the native to develope that civilisation which he can himself evolve.

The system of Direct Rule has many supporters; in fact, the vast majority of people who have not been in close contact with native affairs, and even many who have, would, I think, say that it is the only proper system. 'What is the good,' they argue, 'of bolstering up these corrupt, often ridiculous institutions? Make a clean sweep of the lot. Waste no time in trying to reform what has proved itself to be out-of-date and ineffective. Introduce an executive of wholesome-minded young British officers; let them learn the native languages; they will soon know more about the needs of

the natives than the natives themselves. Set up British Courts of Justice; a few modifications in English law will be necessary, but a criminal code can easily be drafted; let the native see that he is equal to the white man before the Law. Pay due respect to all religious institutions; these do not affect material issues, but, so far as possible, introduce the institutions which have been so successful in our own country. Encourage individualism, raise the native out of his servile state, teach him to be a man and look the world in the face. Show him how ridiculous and harmful are many of his superstitions. Possibly, after a time, you may find that a select few of the natives may be advanced to hold quite fairly responsible positions. Encourage capital to come into the county; lease or sell blocks of land, now unoccupied, to Europeans. By all means prohibit speculation, and keep out the company promoter, but encourage white men to settle. They will bring capital and brains; they will plant and irrigate; they will teach the native to farm his land. Thus all will be well, and there will be no necessity for any change ever to take place.' These arguments sound reasonable enough; and in point of fact large blocks of native subject races have been governed and are still governed in this fashion, not without some apparent outward success. Given extraordinarily good political officers, much may be done under this system.

You can certainly secure law and order and a high degree of material prosperity by such means; but all the nobler aspirations of human nature are not only disregarded, but are actually stifled. The fetters of tutelage are not gradually unloosed; they are rather the more firmly riveted as time goes on. By this system a few of the natives may be educated on European lines, and individually may develop abilities and qualities of a high order; but in the very process they become denaturalised. They lose touch with their own people; they come to view life more or less from the white man's point of view; the traditional customs, habits and behaviour of their own countrymen become strange and even distasteful or ridiculous to them; in short, they become just as much a class apart as the white men themselves. Suppose that you have been able to carry out

the system of Direct Rule to its ideal limits, and that you have educated a sufficient number of natives on European lines, and educated them sufficiently well to justify the placing of the government to a large extent in their hands, even so you will not have advanced appreciably in re-establishing the normal conditions of evolution in the race as a whole. The educated native officials will be just as much a class apart as were the European officials whom they have replaced. The best that can be hoped for will be that on the whole they will not do their work less well than did the Europeans.

Nor is that all. These natives educated on European lines are, on the one hand, by their education detached psychologically and materially from their fellows, and, on the other, they are not, by their education, attached to the European fold. They cannot live and work on terms of complete equality with Europeans either as officials or as private individuals. Of those who hold the contrary view I would ask, Do you consider that intermarriages between the two races are feasible, productive of happiness, or likely to elevate either race? For without such intermarriage there cannot be social equality. Unless the native can marry into the families of Europeans, and such marriages are recognised as normal, no amount of intercourse between the males at business or at the Council Board or occasions of official ceremony will establish anything resembling normal conditions of equality. Separated from his own people and their ideals, debarred from entering the fold of the European, the native, with very few exceptions, will be bound to feel that something is wrong somewhere; and this feeling will probably result in restlessness, discontent, and finally hostility towards the European who has brought about so unsatisfactory a state of affairs.

I have described Indirect Rule as the government of natives through their own institutions, possibly modified to some extent in order to avoid practices which we consider repugnant to reason and humanity. This sounds rational enough in theory, and it may be asked, who would question the feasibility of so obvious a proposal? In practice, however, the matter is not so simple as it appears. To put this policy into real effect means, first of all, that you must shut your eyes, up to a certain

point, to a great many practices which, though not absolutely repugnant to humanity, are nevertheless reprehensible to our ideas, and especially to those ideas which shape the mind of the British official. You must have patience with the liar, though he lie seventy times seven; you must at times have patience with the peculator of public funds (a hard pill this to swallow); you must very generally have patience not only with the honest fool but with the slacker too. You have to make up your mind that men are *not* all equal before the law, and cannot be treated as if they were. An important chief must not be made to work among a gang of felons from the common herd, even though his crimes be far blacker than any of theirs. This is difficult to do in practice. We read of notable persons even in English history accepting bribes and doing various acts which to-day we regard with horror, without at once condemning them as wholly bad, or regarding the regime under which they lived as one which should never have been tolerated for a day.

Nevertheless, if an African chief does any of these things, there are many who will not only want to cast him into the deepest dungeon but also to abolish the office which he held, and do away with the whole system which he represents as rotten to the core. It is hard to get some officials to realise that it is right to punish by imprisonment a policeman who, when travelling, every evening demands and is given by the villagers, free of charge, a fowl for his supper; whereas it would be crass folly thus to punish a native chief, travelling perhaps with a number of followers, who does exactly the same thing on an infinitely greater scale. If it is difficult for the officer in immediate administrative charge to wink at, or even to authorise, practices which stir the depths of his nature to holy indignation, it is ten times more difficult for the higher powers, subject as they are to the criticism of well-meaning but possibly ignorant persons at home, to risk incurring the odium which may be acquired by allowing, and even more by authorising, European officers under their control thus to countenance practices abhorrent to the public opinion of this country. Nevertheless I desire to say, with all the emphasis at my command, that, unless men are found with shoulders broad enough to carry such responsibilities, the British

nation will misunderstand, and fail to discharge, in a proper manner, those duties towards the native races which it has deliberately imposed upon itself.

Granted patience, careful study, administrative ability —qualities which are all at the disposal of the nation in a remarkable degree—there is no reason why the native should not be gradually led up the 'steep slope of civilisation,' to quote Walter Bagehot, without reducing him to a state of collapse on the journey. The process must necessarily be slower in some districts than in others, but I believe that there is one, and only one, road, however long it may be, by which we can truly assist the development of the native under our care. That path follows the natural evolution of the native race. We must lead him along that path, and not persuade or compel him to leave it and follow our path. We must teach him to be a good citizen of his own country first, and he may then become a good citizen of the Empire.

By implanting in his mind a contempt for his own institutions, by persuading him or compelling him to adopt our modes of life, we divorce him from his own natural entourage, and he becomes alienated. And what have we to give him in exchange? We give him stiff-fronted shirts and starched collars and clothes well-cut according to our own ideas; but these garments offend his æsthetic sense at least as much as they do our own, and reduce the natural vitality of his constitution. We may even give him, to a limited extent, the keys of learning, art and science. But what are all these things compared to fellowship, the society of equals, pride of race, patriotism? Of all these essentials we deprive him when we persuade him to leave the fellowship of his kind and the frame in which Providence has set him, and to enter within the pale of our society, where he must be as a stranger at a feast. When we balance the good we can do him against such disadvantages, the scale turns against us; and we incur a grave responsibility when we subject him to the temptations to vice which are inherent in our civilisation.

An important point to be kept in mind, in connexion with the question of Direct or Indirect Rule, is the

influence of the House of Commons over the administration of the subject native races. There is a great measure of centralisation in the government of all these races. All attempts to decentralise are rendered unavailing, or are much restricted, by the fact that all action taken in any colonies or dependencies must be susceptible of explanation by the Government of the day to public opinion at home, as expressed by the House of Commons. Where the native is ruled 'directly,' the responsibility for every action taken is traceable from the District Officer or Resident who took such action through the senior officers of the government of the colony up to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, with whom the ultimate responsibility lies. This fact renders centralisation unavoidable; every one of these officials must be in a position to prove, not only to the authorities, but to a crowd of persons entirely unacquainted with native affairs, that he has not been remiss. The result is what a great authority—I think I am right in saying Lord Morley—has described as 'a striving after over-efficiency.' Every officer in the service becomes over-anxious lest one of his juniors should commit, not a mistake—about which he does right to be anxious—but what may be construed as a mistake by a possibly hostile and misinformed critic.

Thus we get a continual tendency to over-centralisation. A Resident makes a mistake; we promptly set up a system under which neither he nor any other Resident will ever be in a position to make such a mistake again; quite forgetting the adage that he who never makes a mistake will never make anything. So, gradually, all power becomes more and more centralised, until the man who alone is in the best position to act wisely, because he is in closest touch with the native—that is to say the Resident or District Commissioner—is deprived of all opportunity to make mistakes, which is tantamount to saying that he is deprived of all opportunity of exerting any useful initiative. To a certain extent this disadvantage is an inevitable concomitant of foreign rule over native races, whatever system be adopted; but misinformed and ignorant criticism has far more power to damage a 'directly' than an 'indirectly' ruled native community. Public opinion, guided by a natural and

very sound instinct, is more likely to think actions that seem strange to European ideas may nevertheless be justifiable if they be performed by a native authority.

Direct Rule, therefore, has a tendency to centralise authority, and to render it difficult to introduce measures beneficial to the natives but strange to European ideas. 'Indirect Rule' has an exactly contrary tendency. The resultant of these various forces acting on the policy adopted often leads to a complete divergence between the theory and the practice of the government of natives. Not seldom one finds that the native chiefs and administrators are in theory being upheld, but that in practice they are deprived of all power and opportunity to exert initiative, and are in point of fact mere puppets in the hands of the European administrative officers. Who can wonder that, placed in such a position, they sometimes lose heart and that their characters deteriorate?

I can perhaps best illustrate the preceding remarks by describing the work of a Resident. It would not be possible within the scope of this article to give a detailed account of his duties; but, in order to elucidate, and I hope to enforce, the arguments which have been used to support the system of ruling natives indirectly, through the medium of their own laws, customs, and institutions, I will at least try to outline the manner in which such general principles can be, and are being in many cases, put into practice in some parts of Nigeria by the Political Department.

In the first place, the Resident, as administrator of a Province, is held responsible for the smooth working of the wheels of government within his jurisdiction. Should native unrest appear, or should the work of the technical Departments, such as those of Public Works, Forestry, or Agriculture, be hampered by lack of labour, the hostile attitude of the natives, scarcity of food, or other causes, the person who is first called upon for an explanation is the Resident. It rests chiefly with him whether the Government is a success or a failure, as all Government orders are conveyed to the natives by the political officers. I use the phrase 'all orders' literally, including orders which are given by means of laws as well as those which take a possibly more ephemeral

form and are called 'executive' orders. It is the political officers, and they only, who are in a position to see that these orders are carried out. They can rightly, therefore, be held responsible so long as they are not hampered either by the lack of a recognised policy or by over-centralisation, which, by necessitating reference to head-quarters for approval before the most trifling executive acts can be performed, causes the prestige of the white man, as well as that of the native Administrations to be impaired. Such references are justifiable only in cases where the head-quarters authorities are in a position to assist the Resident. All references *pro forma* are, in my opinion, mischievous.

In an advanced group, such as one of the Filane Emirates or great Yoruba Chieftainates, the machinery of a small Government is already in being. At the head is the Emir with his Council (the Diwan of India), to whom the District Heads and Village Heads, the native Courts of Justice, native police, etc., are responsible. The revenue is collected by this machinery, one half being paid to Government, the other half into the Emir's treasury. The Residents, as the Emirs' advisers, of course exert a great influence over all this machinery (sometimes there may be over a thousand native officials and funds up to £100,000 of annual expenditure to be supervised); and in addition they are entrusted, through the Provincial Courts, with great judicial powers. Thus the responsibility borne by a Resident and the power entrusted to him are very great. Nevertheless he should not, in my opinion, as I have just stated, be unduly interfered with in its exercise, nor be continually called upon to give a why and wherefore for his every act; he must often act on intuition. He will of course make mistakes, and, if called upon to give lengthy explanations, will certainly make more. He should rather be judged by results generally, and given a fairly free hand within the limits of the policy laid down by the Government.

Before our occupation of these territories, the great Emirs and Chiefs, though nominally autocrats, were nevertheless subject, and also very susceptible, to public opinion. As a result, whatever harm they may have done to the independent tribes on their borders, they generally ruled their own people with moderation and justice. The

position has now changed. The Emirs and their Chiefs are no longer restrained by the public opinion of their own people; they are responsible to a power which works from afar. The functions of public opinion as a restraining force are now vested in the Political Department.

In order to carry out his duties, which are, in brief, to see that the people are well and justly ruled, but on native lines, a Resident must, so far as possible, keep his authority in the background, concealed, if not from the Emir and his immediate entourage, at all events from the people generally. At the same time he must be on the alert to stamp out and if possible forestall the growth of the innumerable devices by which oppression and malpractices can be introduced. When abuses arise he must, generally speaking, put an end to them, not by outward and visible acts of his own, but by causing the Emir to move in the right direction. To do this he must be fully and correctly informed as to all that is going on among the people; and, to attain this end, he must be in touch with the people; he must get his knowledge at first hand. It follows that he must be readily accessible to the common folk. At the same time he has to be on his guard lest, by so doing, he should encourage the people to despise their own Courts and thus impair the authority and prestige of the Emir. Should he fall into this error, he will, as a first result, place the Emir in a difficult position, lessen his power over his people, and engender hostility in his breast towards the European Administration; and, as a second result, he will find himself spending hour after hour, day after day, settling the ownership of a goat, a fowl, or a native robe worth five shillings.

It may readily be supposed that this keeping-in-touch with the people without impairing the authority of the Emir, and consequently of the whole Native Administration, is no easy task, and one on which any amount of administrative tact and ability can be exerted. It is generally the case that the Resident has to deal with an Emir or Chief extremely sensitive about his dignity, but by no means always inclined to play a fair game, or averse from doing a little extortion for his personal advantage. The Emir is surrounded by a group of

powerful subordinate Chiefs, each of whom is playing for his own hand, greedy of power, as jealous and sensitive as the Emir himself, and all too ready to take advantage of any opportunity to play off the Resident against the Emir, and to commit acts of oppression if they see their way to debarring the Resident from contact with the common people. Finally, there is a populace prone to vacillate between two extremes, at one time bringing frivolous complaints against their Chiefs, at another submitting without complaint to surprising exactions. It will be evident that, under such conditions, the Resident must keep himself in the background, and resist the temptation to become a popular hero with the people (a comparatively easy thing to do), to fill the position of a big native Chief, or to wear, figuratively speaking, the turban of the Emir—a temptation to which human nature renders him susceptible. But, on the other hand, he must be a living force, regarded with confidence by the people as their protector in the last resort, and with respect by the Emir and his Chiefs, who must feel that they cannot throw dust in his eyes, but at the same time can rely on him to support them in the exercise of their legitimate authority.

To carry out these duties, it is of course necessary that a Resident should be naturally sympathetic towards natives—or he will not have the endless patience necessary—and should possess many other qualities, such as aptitude to pick up native languages. But, above all, he must possess a sense of proportion. He must be able to judge the comparative urgency of reforms; and also to know when a reform, however much to be desired, cannot be put into effect. He must be able so to gauge a situation as to know where patience should be exerted and where prompt punitive action should be taken. More especially he must be able so to judge character as to know how and on which individuals he can exert his influence so as to secure the widest results; otherwise he will waste half his efforts on natives of mediocre capacity and little weight.

It is often said that, while such an ideal as I have described may be attainable in cases where the natives have already made considerable advance, the adoption

of the policy of Indirect Rule is impossible in the case of the more primitive tribes. From this view I venture to differ. I do not admit that any tribe can be found without any organisation. Without some organisation how comes it to be there? How has it survived in the struggle for existence which has been going on for countless generations? Some organisation must exist; and, though for a time it may be necessary for the Resident to do much himself, and to bulk large in the eyes of the populace, yet all his efforts should be directed towards fostering the development of the best native customs and modes of government, starting from the family unit if necessary. In other words, the underlying policy should be the same, though the mode of putting it into effect may differ.

Under the system of Indirect Rule, the influence of the European is not only brought to bear on the native in such a manner as to foster the growth of a healthy self-respecting national spirit among all classes of a native unit, but it is brought to bear in the most effective manner possible through the agency of natural leaders. Where the native organisation has been swept away, this influence cannot be brought to bear on the natives generally, but only on a few with whom the European comes into personal contact. I assume, as a postulate, that the influence exerted by a European official over the natives of whom he is in charge is the most important of administrative assets. The opening-up of new markets and the spreading of commerce, the provision of means of transport, railways, ships, etc.—all these are matters of the highest importance from the point of view of the administrator; but I submit that, when we are gauging our duties and responsibilities as a whole, they are a secondary consideration. Our first duty is to ensure that our rule shall operate as an elevating and not as a degrading force on the character of the subject race. We may take the son of a Kano farmer and make him a highly skilled mechanic, or even turn him into a barrister (a vocation for which the native mind, alas! is only too well suited); we may enable him thus to earn what for him may be termed fabulous wealth; yet, if we have, in the process, damaged the moral side of his character, we shall have

failed to discharge our first responsibility towards the man himself, and the community to which he belongs. It would be far better for all concerned to have left him in a state of comparative simplicity, to bring up a family and to carry on elementary but all-important work.

It is only by preserving all that is best in his own institutions, by encouraging, instructing and supporting the born native leader, that we can exert an influence of an enduring description on the native in the mass. There is always a great deal of good in native institutions; if we foster that, discouraging only what is bad, there is no limit to the progress which these native races may not secure under our rule. In some parts of Nigeria we found them already far advanced and able to a great extent to manage their own municipal affairs and finances; in other parts it will take long before they can be given any great measure of responsibility in respect to their own government, without being closely supervised; but the aims of our policy should, I submit, be the same in all cases.

By working on these lines, the Residents in Nigeria have achieved admirable results, not only among the more advanced Filane and Yoruba people but among the more primitive groups, those in the Bassa forests for instance. It is true that, even in Kano—to take the most advanced native State—a captious critic could point out matters where there is room for improvement. We know, for instance, that the native judges sometimes still take bribes, and have to be punished accordingly. Some of the Chiefs appear to be spending more money than their salaries would warrant. Some peculation of public funds before they reach the treasury, we think, takes place. But all these phenomena have occurred elsewhere; sticky palms are not confined to Africa. At the same time, we know that improvement is taking place, that the natives are on the whole prosperous and happy, and that a healthy self-respecting national spirit exists. We think that we can secure further improvement by pursuing the course of normal racial development rather than by attempting to pour the native mass into a mould fashioned after our own likeness.

It may be asked how modern material improvements

can be effected under a system of Indirect Rule. For instance, how can the native Emirs and their staffs build railways? I do not suggest that they should. A certain elasticity must be allowed in the application of every principle. No doubt the Native Administrations will be able to perform such tasks in the future, if we handle them rightly, but for the present a certain degree of Direct Rule is I admit generally unavoidable. Great public works must be done by Europeans; and it is not, except in rare cases, expedient that such Europeans should be paid, promoted and dismissed by native Emirs. All the same, it is not necessary, in order to effect such useful purposes as these, to upset the whole social fabric of a people's existence.

It may also be asked how native groups already living under Direct Rule, whose institutions have been so interfered with and disarranged that they are moribund, are to be dealt with. With regard to such areas the solution is, I think, to resuscitate the native institutions. I believe that this would be perfectly feasible; and from conversations which I have had with natives who may be said to belong to the 'denationalised' class, but whose characters and mental abilities are strong enough to bring their judgment through the ordeal unscathed—and I am happy to say there are many such—I gather that this policy would meet with a large measure of support among these natives themselves. How often have I, after passing in review the work of some of our native clerks in Government service, or transacting business with 'denationalised' natives of the non-official classes, thought to how great an extent the man's energies and talents, character and ability, are being wasted! How infinitely greater would be the services which he would render to the community, how infinitely greater would be his own contentment, were he acting as a leader of native thought and development in some responsible post for which nature appears to have intended him!

In conclusion, it will be readily seen that the policy adopted, whether it be 'Direct' or 'Indirect,' affects almost every single act performed by the Government. The question whether our aim is to support and educate the native leaders to develope themselves and their people on native lines, or, on the other hand, to abolish

the native institutions and to rule the people ourselves or with the help of other natives who have become like ourselves, affects fundamentally every relation between the governed and the governors. An action wise under one policy would be crass stupidity under the other. It is therefore of vital importance that, even if it happens that the same system cannot be equally applied all over a colony or protectorate, it should be clearly understood under which of the two systems it is proposed to administer any given tribe or unit.

Every administrative officer placed in charge of natives will, even if the policy to be followed be not clearly defined by the Government, inevitably think the matter out for himself and adopt one system or the other. Of course where there is a government policy, he will put that into effect, whatever his own views may be. But, where no policy is declared, or if it be not distinctly defined, a divergence of views among the political officers will certainly occur. The result is incalculable hardship to the natives of all classes, especially to the Chiefs. One Resident may blame them for not exerting enough authority; the next may blame them for interfering too much. One Resident will encourage the people to go with complaints to their own chiefs; another may blame them for doing so, saying that they should have come to him. Thus jealousy and distrust is sown between the Chiefs and their people; and this finally leads to general discontent with the white man. My own view, based on considerable experience, is that, by following the principles of Direct Rule, we lead the natives, and ourselves, into a *cul-de-sac* from which it will be hard to escape. But at all events, in such a case, we march in more or less order. On the other hand, when we follow neither one policy nor the other, or both together, we land in the same *impasse*, but in a state of great disorder, which it will be still more difficult to rectify.

CHARLES L. TEMPLE.

Art. 4.—THE PRINCIPLES OF RECONSTRUCTION, II.*

1. *Ministry of Reconstruction. A List of Commissions and Committees set up to deal with Questions which will arise at the Close of the War.* [Cd 8916.] Wyman, 1918.
2. *Ministry of Reconstruction. Committee on Relations between Employers and Employed: Second Report on Joint Standing Industrial Councils.* [Cd 9002.] Wyman, 1918.
3. *Ibid.: Supplementary Report on Works Committees.* [Cd 9001.] Wyman, 1918.
4. *Ministry of Labour. Industrial Reports, No.* 2: *Works Committees.* Wyman, 1918.
5. *Past and Future.* By 'Jason.' Chatto & Windus, 1918.

And other works cited in Part I of this paper (Q.R., April, 1918).

II. Some Problems of the Future.

In discussing the views of certain representative groups with regard to the policy to be adopted after the war, we suggested last April that the logical completeness of their proposals was in some measure a defect, inasmuch as a tendency was thereby created to lay the chief emphasis on the legislative regulation of national life rather than on its animating principle. It is impossible to deny the attractiveness of proposals so concrete and so wide in scope as those contained in, for instance, the Labour Party Report on Reconstruction; but our hopes of a national renaissance must be based on something which goes deeper than organisation, and the 'full and conscious participation of every citizen in the national life' is likely to be impeded rather than facilitated by the imposition of a rigid and uniform system.

The principles underlying our idea of a renaissance have already been discussed, but, when we turn to the practical application of those principles in the life of the community, there is bound to come a sense of anti-climax such as is not felt in the working-out of a political or economic theory. For in the former case it is not possible, as it is in the latter, to embody in a concrete

* For Part I of this article see Q.R. for April, 1918.

and comprehensive programme the conceptions we have formed. This does not mean, however, that we are to be content with a merely emotional appeal. We have not, it is true, any single specific of universal applicability by which to solve all the many and complex questions with which we shall be faced at the close of the war; but it should be possible to deduce from the principles we have discussed an attitude towards the more representative of those questions which will indicate the general lines of their solution.

In the first place, it is essential to distinguish between what may be termed the emergency problems arising immediately out of the destruction and dislocation caused by the war, and the problems of permanent constructive policy which arise from its reactions upon the minds of men. In the former category fall all questions relating to demobilisation and to the economic situation created by war losses and by the prolonged interruption of productive activity. In the latter are comprised many questions of public policy to which the war has given a new prominence or an altered significance, such as the nature and limitations of democracy, the part to be assigned to the State in the initiation and direction of industrial and social progress, and the means by which a minimum standard of material and social welfare may be assured to the individual citizen. The emergency problems are in the main questions of expediency. They relate to the practical methods of passing through an economic crisis with the least possible suffering and disturbance. The constructive problems are of a more fundamental character. They are questions of principle which derive their urgency from the growing conviction that the exertions and sacrifices made during the war can be redeemed from futility only if the conclusion of peace becomes a definite landmark in human progress.

It will be observed that the emergency and constructive problems are in many respects closely related. The provision of employment, either for returned soldiers or for those whom they displace, raises many questions which cannot be disposed of without reference to the claims of Labour to a larger share in the control and in the fruits of industry. The combination of abnormal

needs with inadequate supplies in the years immediately following the war will challenge the adequacy of the whole existing economic system.

In this connexion between the necessities of the immediate crisis and the requirements of the future there is an obvious advantage, since it may be possible so to frame the emergency measures as to lay the foundations of a more permanent reconstruction. At the same time, this connexion involves serious dangers. Preparation for the task of dealing with demobilisation and with the other problems of transition economy cannot be postponed until the end of the war. Already the Ministry of Reconstruction has published a list of eighty-seven commissions and committees which are taking into consideration subjects ranging from the reinstatement of demobilised workers to the 'Machinery of Government,' from the legal position with regard to *ante-bellum* contracts to the broad questions of future commercial and industrial policy. In respect of many of these subjects, considerations relating to the immediate and to the more remote future are inextricably entangled; yet the need for immediate action is so urgent that it will hardly be possible to defer the preliminary steps until the nation has become familiar with the issues before it.

Although the emergency problems themselves arise from abnormal circumstances which justify their being met by the application of unusual remedies, the measures adopted will inevitably be seized upon as precedents for future policy. Especially will this be the case with regard to the extension of State control over economic activities. It is obvious that the new powers and functions acquired or exercised by Government during the war cannot be suddenly dropped. The disorganisation of the ordinary economic life of the country has been so complete that traders and manufacturers would find it impossible to take up once more the threads of business activity, without some assistance from the State in restoring the machinery which has been dislocated by the State's own action and necessities. It is obvious, too, that the assistance of the State will be required in meeting the abnormal demands caused, as in the case of housing, by a long suspension of productive activity

due to the absorption of labour and material by war industries. But the State Socialists have already announced in the clearest terms their intention of seizing this opportunity to press their own programme of progressive State control and ultimate nationalisation of industry; and there are many indications of a prospective alliance between the Labour Party and the new bureaucracy, to secure this end. On the other hand, the evidence of certain weaknesses in our industrial position revealed by the war has been hailed in some quarters as an opportunity of insinuating, almost without discussion, a radical change in our whole fiscal policy.*

Whatever may be the merits of these and other proposals, there is a serious danger that the nation may find itself committed to revolutionary changes in its economic and social policy without having had sufficient opportunity to consider the consequences, or even to become fully acquainted with what is being done. This danger might be averted, and the quick passage of emergency legislation assisted, if it were possible to arrive at a general and genuine agreement that steps taken in connexion with the transition from war to peace should be treated on their merits as emergency measures, without prejudice to future policy. Emergency legislation and organisation have always, however, a tendency to become permanent. A precedent is created; the onus of proof is shifted; and the weight of inertia, previously opposed to the innovation, is transferred to its support. In these circumstances it is particularly desirable that what is done under the pressure of the immediate crisis should be restricted so far as possible to genuine emergency measures, designed to meet specific difficulties, and not to introduce new principles of general application. It is always much easier to effect changes in the political or economic structure of society than to undo what has been done; and the danger of premature commitments is much greater than that of a more cautious policy proving a stumbling-block in the way of future progress.

These considerations are the more important because

* See the Report of the Commercial and Industrial Policy Committee (Cd 9035) and press comment thereon.

the conditions of life and men's ideas with regard to it are alike in a state of flux. No one can as yet predict with certainty the manner in which the conditions and habits of life of the community and of the individual will be affected after the war by the consequences of its appalling cost both in lives and treasure. It is equally impossible, while public attention is concentrated on the war and discussion is fettered by the limitations imposed by military exigencies, to gauge accurately the force and depth of the disturbance of ideas to which the great upheaval has given rise. All we do know is that, whenever we penetrate a little behind the decent reserve of the press and the platform, we find a tendency to challenge, even with some impatience, the worth of every existing human institution.

In such an atmosphere we need to beware especially of the two besetting sins of reformers: the tendency to consider problems as stabilised, and the tendency to compare the practical working of an existing system with the theoretical working of a proposed alternative. The desire to 'settle things once for all' is very strong and very pardonable, but it is a fruitful source of blunders. The life of men and of nations is not static but dynamic; and the conditions produced by their reaction upon each other and upon their environment undergo a perpetual change. The assumption of the stability of existing conditions in the pledges made to Labour has been the cause of endless disappointment and friction during the war. The grouping of powers or parties upon a basis of common policy is continually being shifted by the emergence of new forces which affect that policy itself. The attempt to fix permanently prices or wages is defeated by the perpetual fluctuation of money values. A rigid economic policy is liable to be stultified at any moment by the development of new markets, the discovery of new sources of supply, or the invention of a new process. Hence the policies and institutions marked by the greatest vitality are not those which are the most logically complete, but those which are most adaptable and capable of readjustment.

The temptation to confuse incidental errors of administration with the defects inherent to a system has been

strikingly illustrated in recent controversies. It has been displayed by critics both of the competitive economic system and of the manner in which State control has been exercised during the war. It has been seen in the controversy raised over secret diplomacy and democratic control, and in much of the criticism of democracy based on the collapse of Russia. Mistakes arising from human stupidity and human depravity are, unfortunately, inherent in the imperfection of humanity, and will arise under any system. It may fairly be argued that one system imposes a more satisfactory check than another upon such errors; but it is hopelessly unpractical to compare the ideal working of a proposed alternative with the actual results of an existing system, without allowance for the imperfection of the instruments which both must employ. At a time of intellectual ferment such as the present, there is grave danger of an unnecessary breach in the continuity of national traditions and development, through the hasty abolition of institutions whose vitality is not yet exhausted, in a moment of emotional reaction against their occasional abuse.

If we can shake ourselves free from these dangerous prepossessions, the period of transition will afford us an invaluable opportunity of studying the larger problems with which we have to deal, and testing the various methods by which it is proposed to deal with them. But, whether in dealing with the emergency or the constructive problems, the spirit in which we approach them will be the determining factor of our success. There has been an increasing tendency during the war to adopt expediency as the only test of policy, and to scout as impracticable and almost unpatriotic all appeals to national traditions or moral standards. Whatever excuse may be made for the adoption of this attitude during the progress of a life-and-death struggle, it is urgently necessary in the discussion of our future policy to re-establish the application of ethical standards to public affairs. The economic, political and social factors in human life are so inextricably entangled that, if we accept quality of life and not mere power or wealth as the touchstone of national success, we dare not, even in the consideration of economic or political questions, lose sight of the moral issues.

It is in the light of these issues that we shall have to examine that challenge to the existing social order which is being so generally flung down. Political institutions and economic systems alike will be assayed by their adaptability to that new and higher development of social relationships after which the nations are groping. It is by the opportunity offered to the individual human being to attain to 'a life fit for the dignity of man' that the success of our national policy will be tested; and no vested interests or traditional institutions can claim a prescriptive right save in so far as they conduce to this end.

Tried by this standard the existing social order shows to little advantage. The large proportion of the population whose means are insufficient for the attainment of a low minimum standard of food, clothing, and accommodation; the mass of preventible disease directly traceable to overcrowding, poverty and ignorance; the cramping routine which has deprived the majority of workers of any kind of joy or pride in their work; the purely material standard of success; the bitterness of class hostility—these things forbid us to accept without question the continued existence of the present framework of society. It is evident that there has been something wrong either in our social institutions or in the spirit in which they have been worked.

It is here that we are brought face to face with the first great problem which we have to solve. Can the existing political and economic systems be so transformed by the introduction of a new spirit as to bring them into line with the demands of an awakened public conscience, or must they be swept away to make room for a new social organisation, inspired by a loftier ideal?

It is in the latter sense that this question is answered by many influential groups of reformers. Socialists of all parties desire to subvert the existing economic system by the abolition of private ownership of capital and of the competitive principle. Fundamental changes in the Constitution are advocated both by the exponents of government by a single chamber, supplemented by a series of popularly elected administrative committees, and by those more extreme revolutionaries who desire

to replace the State itself by a multiplication of self-contained local or functional units.

Freely as we admit the claim that the institutions thus threatened must be judged by their fruits, we cannot afford lightly to abandon that body of corporate achievement, corporate traditions, and corporate ideals, which has been built up by the common effort of many generations; nor can we admit that the possibilities of further progress on the lines of organic development have yet been exhausted. The failures of the past have been due mainly to an insufficient recognition of civic obligations on the part of the community as a whole; and without a more active sense of these obligations no mere reorganisation of machinery will do much to improve the quality of national life. The economic doctrines of Socialism are rightly based upon the conception of all productive and distributive activity as a form of public service; but it is impossible, under any conceivable socialistic system, to compel any man to serve the community to his maximum capacity, and the difficulty increases in proportion with the value of his services. You can compel a man by law to work at a particular job in the public interest for so many hours a day; but you cannot compel him to put his maximum powers of hand and brain into that work, and you cannot compel an inventor to invent. Whether we remove the element of private profit altogether or allow it to remain as an additional incentive to effort, and—what is still more important—a tangible index of the demand for special products and a criterion of successful service, we shall obtain the maximum improvement in our economic and social condition only by the development of a deeper sense of responsibility on the part of all who are engaged in production and distribution. Nor is this spirit excluded by the competitive principle so long as competition is confined to the perfecting of organisation and the improvement of quality, so long, that is to say, as the object of competition is the privilege of service. In the same way, no reorganisation of the machinery of government will bring us appreciably nearer to Utopia so long as any considerable section of those charged with the task of legislation and administration, or of the electorate itself, is governed by the desire to promote sectional

interests, by fallacious ideas of what can be achieved by legislation, or by a low and material standard of human life. Nor is it possible by the widest adoption of decentralisation and democratic control to exclude the possibility of undue influence being exercised by active and well-organised minorities, or of measures which are not approved by the public conscience being carried by the bargaining of groups for mutual support.

To say that a suggested innovation will not of itself bring about the millennium is not, of course, sufficient to put it out of court; but, in view of the very grave difficulties and dangers attendant upon sudden, sweeping changes in the constitution of society, it is at least worth while to see how far the working of the existing systems can be transformed by the introduction of a new spirit, before embarking upon a vast and uncertain experiment. The clean sweep may involve a false start, and the effort to attain mechanical perfection is apt to strangle natural growth.

We shall be met, of course, by the familiar argument that any attempt to remedy obvious and pressing grievances, which leaves the main outline of the existing political and economic systems unchanged, tends to divert attention from their fundamental evils. Thus, the Guild Socialists, who avow themselves to be 'revolutionary in purpose, and, for the time being, reformist in tactics,' assert that their immediate work 'is directed solely to the prosecution of that class-war aim, and in no way to the securing of reforms for making tolerable the existing order'; and it is for this reason that they refuse to co-operate in the Whitley Scheme of industrial organisation.* With regard to this attitude, it may be said that a very strong faith in the infallible and exclusive efficacy of a single specific is needed to justify the contemptuous rejection of every other form of effort and experiment. It is, however, more important to observe that the whole assumption on which that attitude is based is demonstrably false. The experience of the past goes to prove that every step gained in freedom, knowledge, or material welfare, tends to create new demands so long as anything is left to achieve; and that

* Letter in the 'Nation,' March 16, 1918.

real and stable progress is more often the result of gradual organic development than the production of revolutions, which have a knack of yielding results widely divergent from those contemplated by their promoters. Success in the reshaping of our national life will be attained not by the tactical triumph of any one group in imposing its particular shibboleth upon the community, but by experimental measures containing within themselves the seeds of development and expansion, and possessing sufficient elasticity to respond to new demands arising from the gradual development of the public conscience or from the teachings of experience.

It is not by unqualified acceptance of any single standpoint that we shall solve what is likely to be the most pressing problem of the immediate future—the reconciliation of freedom for personal development with the due discharge by the State of its functions as Trustee for the community. The criticism both of State Socialism and of bureaucratic centralisation in Part I of this paper was based mainly on their transference of responsibility and initiative from the individual to the State; and it is evident that, if character, rather than power or wealth, is adopted as the touchstone of national life, it is necessary to leave an ample field for individual activity and self-expression. The general right of each man to determine his own actions and to exercise his own judgment is essential to all moral, as distinguished from merely mechanical, progress. But we are not necessarily thus committed to accepting in its entirety the doctrine of *laissez-faire* preached by the 19th-century economists. The freedom which we seek for the individual members of the community is not an unrestricted licence to pursue selfish interests, but freedom to receive and render reciprocal service. Within certain limits, the pursuit by each individual of his own interest may conduce to the common good, inasmuch as profit can be derived only from those services for which there is a general or particular demand; but it is evident that, where the motives of activity are purely selfish, and bargaining power is unequal, the personal end may be attained at the expense of others; and, however clearly we may recognise the superiority of moral influences over legislative checks, there is an evident necessity for

imposing some restraint upon those who, in pursuit of their own aims, impede the legitimate activities of others. It is, in fact, for this very purpose that the State, as the instrument and expression of the common will, has been brought into being.

Moreover, the possibilities of self-development and self-expression which are open to any individual, and consequently the extent of the service which he can render to the community, are dependent not only upon his own character or energies, but upon the conditions of his environment, and upon his ability to attain that standard of physical and intellectual development which the conditions of the communal life demand. If his opportunities are cramped or his faculties blighted by ignorance, lack of leisure, or unhealthy conditions of life, he can neither obtain for himself his proper share of the fruits of the common effort, nor contribute effectively to the development of national life. While, therefore, we are prepared to oppose the claim of the State to prescribe and direct the daily activities of its citizens, we must not deny its duty to ensure conditions favourable to the free exercise of their powers.

It is for this reason that we support the provision by the State of *educational facilities* and the exercise of compulsory powers to ensure their utilisation. Compulsory education has been opposed in the past on the ground that it interfered with the liberty of the parent in the discharge of his parental responsibilities. This argument is obviously fallacious. The child is not the personal property of the parent, but a member or prospective member of the community, with a right to such equipment as is required for playing a worthy part in the national life; and the community has a right to expect that it shall be so equipped. It is desirable that there should be, so far as possible, a free choice of schools, and that the door should be kept open for private educational experiment; but it lies undoubtedly within the province of the State to insist that every child shall receive what the public conscience recognises as the minimum educational equipment, and that those capable of profiting by a more extended education should have the opportunity to acquire it.

It is in regard to the standard to be fixed that the greatest difference of opinion is likely to arise. The old idea that the education of working-class children should be mainly confined to immediate preparation for industrial employment dies hard even among the workers themselves, though there are many signs of an increasing demand for a greater share of humanistic culture.* Many enlightened employers freely admit that a good general education affords a better foundation for subsequent technical instruction than a purely vocational training; but the real point at issue goes somewhat deeper than this. The purpose of education is to fit the child and the adolescent to play his or her part in the world and not merely in the workshop. For this purpose the formation of character, the development of intelligence and of the capacity to observe and reflect, are of greater importance than the actual instruction imparted; and no small share in acquiring the great and difficult art of living together is derived unconsciously from the organised games, the delegated responsibilities, and the daily associations of school life in work and play. The pursuit of these aims does not exclude direct vocational training during the years of adolescence; but it does forbid the idea of that training occupying the primary position in the curriculum, and it requires its application during the later years of the educational course to be linked as closely as possible with the development of general culture.

Indeed, the formative influence of education on character and intelligence during the years of adolescence is the strongest argument for the raising of the school age, and it is mainly on this account that we regret the apparent concessions recently made to those employers, happily fast diminishing in number, whose chief interest is in maintaining the supply of cheap child and adolescent labour. It is necessary, however, to recognise that there are many homes in which the urgent need for supplementing an inadequate family income renders every restriction on juvenile employment a real and immediate hardship. Yet such restrictions are absolutely necessary both in order to enable an adequate educational course to be provided and to enable full advantage to be taken

* See pamphlet 'What the Worker wants of Education,' published by the Workers' Educational Association.

of the opportunities offered. Apart from the question of the leaving age, it is impossible for children to derive full benefit from attendance at school if they come to it wearied out; and, on this account alone, the prohibition of juvenile employment is amply justified.

The provision of educational facilities is equally useless in cases where children are prevented from profiting therefrom by curable *physical defects* or by weakness arising from *malnutrition*. The work of the Medical Inspectors and Care Committees has done much to reduce the percentage; but this work could be rendered far more effective by better organisation and the granting of more direct compulsory powers. Here again there is no real question of interference with individual liberty. The majority of parents are only too glad to avail themselves of advice and assistance in the medical care of their children; and, as in the case of school attendance, they should be made to feel that the process is one of co-operation rather than of compulsion. In the comparatively rare cases of real indifference, it is unjust that the children should be allowed to suffer.

The nature of many medical defects and the question of feeding necessitous school-children bring us, however, on to very difficult ground, which includes also questions such as housing, sanitation, infant welfare and maternity assistance. In these cases the issue is complicated by the fact that the evils from which we are suffering have their root in the economic and social blindness of the past. We have to face the fact that a large percentage of the population are unable to pay an economic rent for accommodation attaining a low minimum standard of decency and comfort, to provide themselves and their children with adequate food and clothing, or to pay for proper medical assistance.

There is here a strong case for State provision of *housing* at rents adjusted to the capacity of the poorest class, for extended free provision of medical assistance, especially in the case of infants and mothers, for the feeding of necessitous school-children, and for the subsidisation of school attendance from the time at which the child would be capable of contributing to the family income. It is futile to expect satisfactory self-development or a keen sense of social obligations from those

whose whole environment is equally detrimental to health, decency, and self-respect. It is absurd to talk about interference with personal or parental responsibility in the case of those whose circumstances and conditions give them no opportunity rightly to exercise it. The real objection to State subsidisation is that it tends almost inevitably to divert attention from the fundamental problem of the position of unorganised and ill-organised workers. While the urgency of the problems may compel direct State action of a palliative nature, the primary essential of permanent reform is the introduction in the worse-paid industries of such organisation as will enable the employers to pay higher wages and the workers to demand them.

The means by which this may be accomplished will be discussed later; but the guiding principle of the policy adopted should clearly be, while removing so far as possible the obstacles presented by the results of past mistakes or inefficiency, to raise the economic condition of the mass of the people to the level at which they can procure for themselves the elements of a decent and healthy life. Only when this has been done can it be said that the individual members of the community are really free to exercise the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship.

The provision of *amenities* which are in their nature public rather than private possessions, such as open spaces, baths and gymnasia, will in any case remain in the hands of the State or the Municipalities; but, in so far as the fundamental aim is accomplished, it will be possible for the State to abstain from the direct provision of private amenities, and to confine itself to the imposition of standards, representing the minimum demanded by the public conscience, to which private enterprise must conform. The vexed question of housing, for instance, will never be finally settled until the labourer, whether in town or country, is able to pay an economic rent, or to effect purchase through a building or co-operative society at a price yielding a fair margin of profit; but it will always remain for the State to see that the accommodation which he receives in return conforms to hygienic standards, and that town-planning is carried out with a due regard to social interests.

Of still greater difficulty is the question of ensuring that *access to land*, whether for building or for cultivation, which is an essential condition of free individual development. The difficulties at present existing in the way of such access arise, in large measure, from the restricted resources of those who need it, and may to a great extent be overcome by an improvement in the economic condition of the rent-payer, and by the association of small holders for more effective cultivation and the hire of capital and machinery. A simplification of the system and reduction in the cost of transfer and registration of titles would prove of considerable assistance. But it is impossible not to recognise the fact that there may be urgent social needs for the acquisition of land which the owner has no desire either to sell or to develop. The issue has been obscured by the exaggerations of those who expect the deer forest to blossom like the rose and ignore all augmentation in values through clearing, fencing or improvements. The right to withhold large quantities of an urgently needed commodity from the market cannot, however, properly be conceded. At the same time, the exercise of an autocratic power of expropriation is objectionable both in practice and in principle. It is possible to conceive the establishment in particular districts of special tribunals, representative of landowners and purchasers, with members appointed by the State or the Municipality, and the assistance of agricultural or building experts, to decide whether a case for the compulsory acquisition of undeveloped land had been made out, and if so, to adjudicate upon the terms of purchase.

It is not sufficient, however, in order to ensure freedom of self-development, that opportunities and facilities should be provided. It is necessary also to restrain those who abuse their freedom by using it in a manner directly detrimental to others, or by which the legitimate activities of others may be impeded. There are some who would go still further, and contend that it is the right and duty of the State to regulate the private life and habits of its citizens, on the ground that a man who, by his own folly, diminishes his value as a social unit, is thereby defrauding the community of the services to

which it is entitled. The plea is specious but untenable. It is not possible in practice to enforce a standard of positive conduct, and to compel a man by law to be generous and prudent, or even to be chaste and temperate. And, if it were possible, compulsory conformity with an external standard would be a poor exchange for the surrender of free-will. Moreover, such regulation usually implies, as in the case of *prohibition*, the sacrifice of the majority who make good use of their liberty, for the sake of the minority who abuse it. The prohibition of actions directly injurious to others stands on a different footing; and few to-day would deny the right of the State to take action in such matters as the adulteration of food and the failure to isolate persons suffering from infectious diseases, or to prohibit methods of production, whether commercially profitable or not, which are injurious to the health of those employed.

A stronger case for positive compulsion can be made out with regard to the regulation of production in the interest of 'first things first.' But it is very doubtful whether any centralised authority could effect the perpetual delicate adjustments of supply to demand requisite for the correlation of production to public needs, without a margin of waste and failure still larger than that produced by the operation of economic laws under the existing system. It would be necessary, moreover, to exercise a control over the consumer as well as the producer, which would be strongly resented by the very classes whom it was intended to benefit. The most effective stimulus to the production of necessaries will come from an increase in the purchasing power of the majority and a more equitable adjustment of taxation.

There is, however, one field in which an increase of State regulation of industry during the next few years may be looked upon as certain. The enormous power wielded by great *financial and industrial combinations* has constituted them to some extent *imperia in imperio;* and their activities may easily become a disturbing influence in the social order. Combinations having for their object the elimination of wasteful competition and overlapping, better organisation of methods, or the exchange of information, may fairly claim to derive their profits from the rendering of better service, but

there are also combinations whose object is not service but exploitation, and whose profits are derived from concerted, artificial manipulations of the market.

Apart from this danger to the consumer, an unhealthy feature of the tendency to amalgamation is the obstacle thus placed in the way of individual enterprise. While many big associations are purely voluntary in character and many are based on the idea of co-operation rather than of amalgamation, there are others whose object, avowed or unavowed, is to crush out or absorb the individual trader by cornering materials, cutting prices, tying down customers, and gaining control over the channels of information. The elimination of the small trader entails distinct social disadvantages, involving as it does the stereotyping of products, the progressive dehumanisation of trade and industry, and the loss of valuable elements in the social life of the nation. Moreover, this use of competitive methods to crush out free competition is an instance of interested interference with the legitimate activities of others which justifies and calls for the intervention of the State. The methods by which the State can most effectively intervene for the protection either of the consumer or of private enterprise are at present receiving consideration from a Committee of the Ministry of Reconstruction; and the problem is undoubtedly one of the most urgent and important of the immediate future, especially in view of the stimulus given to combination and consolidation by State encouragement during the war and by the Report of the Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy.

This necessity for State supervision in the interests of the individual and of the community extends not only to trading associations but to all great industrial, commercial and professional organisations. There are very grave dangers in the development of the political strike, in which the power acquired by a Labour organisation for industrial purposes is employed to force on the community—by cutting off the supply of essential services or products—schemes for which it has been unable to find acceptance by argument and persuasion. It must be remembered, however, that precisely the same objection applies to the undoubted, though less obvious, deflexion of national policy by financial interests. Indeed,

the whole question of the use of economic organisations and influence to affect social and political policy requires careful investigation.

This adjustment of power and responsibility between the State, as representative of the whole nation in all its various phases of activity, and autonomous bodies representing particular groups, acquires additional significance from the overwhelming arguments in favour of a great extension of both *local and functional devolution*. It has become evident that the result of over-centralisation is to clog the legislative and administrative machinery of the country with a mass of minutiæ, which handicaps it seriously in attempting to deal with the wider questions of national policy; while, at the same time, the attempt of the central authority to legislate in detail for the country as a whole is apt to be defeated by a lack of sufficient acquaintance with the varied conditions and requirements of particular localities and of particular industries or professions.

Even more important than the question of administrative efficiency is the relation of devolution to questions of national life and character. If we are to base our hopes for the future upon the development of a deeper sense of civic obligations and personal responsibility, rather than upon State compulsion, it will be essential that there should be a conscious recognition by individuals of their privileges and responsibilities as members of a great community, and of their full participation in the national life. This sense of participation will not be given by mere inclusion in the Parliamentary electorate; for the opportunities for the exercise of the franchise are too few and far between, the influence of the individual vote too small, and the issues frequently too complex and too remote from the daily life and experience of the majority of voters. In order that the ordinary man may feel that he plays an effective part in the national life, it is necessary to give him some share of control over his immediate environment, the conditions in which he lives and works. He is more easily and more keenly interested in the limited questions which concern his daily personal life than in the larger but more remote problems which concern the whole community

in its corporate aspect. The responsibility which he recognises most readily is that which he feels towards those with whom he is thrown in daily personal contact; and the strength of local feelings and associations, the pride of place, and the tenacity of local customs and traditions, may all become invaluable means of linking up the life of the individual with that of the community.

The development of Local Government has made great strides within the last half-century, and has done much to preserve and to reawaken a feeling of local patriotism which is by no means incompatible with patriotism in its broader aspect. A man will make all the better citizen of the nation if he feels that he plays an effective part in controlling the affairs of his parish, his ward or his municipality. The exercise of the local franchise, where the individual vote plays a larger part and the issues are familiar, is an invaluable education in the intelligent use of political power which will have its effect in the use made of the Parliamentary vote.

It should be the object of Government to foster as much as possible this interest in local affairs by an extension of the powers of option and initiative possessed by local authorities, and to enlist the active co-operation of all who are willing to assist in the administration of local affairs by service on executive or advisory committees, as school managers, or in any other capacity. Whatever may be said as to the executive weakness of committees, the committee system does afford some guarantee that administrative policy shall reflect the common conscience and the common will; and it ensures the leavening of public opinion by an increasing number of men and women who have acquired some practical familiarity with the issues of public policy and with the possibilities and limitations of administrative action.

If, however, interest in local administration is to be sustained, it is necessary that the authority and responsibility conferred upon local bodies should be real and definite. At present, generally speaking, the powers of local authorities are confined to those specifically assigned to them by Parliament. The principle should rather be to extend their powers to anything not specifically forbidden. The sense of responsibility awakened would be

far greater, and the nation as a whole would gain by the increased elasticity of administration and the wide field opened to social experiment, while the veto of the State would provide sufficient guarantee against action being taken which might prove detrimental to other areas, or to the general interests of the nation.

The successful development of Local Devolution depends in large measure upon the extent to which the spirit of local communal life is fostered by the growth of Voluntary Associations. Educational, recreative, or productive societies, which bring together those associated in daily life for the fulfilment of a common purpose, have an important share in producing the necessary recognition of mutual dependence. Co-operative societies of consumers, whatever their economic value, have no particular significance in this respect; but the co-operative societies of producers, which are rapidly increasing in numbers, may not only go a long way towards solving some of our agricultural and industrial difficulties, but are based upon the very fundamentals of communal life. The co-operative housing societies have also their social as well as their economic side; and in the State and municipal housing programme necessitated by the suspension of building during the war, due provision should be made to prevent injury to such societies by the competition of subsidised accommodation.

The principle of Functional Devolution has always been recognised in the powers and status conferred on such professional associations as the Bar and Medical Councils and the Incorporated Law Society. It is exemplified also in such bodies as Port Authorities and Harbour Trusts. The creation of similar administrative organisations, representative of all industrial interests concerned, of the consumer, of the Municipalities, and of the State, may prove the most practical method of dealing with such great branches of internal transport and supply as are essentially monopolistic in their nature.

The most important aspect of Functional Devolution is, however, its bearing on the great problem of the organisation of industry for the purpose of ensuring more effective production and more equitable distribution of wealth, and of introducing a new spirit and purpose into all industrial activity. It is this question

which is the subject of the three reports issued by the Whitley Committee. The scheme which they have worked out has the great advantage of providing both for the autonomous administration of each industry as a whole by Joint Councils representative of all engaged in the industry, and for the consideration of local problems and specific questions arising in particular establishments, by District Boards and Shop Committees, representative of those immediately concerned. It is an additional advantage of the scheme that it is voluntary, elastic in constitution, and based not on the supersession but on the utilisation of the existing organisations—the Trade Unions and Employers' Federations.

In all Functional Devolution there is a certain danger of conflict between the powerful organisations created—of tyranny within the unit, and of undue prominence being given to a single phase of communal life. The first of these dangers does not yet appear to have been considered by the Committee, and it will probably be necessary to create some machinery by which the competing claims of various industries may be adjusted; but the risk of internal tyranny and the possible neglect of social interests are provided against both by the organisation proposed and the objects for which it is created.

For the purposes of the scheme all industries are divided into three categories. Those in which organisation is still rudimentary would be dealt with by the establishment of Trade Boards, representative of employers and employed, with a proportion of 'nominated members.' Such boards would possess authority in all matters of wages and working conditions; but they would also concern themselves with encouraging and facilitating such growth of organisation within the industry as would justify the Ministry of Labour in sanctioning the replacement of the Trade Board by a Joint Industrial Council representative of the Employers' Federations and Trade Unions. In industries where organisation, though imperfect, had reached an advanced stage, the creation of a Joint Council would receive immediate sanction; but the assistance of one or two members appointed by the Ministry would be given for so long as the Council itself should desire their presence. Finally, fully organised industries would be left to work

out their own salvation by means of a Joint Industrial Council, upon which the Ministry of Labour would be empowered to confer, at its own request, the status and authority of a Trade Board. In the case of both the latter categories, District Boards and Works Committees would be associated with the Council; and Trade Boards, linked with the Council, would be provided for special areas or branches in which organisation was backward.

These recommendations are on the right lines, and it may be said in general that proposals for making membership of functional organisations compulsory, or for the legislative application of their decisions outside their own membership, should only be carried out in cases where these bodies are so fully representative as to embody the corporate conscience of the industry or profession concerned. There is a valuable suggestion in the Builders' proposal for the creation of two distinct codes: one a compulsory code for which legislative sanction would be sought, confined to measures on which there was general agreement; the other a voluntary code proposed for experimental adoption. It must not be forgotten that compulsory powers are not essential to the exertion of widespread influence. Obedience to an unwritten code of professional conduct is a familiar feature of many walks of life; and the influence of unofficial organisations often extends far beyond their own membership. The nature and growth of the authority exercised by such bodies as the Jockey Club and the M.C.C. in the world of sport are well worthy of examination by students of social phenomena.

As regards the scope and object of the Whitley Councils, this embraces not only questions of wages and hours, but the improvement of methods of production and the general status of the industry. The agenda proposed for the Builders' Council includes the closer approximation of commercial and æsthetic requirements; and there is amongst both employers and employed a growing recognition of the fact that those engaged in production have a duty to the community, and that a man's work forms so important a portion of his life that his interest in it extends, beyond the money he receives and the conditions under which he works, to the worthiness of the work performed. Moreover, the connexions

between industry and social life are so close that the Councils may well come to play an important part in the consideration of many social problems, with the result of contributing valuable elements to the discussion, broadening their own outlook, and emphasising the indivisibility of national life.

It is not to be expected that the establishment of these Councils, which involves many difficult questions of industrial demarcation, should proceed rapidly, especially during the continuance of the war, nor is it to be expected that blunders will not be made at the outset; but the experiment is so important that a large amount of patience and tolerance may fairly be demanded. 'At the outset it might often happen that much of the discussion, either in a Works Committee or a National Industrial Council, was obstructive or irrelevant. But it has been proved again and again that contact breeds mutual understanding and responsibility calls forth capacity.'* The principle of Devolution involves faith in the willingness and ability of the nation to shoulder responsibility and to recognise obligations. It involves, also, the acceptance of certain risks. But the most highly centralised State direction can afford no guarantee of immunity from blunders, and the blunders of autocracy go deeper and are harder to rectify.

When all is said and whatever machinery is adopted, our national future depends upon the conception we form of national and individual life, its nature, its value, and its purpose. If we place our trust in power or wealth for its own sake, we may attain our end, but at the cost of all that is best in our national traditions and character. If we base our conception of national welfare on the fulfilment of the mutual obligations of the citizens, upon the sanctity and dignity of the individual life, and upon the nobility of service, we shall not go far wrong, whatever development our institutions may take.

C. Ernest Fayle.

* 'Memorandum on the Industrial Situation,' issued by the Garton Foundation.

Art. 5.—THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL.

1. *The Law Reports*, 1908–1917.
2. *The Criminal Appeal Reports.*
3. *Le Système Judiciaire de la Grande Bretagne.* Par le Comte de Franqueville. Paris: Rothschild, 1893.
4. *Die Englische Gerichtsverfassung.* Von Prof. Dr H. B. Gerland. Leipzig: Göschen, 1910.
5. *The Court of Criminal Appeal.* By R. E. Ross, LL.B., Principal Clerk of the Court. Butterworth, 1911.
6. *Outlines of Criminal Law.* By C. S. Kenny, Downing Professor of the Laws of England. Eighth edition. Cambridge University Press, 1917.

It is just ten years since the greatest innovation made by one stroke in English law empowered judges at once to reverse the verdict of a jury on the facts of a criminal case and to revise sentences. It has been said that no institution ever does only what it is designed to do; it always does something else as well. So it has been in this instance. This we may enquire into presently; but first let us see how the new institution came into being. The records of the Court now contain material enough to illustrate its origin, its development and its efficiency.

For our immediate purpose we need not carry back our researches to any precise date. For centuries before 1848 the twelve common-law judges had been in the habit of meeting to consider, on the suggestion of that one of their brethren who had presided at a trial at which a criminal had been convicted, whether his doubts on some point of law which he had ruled at the trial were well founded, and whether, if so, they would recommend a pardon or some mitigation of sentence. They had no other constitutional power, for they were an informal body. The simple and august machinery of the royal prerogative to which they resorted, was as old as kingship, and has always been exercised, independently of judicial initiative, on the merits of the case; and this prerogative remains undiminished. It is still the only refuge after appeal for belated exculpations, due, perhaps, to the discovery of demonstrative testimony or to remorseful confession. The only other alternative to these

merciful deliberations was the cumbrous technical process known as 'error,' which was a very costly expedient.

These conclaves of judges were superseded in 1848; but once, in 1885, in order to review a decision of the superseding tribunal—the Court for Crown Cases Reserved—it was found convenient to revive the old 'assembly of the judges.' That Court, composed of at least five members, was created in 1848 to enable a Judge of Assize or a Recorder, or a Quarter Sessions bench, when a jury convicted, to take its opinion whether he or they had determined some point of law correctly at the trial; if not, it had power to quash the conviction. The flaw here, as experience has shown, was that the case could only be thus 'stated' with the consent of the Judge or the bench whose law was impugned; if he or they had no doubt, nothing could be done for the defendant.

It is a mistake to suppose that the sensational Beck case of 1904 created the demand for reorganisation, though no doubt it quickened it. There were just men before 1907; for half a century at least a series of bills had been brought in to establish a court of criminal appeal; one introduced by Mr Fitzroy Kelly in 1844 is before us. But the crucial point in the Act of 1907 is that the initiative comes from the defendant, and not from the Judge* at the trial unless he chooses to give leave; no one's leave need be sought to test a point of law; and on a question of fact the only leave necessary is that of a Judge who has had nothing to do with the trial or, if he refuses, that of three other Judges. In short, the scene of preliminary contest for appeal has been transferred from the local court, in effect, to the King's Bench Division.

The epoch, then, of the new Court is marked by the recognition in law that a jury's verdict is not infallible. The jury could indeed often be a near approach to tyranny. Yet it had in the course of ages become sacrosanct; and the proposal to subject its primeval privilege, the determination of facts, to the revision of three lawyers naturally gave a shock to the John Bull tradition, and was promptly met by the outcry that the authority of the jury would be undermined. Trial by

* 'Judge' here means president of the bench and includes lay-chairmen.

jury—Blackstone's 'Palladium'—was to be replaced by trial by judges. This has, in fact, occasionally happened —with the result which attended the malediction of the Abbot of Rheims; nobody has been one penny the worse, and a few prisoners have been sensibly the better. The jury stands in public opinion exactly where it did in 1908, but its absolutism is now limited.

For the new Court has been a success. The last constructive experiment with which it can be compared is that of the Commercial Court established in 1895, which may fairly be described as a legal novelty. Both marked an abandonment of precedent and a bold adaptation of means and materials to ends, and both have been successful. In the ten years under review no doubt some mistakes have been made, but in the handling of facts we believe that in only two instances has the Court been demonstrably—by its own admission—wrong. Those cases sufficiently reveal the triple bulwark of legal safeguards—no longer, owing to the abeyance of the Grand Jury, quadruple. In one case, a man convicted on July 10, 1910, was refused leave to appeal; on Aug. 10 he petitioned the Home Secretary, who exercised his right to refer the matter back to the Court; the conviction was quashed on Aug. 18, 1911. In the other instance, it was a second conviction, which, as in Beck's case, led to ultimate rehabilitation. After a conviction which took place on Dec. 18, 1911, a sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment with hard labour was imposed; leave to appeal was refused on Jan. 22, 1912; eight days later the same man was sentenced, for a similar offence, to three years' penal servitude (to be concurrent with the other term); the Home Secretary intervened, and on March 25 both convictions were quashed. It is a commonplace that in England some guilty persons escape conviction in order that no innocent person may be convicted; yet, even at this price, total immunity cannot, as we see, be attained, even at second hand, or indeed under any system. But, at any rate, this risk has been reduced to a minimum in jury cases; some people think that the time has come when police-court convictions should be similarly handled.

In a few cases the Court has quashed convictions where appellants had actually served their sentences or

part of them, to the abiding joy of those reformers who regarded it as a chronic grievance that before 1908 there was no relief for such unfortunate persons except by pardon. It may be added that, in one case, the House of Lords has loosed where the Court had bound, while, in another, the parts have been reversed. In three out of five such super-appeals in all, the Lords have confirmed the Court. The correction, then, of mistakes of 'fact' has been one of its primary duties.

Yet, if it be asked wherein the Court has done its best service to the country, we are disposed to think that it has been by its discipline of the benches of jury-courts—that is, of lawyers and lay-chairmen as much as, if not more than, of juries. Its chief diet was supposed to consist of verdicts, but it has in fact consisted of summings-up. Error, which long gave its name to the most stately legal protest—which still survives, though not perhaps in great vigour, in Ireland—is now chiefly represented in what used to be called the charge to the jury and is generally spoken of as the direction or the summing-up. Here the Court has, at any rate in expert opinion, done its most valuable work in regulating and inspiring; and the code still grows.

'Misdirection' is the burden of most of such appeals. In other words, the most frequent complaint on a point of law is that, when the whole case is finally handed to the jury with a commentary from the bench, the defence has not been fully or fairly reproduced. That commentary is naturally a target for the lawyer and the layman. The former is the guardian of his science as well as the *patronus* of his client, and has been jealous for his law since the date of the Twelve Tables. The apparatus for nailing down bad legal currency in our courts is almost perfect, and little more need be said about it. It was, as we saw, refurbished in 1848; and its enormously greater employment since 1908 is due, no doubt, to the simple fact that the appellant may be, and generally is, put to no expense for legal aid.

It is true that, generally speaking, no law is required in directing a jury; common sense is enough. But, after all, there is an art of oratory; and every occasion for its display has its temptations. For this the Court makes full allowance by declining to dissect these speeches

'microscopically' or as a 'treatise' on the law. It must be remembered that over most County Quarter Sessions a country gentleman presides. He is, of course, a valuable national asset, but his chairmanship is nowadays that function of his which is exposed to the strongest professional and unprofessional criticism. There are indeed to-day few survivals of the Pepys who wrote in 1660: 'We were sworn Justices of the Peace for Middlesex, Essex, Kent, Southampton, with which honour I did find myself mightily pleased, though I am wholly ignorant of the duties of a Justice.' The worst that can be said under this head is that such chairmen are not always good speakers; and, since they are acting as oracles—for so juries happily regard the bench—the expression of the critical last word becomes important. Yet it cannot be denied that the occasional forensic vagaries of a county magnate are often matched by those of lawyers who ought to know better; and, among the severe lessons which the Court has from time to time read to such public servants, the most emphatic have been addressed to the gentlemen of the robe.

At any rate, here the Court reverts to the time-honoured rôle of the King's Bench—its other self, so to say—as *corrector Bestius* of all inferior criminal (and other) jurisdictions in the country. In fact, every class of presiding judicial officer, including their brother Judges of the High Court, comes in turn before the Court for judgment in respect of their charge. The spectacle was once fairly common (and is not unknown now) of Judges concurring in 'reversing' themselves, though this can seldom happen in the new tribunal, because of the prevailing convention that the trial Judge should not sit on an appeal from his own Court. The net result is that the Court has practically created a new learning, a pathology of 'misdirection.'

Popular interest, however, concentrates on something less scientific. 'Reasonable' in English law often means what you can get twelve plain citizens, at least, to agree upon. The great reform of 1907 did not ignore this principle, and had no intention of letting loose a flood of attempts to reverse conviction from every dissatisfied criminal in the country. Serviceable breakwaters, which have weathered well, were accordingly constructed. An

appeal against conviction must either be certified by the Judge at the trial or must run the gauntlet of one other Judge or more before it can be heard. The principle on which the Court allows a verdict to be challenged was speedily formulated. In an early case the late Lord Alverstone, who as titular guardian of the Common Law devoted himself to moulding the procedure of the new Court, said: 'The Court has been asked to re-try this case; this, as the Court has already stated, it will not do. . . . The administration of the Act will become impossible if they [counsel] address the Court on topics proper only to be addressed to the jury at the trial.' In other words, the Court is not the place for a mere re-hearing.

Here we venture on our first criticism, for a re-hearing is exactly what the public, which clamoured to Parliament, thought that it was going to get. And surely this is what the Legislature intended that the country should get, when it enacted as follows:

'The Court . . . on any appeal against conviction shall allow the appeal if they think that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.'

This is a plain charter to the smaller jury of three—the least and the usual but not the only number of appeal Judges—to review the finding of the larger body. Nor has the Court ever hesitated to do so 'in a proper case,' in which, oddly enough, they have not invariably included that in which the presiding Judge thought there ought to have been an acquittal. For instance, in 1912, during a trial for theft, the foreman of the jury remarked that nothing had been said about the previous character of the accused. Information on this point is forbidden, and none was given. After the man was convicted, with a recommendation that he should be treated as a first offender, it came out that the sceptical foreman had imparted his suspicions to his fellows, and thus, presumably, influenced their decision. The man had, in fact, been previously convicted eighteen times and had often been in penal servitude. The Court quashed the conviction, 'though in all probability the verdict was right,' because it was arrived at in a wrong way. By all

means be on the safe side, but why disclaim re-trying cases? Again, in 1913, a judgment says:

'This Court has said that it does not proceed on such lines as these—to look at the evidence, see what conclusion the Court would have come to, and set aside the verdict if it does not correspond with such conclusion. There have been cases where the Court has done so on a question of fact alone, but only where the verdict was obviously and palpably wrong. . . . It is not necessary to say whether we [that is, three judges] would have given the same verdict.'

But surely, if they would not, it was their function to say so, which comes to the same thing. If they—at any rate unanimously—come to a conclusion contrary to that found by the jury, are they to sit still and allow some one whom they believe innocent to be condemned? Even the single judge of first instance is not reduced to that necessity, for he can impose a nominal sentence or advise the Home Secretary.

Then there is a type of cases where the Court does not doubt, or rather, will not examine the guilt of the accused —so that no question of the verdict on its merits arises— but, owing to some technical misdirection on the law or some omission ('non-direction') declines to assume that the jury would have found the same verdict if the mistake had not been made. Thus, a lucky three-card trickster (suspected, too, of drugging his victim) escaped in 1913 because a point in the theory of possession had not been expounded to the gentlemen in the box. As this is *in favorem libertatis* we applaud the decision; but we should like to be sure that, when the Court itself would have given a different verdict on the whole facts, it will not be deterred from insisting on its own, merely because it has no technical 'call.' When Parliament set up a court of three judges to try Mr Parnell and his party on the Piggott forgeries and much else, that tribunal was freely defended as an ideal one in cases where a man's honour or freedom was at stake.

It is true, however, that the Court of Appeal does not as a rule hear witnesses. There was a case in 1914 where in some ribald revels in and outside a low tavern some women were accused of robbing a man. The Court said roundly that there was not enough evidence against

one of them and discharged her. Yet antecedently it might have been supposed that this was just a case for the jury who saw and heard the witnesses—which their lordships did not. By all means acquit, but then why object to 're-try' cases? And how shortly they can deal with a 'perverse' jury which sets at defiance the Judge and the facts, an appeal heard on July 11, 1917, attests. Finally, in 1914 there was a case in which a lady going home was violently assaulted on a lonely country road about 4.30 p.m. on a February day. The convicted man, a soldier, set up an *alibi*. The lady picked him out of no less than 3500 men on parade, but she had previously given a description of her assailant 'quite irreconcilable' with this man's appearance; two other independent persons had identified him as being near the scene of the attack at the time. It may, therefore, be presumed that the accused bore some resemblance to the footpad. The verdict was merely one of assault; beyond question, if the man in the dock was guilty at all, he was guilty of a much more serious offence. The rest may be told in the words of the quashing judgment:

'Quite apart from the *alibi*, this conviction must have raised serious doubts. A jury must be sure beyond reasonable doubt; and they ought to be unanimous and clear in their belief in the identity of the man charged before convicting; a compromise verdict is a very undesirable thing in any circumstance. In a criminal case . . . it is not only undesirable; it is wrong. The verdict was quite out of keeping with the facts proved and must have been a compromise verdict. The jury must have really doubted whether the case was made out.'

Before the Court existed, this man's only chance of redress would have been a petition to the Home Secretary for a pardon; what machinery that overworked official had for reinvestigation or whether he would have used what he had, we can only guess, but we doubt whether he would have moved. If, then, the systematic control of juries is all to the good, as we believe it is, why depreciate or deprecate it?

A sense of symmetry suggests a further mention of the category of 'mixed' verdicts, if that phrase may be permitted to mean those findings of facts which it is suggested have taken a false colour from bad law. The

section of the Act already quoted (p. 347) proceeds to enact roundly that a conviction shall be quashed if 'on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice,' but it adds, 'Provided that the Court may, notwithstanding that they are of opinion that the point raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if they consider that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.' There is a sterling ring about the first and last phrases of these passages which echoes popular antipathy to 'technicality.' As a matter of fact, both parts of the canon have long practically governed civil appeals (which, however, may produce the *via media* of a new trial); while the gist of its wholesomeness—the enquiry whether 'on the premisses' justice has been done or not—can be traced in criminal cases at least to the respectable antiquity of 1781 (R. *v.* Tinckler). That problem, however, as it presents itself each time, is not necessarily easy to solve; and, owing to its nature, it is not surprising that no general rule can be extracted from the numerous cases that have occurred. But the whole section is plainly an invitation to the Court to override juries—*sub modo.*

Popular opinion is interested not only in the relief of the victims of downright juridical error, but also in the gradation of sentences according to circumstances; for crime only repeats itself, as history repeats itself, with a difference. Now, no one ever supposed that punishment can be awarded on a 'flat' rate; and the Court very soon expressed its own view, in a case where a man had pleaded guilty.

'Where there has been a trial (i.e. on a plea of not guilty) the judge who has tried the case has a far better opportunity of justly and adequately determining the proper sentence than the Court reviewing the matter after sentence. . . . Where there has been a trial, the Court will be slow to interfere with a sentence which does not appear to be wrong in principle, *although members of the Court may feel that they themselves would have imposed a different sentence.* . . . But we do not think that the same reasons extend to cases where the appellant has pleaded guilty, in which case the circumstances before the Court of trial are also before this Court to very much the same extent; although even then there may be local circumstances known to the judge . . . which are not before

this Court, such as the prevalence of a particular form of crime in the district. We think that the Legislature must have intended by this Act (1907) to do something in the way of standardising sentences where the prisoner has pleaded guilty, although cases vary to such a large extent in the circumstances that affect the punishment' (Justice of the Peace Reports, vol. 73, p. 30).

Here again we must demur to another *idée mère* of the Court, expressed in the passage above underlined and often elsewhere. Surely, if no one of the three appeal Judges would have inflicted the given sentence, it is not only reasonable but imperative that they should reduce it. If the Legislature intended anything on the subject, it intended this; why, then, this abdication of jurisdiction? And *a fortiori*, on their own principle, why should they ever increase punishment—of their ample power for which they have been sparing to the point of parsimony? Otherwise the record of the Court in this respect is admirable. No plea for mitigation—the only mercy within their prerogative—that has been urged by the convict in person or in an illiterate scrawl from his cell, or launched by the more artistic methods of advocacy, but has been sympathetically studied.

Exclusive of the numerous cases in which fresh evidence or facts have come to light since the trial, and in which the Court only professed to give effect to what the trial Judge would have decreed or the jury found had that information been before them, there remain to be considered those cases in which the Court has used this distinctive power of mitigation. In a few of these a sentence of death has been set aside. In two, in 1908 and 1914, juries had refused to accept the medical testimony of the defence (and, apparently, in one case, of the Crown doctors) that the accused was insane, and on that testimony alone the Court substituted the proper verdict. In 1911, for the first time, it was forced to liberate without qualification a man under the capital sentence 'without the slightest expression of opinion' whether he was guilty or not, because the Judge at the trial had made a serious mis-statement in his direction; well might the Court again lament, by no means for the last time, that it has no power to order a new trial. The next case, which occurred in December 1914, has a special interest;

the condemned man, a naturalised alien, was German Consul at Sunderland on the outbreak of the war, and for his official acts he was convicted, on Aug. 5, 1914, of high treason. The presiding Judge gave him leave to appeal, both on the facts and on the law as laid down by the Judge; and he was actually liberated by reason of a mistake in that law, admitted as possible by the Judge himself. In 1915 the Court was confronted with the problem, than which at times there is none nicer in criminal law, of murder or manslaughter on the admitted facts. The jury, having reason to believe that there was no middle course between acquittal and a verdict of murder, and characteristically objecting to impunity for any homicide, found the prisoner guilty of murder. It was pretty clear that they would have found the lesser offence had they known their power; and the Court gave the prisoner the benefit of the doubt.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to summarise the principles which the Court, overcoming its avowed reluctance, has adopted in remitting penalties; obviously the amount of punishment, be it incarceration or fine, is a matter about which Judges, like other men, will always disagree. But it may be said generally that their example has had a steadying effect on the local tribunals —an effect which will strengthen with time. Acting in harmony with the spirit of the hour, they have sensibly lowered the standard of severity; the savage sentence is a thing of the past. Thus, they have insisted that the maximum legal penalty should be reserved for the worst cases of the crime, and that detention before trial should be allowed for in the term; they have strongly discouraged the imposition of penal servitude after imprisonment with hard labour or of hard labour after penal servitude, and of penal servitude for a first offence, or, if such a penalty is inevitable, they have preferred the minimum term of three years; while they have repeatedly favoured the merciful policy of 'winding up a delinquent's moral bankruptcy' by indicating how, when a defendant is riddled with charges from several quarters, he should be punished once for all and start again 'with a clean slate.' In short, even their failings have leaned to leniency's side. Perhaps, before long, even Deputy-Chairmen will accept this bias.

Another grievance which has been at least modified, is that of the long delay, spent generally by the appellant in prison, between sentence and 'appeal' in the old forms. The present interval is about a fortnight, or three weeks at most. Formerly there was no allowance if the conviction was confirmed; now, to say nothing of the increased facilities for bail, the expedient has been devised of a sliding scale of incarceration. The appellant has the option of letting the whole or part of the time while he is *sub judice* run for sentence, or not; if he adopts the latter course, he is 'specially treated,' and in a proper case even this comparative freedom counts for the term; the last phase may be liberation.

Few laymen know enough of legal processes to realise that the only certain pathway to justice is through law —technical, scientific, text-book law. What, then, has the Court of Criminal Appeal done in ten years for the progress of criminal law? We would suggest that they have, at least, developed the jurists' doctrines of corroboration, the limits of relevant evidence, the admissibility in evidence of 'similar acts,' and the criteria of guilt—all points which may be included in the one category of Evidence. That law is an ocean which only expert lawyers can navigate in adverse weather with hope of a port, but a few observations may be made on each of these themes.

Misreception of evidence runs misdirection as a ground of appeal very hard. A distinctive mark of English legal procedure is the careful exclusion of any deposition not clearly relevant to the charge on trial. No doubt reasonable persons may and often do differ gravely whether a given statement is perceptibly relevant; and he will be a great jurist who can invent a formula of universal application. The Court has given innumerable decisions under this head, notably in cases under the statute of 1898, which permitted the accused to give sworn evidence in his own behalf, and provided due safeguards for his cross-examination. Their contributions under this head form quite a little *corpus* by themselves, which, of course, binds the practitioner.

Another part of their teaching, though it too is authoritative, has not met with equal acceptance; we

refer to their tendency to admit as evidence the fact that a person accused of a specific offence on a given date has been guilty of other similar offences before or after that date. This is not the place to argue the general question —which at bottom is ethical—how far you are entitled to lay bare a man's past in order to convict him. The extent to which it is permissible must depend on circumstances. Our immediate point is that the new Court has in fact modified the old doctrine, and has been criticised therefor. To prove this statement, compare the following cases.

Take first the famous case of Palmer in 1856. On this Sir James Stephen writes as follows:

'He was actually indicted also for the murder of his wife and for that of his brother, and it was commonly reported at the time that he had murdered in the same way many other persons. Under the French system the *acte d'accusation* would have paraded these, with all the other discreditable incidents of his life, before the eyes of the jury. He would have been questioned by the president, probably for days, about them; and it would have been practically impossible for the jury to consider calmly and impartially whether the fact that he had murdered Cook was properly proved. As it was, no one of these matters was introduced or referred to except so far as it directly bore upon the case of Cook. . . . The suggestion that he had murdered his wife (as he most unquestionably had) was never made or hinted at.' So of his brother. 'The evidence on all these matters was confined to what was absolutely necessary for the purpose of showing motive' ('A General View,' etc., p. 270).

In the 'Three Brides' case (1915), the law was laid down as follows:

'The prosecution may, in order to prove the quality of the act charged in the indictment, give evidence of subsequent criminal acts by the prisoner and the facts and circumstances surrounding the same, other than that covered by the indictment, when a *primâ facie* case in law has been established against the prisoner' (Law Journal Reports, vol. 84, p. 2153).

Here the Crown had given evidence of the deaths (for which indictments were pending) of two other wives of the accused in their baths, besides the similar death

then on trial. It cannot be denied that since 1856 there has been a development of the doctrine of 'similar acts,' which is not favourable to the accused.

Here may be conveniently noticed the inherent vice of extraneous (i.e. remote) supplement of evidence, which is a common and, to us, somewhat amazing feature of trials in France. In the second of the cases just mentioned and in many others, the Courts below have emphatically instructed the jury, with the approval of the Court above, that the only use they could make in law of the suggestion that the man in the dock had committed another crime was to compare it with his defence—that, for example, he had no knowledge of facts necessarily imputed to him by the prosecution, or that his impugned act or acts were purely accidental. Thus, in the 'Three Brides' case, the jury were warned that they were not enquiring and must not enquire into the two other suspicious deaths, references to which were introduced to reinforce the charge with which they were concerned. But the fact is that neither they nor any one else could prevent their minds being influenced by such parallels; and so Lord Brampton, *more suo*, said bluntly in such a case some years ago. The mind is subject to the laws of nature and not to the *minutiæ* of legal regulations. Every practitioner knows that, in a doubtful case, after the revelation of 'similar acts,' the mischief is done, and the prisoner has no chance.

The difficulty upon this point of evidence appears to indicate a flaw in our criminal jurisprudence; and we have dwelt on it because it is one of two problems—the other being the responsibility of the mentally deficient (see below)—with which the Court seems not to have grappled, but which ought to be finally settled. We have no intention, however, of minimising the substantive merits of the Court in developing the principles and the administration of the criminal law. It should be said with gratitude that they have welded into a consistent whole the Law of Corroboration, not only in those cases where statute insists upon it but in those in which reason and practice require it; and notably, with regard to accomplices, they have practically ensured that, whether strict law goes so far or not, no conviction shall take place on the unsupported evidence of an accomplice. They have

settled the vexed question of *onus* in trials for receiving stolen property with guilty knowledge; it is for the Crown to prove that defendant's knowledge was guilty, not for him to prove that it was innocent. They have 'keyed up' to a correct pitch police methods of identification, which have been sometimes wanting in scrupulousness: and out of their decisions a *rationale* may be constructed for the use, by the Bench and the police, of the documents, extraordinarily 'human' sometimes, known as prisoners' statements, e.g. what they say when they first come into physical contact with the Law. The vagaries, too, of an undefended prisoner have always received a merciful interpretation from judges who recognise the infirmities of lay nature. Their constant advice to defendants not to reserve their defence before the magistrates has been wholly in the interest of the accused, especially of the undefended accused. Here, too, it is apposite to mention the benevolent acceptance by the Court of the recognised criterion that evidence equally consistent with innocence or guilt is to be interpreted charitably; and consequently, when juries have failed to give the accused 'the benefit' of a real doubt, it has not hesitated to do it for them.

Of one whole section of neo-penology they have had seisin from its origin, viz. the treatment of the 'habitual criminal,' a creature of the law since 1908 (though the phrase is found in a statute of 1869); and they have deliberately fashioned its administration. Rarely has a new law been launched on its career so well equipped by a judgment as was this by Sir Arthur Channell's judgment in November 1909. The invention of 'preventive detention'*—for the benefit of 'the habitual'—has afforded another opportunity for the Court to moderate sentences.

The other problem which the Court has left untouched is the criminal responsibility of the 'mentally affected'—a phrase which covers every variety of abnormal intellect. In no case has it granted relief on the ground that the law was unsatisfactorily expounded at the trial, so that there has been less opportunity of formally

* This phrase is taken from French law, where it has quite a different meaning, viz. detention before trial, i.e. no bail.

considering whether there has been adequate progress in the criminal law of insanity (as it may be called) since the Judges corporately pronounced on the question in 1843, after M'Naughten's case. The new Court has simply affirmed again bodily the rules then formulated, leaving the discretion of life or death in the individual cases—for they are almost without exception capital—to the Home Secretary, which is generally the most merciful course they could take. In one or two instances there have been frontal attacks from the Bar on the M'Naughten doctrines; but, though theoretically the Court is not bound by them, it can hardly be expected to dissent without the authority of the Legislature from the considered opinion of all the Judges advising the House of Lords. In one case (Nov. 2, 1914) the significant remark was made in argument that at the trial it was contended for the Crown that the doctors were expressing an opinion on the applicant's sanity 'from the medical rather than from the legal aspect of the question.' If, as that distinction implies, those views may differ, then it is clear that only the authority of Parliament can decide between them: and such a decision should be given without delay. Is it the case that the voices of Science and Law tell different tales? On this point the Downing Professor of Law in the University of Cambridge remarks, in his well-known 'Outlines of Criminal Law,' as follows:

'Though the doctrines laid down in the Judges' answers . . . remain theoretically unaltered, the practical administration of them has been such as to afford a wider immunity than their language would at first sight seem to recognise.* For many forms of insanity, which do not in themselves constitute those particular defects of reason which the Judges recognised as conferring exemption from responsibility, are now habitually treated as being sufficient evidence to show that one or other of those exemptive defects was also actually present. . . . How far an insane impulse to do an act is to be regarded as affecting the criminal responsibility for doing it, is a question which is not yet definitely settled . . . The

* 'Had the M'Naughten dictum been rigidly insisted on, it would have been the means of hanging more than half the women who are now in Broadmoor, as criminal lunatics, for the murder of their children.' Sir Clifford Allbutt's 'System of Medicine,' viii, 456.

defence of insane impulse is now rarer than that of unconscious automatism, as in sleep-walking or epilepsy. But our Courts, unlike Continental tribunals, have not yet become familiar with the plea that a crime was committed under the influence of post-hypnotic "suggestion," exercised by some designing person who had induced hypnotic sleep in the offender. It remains to be seen what exemptive effect will ever be accorded in England to such "suggestions," or to those affections which (like hysteromania and neurasthenia) have been called the borderland of insanity. Such questions have become of great practical importance, now that modern science has come to recognise so clearly, in addition to the ordinary "Intellectual" insanity which impairs a man's judgment, a "Conative" form which affects his Will, whether by weakening his natural impulses to action or by inspiring abnormal impulse and "Affective" insanity which disturbs his Emotions of love or hatred (cf. Ribot, "Les Maladies de la Volonté")."

We do not possess enough of the science invoked to presume to endorse what its sponsor says, but can any one doubt that in the above quotation (mutilated as it is) a *primâ facie* case is made out for revising our criminal law of insanity? Probably a Royal Commission of doctors and lawyers would be the best preparation for bringing the law up to date.

Another large question in regard to the whole system is sure to recur: Is the Court to have the power of ordering a new trial? The question was not overlooked when the Court was created, as Hansard, for July 29 and Aug. 5, 1907 (645–'58, Commons; 1471–'83, Lords), shows. But for ten years since that date the Court has been asking for this power; and surely its opinion ought to be regarded as decisive. On the other hand, the objections then urged still exist; the chief being the difficulty of getting together again the same band of witnesses on both sides and the additional expense and loss of time. And, apart from the difficulty of reconstituting the enquiry, there will always be the popular objection that, if a man has been tried once and the charge against him has, through no misconduct on his side, miscarried, he ought to get the benefit of his luck; otherwise it is like a player—in such a case, the Crown—asking for a move back at chess.

Indeed, Sir F. Pollock and the late Prof. Maitland point out ('History of English Law,' vol. ii, c. 9, s. 4) that one view in this country has long been that the Judge

'stands like the umpire of our English games, who is there not in order that he may invent tests for the powers of the two sides but merely to see that the rules of the game are observed. It is towards this ideal that our English mediæval procedure is strongly inclined. We are often reminded of the cricket-match. The Judges sit in Court not in order that they may discover the truth but in order that they may answer the question "How's that?"'

In short, the House of Commons, which in 1907 rejected the proposal by 116 to 41, would have to be converted to the belief that to re-try a convicted person in a doubtful case where there has been some irregularity is compatible with fair play. In some cases it undoubtedly is.

Perhaps one suggestion may be diffidently hazarded. It is that legal aid, both that of counsel and that of solicitor, should be afforded, not indiscriminately but more freely than at present, to appellants who ask for it. Take this case, which occurred in 1908. A man convicted of murder prepared his own notice of appeal. His counsel at once stated that he could not support it, as 'it was opposed both to the defence [at the trial] and to the evidence'; and the Court, remarking that it must take the whole circumstances into account, including the statements in the notice, added, 'If this Court had had any doubt about the verdict on the evidence given at the trial, that doubt would have been settled by what the appellant had said in his notice' (Justice of the Peace Reports, Vol. 73, p. 11). It is obvious that, if a solicitor had advised this man, his case would have been presented very differently to the Court. Moreover, in less grave cases, the time of the Court is often wasted by the reading of long, rambling and incoherent writings by appellants, a large proportion of whom are quite illiterate and cannot express what they mean.

The evil goes even deeper. The Poor Prisoners' Defence Act (1903) permits both counsel and solicitor being assigned by the court of trial to a 'poor prisoner' without expense to him; and the Court of Appeal has encouraged a more liberal grant of these facilities in

some classes of cases, but in practice it frequently happens that counsel alone is assigned. Now experience has shown that sometimes a convicted man, in such circumstances, loses his chance of appeal. It is not becoming for counsel, except in a very clear case, to urge his client to appeal, though he may think that some legal point might succeed. This, of course, he cannot discuss with the accused, even if he were not in prison, which he almost always is; it is impossible for defending counsel to carry on a correspondence with a man 'doing time.' But to a solicitor he can speak confidentially; and we are certain that many a prisoner would have appealed with success if he had had the services of a solicitor. It is too late to say that appeals on technical legal points should not be encouraged. There is a good deal of misconception on this head. It is not usually the case with indicted persons that they are quite innocent or quite guilty. They have generally done something wrong; pleas of guilty are frequently 'given away,' so to say, by ignorant persons who know that they are not morally innocent. But by our constitution the bad, as such, cannot be punished; we leave them to the laws of nature. The only practical justice is legal justice, whose most useful champion in many cases is a solicitor.

The outcome of our analysis is, then, that the new Court has been a valuable addition to the institutions of the country. It has been a boon to the profession above all, because it has inspired a secure sense that there is no point in criminal law, conspicuous or obscure, on which they cannot look to it for authoritative guidance. It has done a great work of co-ordination; to it in its sphere

> 'No high, no low, no great, no small;
> It fills, it bounds, connects, and equals all.'

It carries on the immemorial English tradition of Justice with mercy. 'Spiritus intus alit.'

HERMAN COHEN.

Art. 6.—CICERO AND THE CONQUEST OF GAUL.

1. *Ciceronis Epistolæ.* Edited by Tyrrell and Purser. Vols. I and II. (Third edition.) Dublin University Press, 1906–1908.
2. *Julius Cæsar.* (Heroes of the Nations Series.) By W. Warde Fowler. Putnam, 1892.
3. *The Greatness and Decline of Rome.* By G. Ferrero. Translated by Alfred E. Zimmern. Vol. II. Heinemann, 1909.
4. *Cæsar's Conquest of Gaul.* By T. Rice Holmes. (Second edition.) Oxford University Press, 1911.
5. *Cicero of Arpinum.* By E. G. Sihler. Yale University Press: New Haven, Conn., 1914.

CÆSAR'S conquest of Gaul may well be thought to be the most important event in the whole history of Western Europe; it settled once and for all the line between Latin civilisation and Teutonic barbarism; it laid the foundation for the French nation, the greatest of all Rome's great creations; it saved Mediterranean culture from the destroying flood which threatened to overwhelm it. The fact that the conquest led immediately to the destruction of the Roman Republic is in itself less important, for the Roman Republic was doomed to perish from its own internal weakness; but it is on this, the constitutional result of Cæsar's work, that our modern historians lay most stress.

The great series of campaigns which accomplished the conquest of Gaul has at last received adequate treatment in English. The 'De Bello Gallico' had too long been treated as a mere introduction to Latin; it had been used as a school book in which uninterested boys might be shown countless examples of ablative absolute and *oratio obliqua.* To Mr Rice Holmes belongs the credit of having produced a book which deals fully, and in an up-to-date manner, not only with the actual narrative, but also with all the problems, ethnological, geographical, social, which are raised by Cæsar's book. The second edition, the publication of which had been rightly secured by the Oxford Press, is not a mere reissue of the first; students of Cæsar ought to retain their old copy,

while getting the new one, for the first edition contains a good deal which has not been republished in the second. But one or other edition ought to be in the possession of every student of the great things in European History.

The conquest of Gaul, as it happens, falls within a decade of Roman History on which we have fuller information than on any other decade, except that immediately following it. It can even be claimed that, thanks to Cicero's letters and, to a small extent, to other sources such as Plutarch, we know this period better than we know any other period of history before the invention of printing. Now that the interest of our own nation is concentrated on the greatest of all wars, it may be worth while to compare the attitude of Rome to this great war, more especially as Cæsar's campaigns were fought in part on the present battlefields and, to some extent, for the same ends as our own.

There is no doubt that the events in Gaul were closely followed in Rome. Our information as to what was felt and thought there depends chiefly on the fact that Cicero had, during some three years of the period,* as correspondents in Cæsar's camp, his brother Quintus, and his friend, the lawyer Trebatius. Unluckily it is only during a period of about twelve months, beginning with the spring of 54 B.C., that we have letters to them —thirteen to Quintus Cicero, and a similar number to Trebatius; why this is so, we can only conjecture. Still more unluckily, their answers, which would have been even more interesting to us, have not been preserved. The usual time that a letter from Gaul took to reach Rome was from twenty to thirty days; Cicero in September 54 B.C. receives a letter from Quintus 'on the twentieth day,' though rather oddly a time nearly half as long again, viz. twenty-eight days, was taken by a letter from Cæsar, which was written in the same

* Q. Cicero was at Ariminum on his way to Gaul in May 54 (Q. Fr., II, 12, 1, T. 139); he was there till the end of the campaign of 52 B.C. (Cæs. B. G., VII, 90), but unfortunately no letters to him in Gaul are preserved later than the beginning of the winter of 54 B.C. As to the letters of Trebatius we are a little more fortunate; the 'summer campaign' (*æstiva*) referred to in Ad Fam., VII, 14, 1, must be that of 53 B.C., though the letter is not dated. But in any case, the letters that bear directly on the Gallic campaigns concern only one single year—54 B.C.

month from Britain, to relieve Cicero's possible anxiety* about his brother's long silence. It is characteristic of Cæsar's attitude to Cicero and of his humane courtesy that, even amid the anxieties of the British campaign, he made time to write this considerate letter. So again † we find Cicero anxious because 'a more than fifty days' interval' had elapsed since he had had letters or 'even any rumour.' As he had had Cæsar's letter of explanation, just referred to, less than a month before, Cicero must be considered a somewhat exacting correspondent. But his impatience shows at any rate how close was the intercourse between the capital and the seat of war.

On the whole, in matter of time, correspondence with Gaul compares quite favourably with our own correspondence with our men in Mesopotamia, and not altogether unfavourably with the letters which come from Salonica. It is true that Roman correspondence had other drawbacks which were worse than even our worries from the censorship; letters were apt to arrive in bundles as they do with our men at the front, and sometimes much 'out of date' (*pervetus*). Morever, it was necessary to be careful of your letter-carrier; if Cicero wished to send anything, he had to depend on Cæsar's special messengers, who were managed by his friend Oppius; more private correspondence went by confidential freedmen, like Hippodamus, because it might cause trouble if it fell into wrong hands.

Cicero's close correspondence with his brother and his friend is no doubt typical of that maintained by many Romans with relatives and connexions at the front. There is no reason to suppose that in 54 B.C. intercourse with Gaul was unusually well maintained; it may rather be assumed that the amount of interest shown in that year is typical of the general feeling of Rome during this eventful period. In the absence of further letters from Gaul, we are driven, in estimating the state of

* Q. F., III, 1, 25, T. 148. In all quotations from Cicero's letters, I have added the number in Tyrrell's edition (1879–1890) as the most convenient for reference.

† Q. F., III, 3, 1, T. 151. This letter is not dated, but it was written two days before the first trial of Gabinius (*ibid.*, § 3), which took place on Oct. 24. Cicero reckons his 'more than 50 days' from the date of Cæsar's writing, not from the date of his receiving the letter, which was Sept. 28. Impatience made him very unreasonable.

feeling in Rome, to make the best of casual allusions in Cicero's correspondence during other years, combining with these the hints given by Cæsar himself in his Commentaries, and the few mentions of the attitude of parties at Rome to Gallic matters, which occur in later writers.

The apparent interest in Gaul was great, but it certainly was not based on much knowledge. Cicero's own ignorance of the real strength of the country may be judged from his casual statement in his third Catilinarian oration that the Allobroges were the 'only Gallic tribe who had both the power and the will to attack Rome.' Two years later we find the first allusion in Cicero's letters to the great series of events which were about to begin in Gaul; it is typical of his lack of real interest in the subject, and it shows from the very first how little grasp he had of the importance of that province. In March 60 he writes to Atticus:

'In public affairs at the present time Gallic terrors are very much to the fore. Our brothers the Ædui have lately been badly defeated; the Helvetii are undoubtedly in arms, and are attacking the Province. The Senate passed several votes, (1) that the consuls should have the two Gauls for their provinces; (2) that all leave should be suspended; (3) that ambassadors with full powers be sent to visit the Gallic States and to take measures to prevent them joining the Helvetii.'

The occasion was indeed a critical one; already there were 120,000 Germans* in Gaul, and more were expected at once; the Gap of Belfort, the weak place in the mountain defences of Western Europe, was in their hands. And, as had happened half a century before, when the migration of the Cimbri and the Teutones seemed likely to anticipate the destructive work of the fifth century A.D., and prematurely to end Mediterranean civilisation, the German movement had started a 'wandering of the nations'; the Helvetii were planning a march of conquest westwards. Rome was within measurable distance of a danger as serious as that from which the genius of Marius had saved her.

* Cæs. I, 31. Both Cæsar's narrative and all probability are against Rice Holmes' suggestion that three-fourths of the 120,000 were women and children ('Class. Quart.,' iii, 204).

The resolutions of the Senate were as thoroughgoing as could be wished, and continued the policy of the previous year,* when it had voted that 'whoever was governor in Gaul should, so far as state interests allowed, defend the interests of the Ædui and of Rome's other allies.' But it was no longer an 'assembly of Kings,' as it had been when it defeated Pyrrhus and Hannibal. Like the Athenian assembly in the days of Demosthenes, and many other more popular bodies since, it was satisfied with a policy on paper. When, about three months later, it found that the consul for next year, who would have to carry out the above resolutions, was to be the Opposition leader, Julius Cæsar, it stultified its own motions by voting for him and his colleague the charge of unimportant home departments—'the Woods and Forests of Southern Italy.' It is not surprising that Cæsar, who saw that Rome's interests could not wait, upset the senatorial arrangement by direct appeal to the people, and secured for himself the command in Gaul by the motion of his tribune, Vatinius. Cicero's own remarks on the debate of March 60 reveal the general senatorial indifference to the danger from the North; what interests him in the whole business is the personal fact that, when he was the first consular to be chosen by lot as commissioner, a crowded Senate unanimously voted that he could not be spared from Rome.† A similar compliment was paid to Pompey; but it may well be doubted whether the senatorial protest was really as flattering ‡ to Cicero as he imagined. The work of the commissioners was only diplomatic, but success required armed force behind it; and for this reason the Senate was not likely to give it to the orator, who had no military experience at all, or to Pompey, whose military experience was an object of bitter jealousy to the majority of his fellow senators.

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* Cæsar, B. G., I, 35.

† Roman History is still written from the same narrow standpoint. In the latest life of Cicero, that of Prof. Sihler of New York, this interesting passage is briefly epitomised without note or comment. But it must be added that this is the general character of Prof. Sihler's work; he gives the materials for Cicero's life, but there is little or no criticism or comment of any value.

‡ He and Pompey were to be kept 'quasi pignora reipublicæ.' Ad Att. I. 19. 3.

The real interest of the debate lies elsewhere. In the first place it shows (along with the resolution of 61 B.C. quoted above) that the danger in Gaul was a real one, and that Cæsar's vigorous dealing with it, two years later, was not prompted by personal ambition only, as has often been suggested, but was urgently required in the interests of the State. And secondly, the whole treatment of the incident by Cicero is typical of the attitude of his party at Rome, which looked on all foreign affairs as primarily important in their bearing on personal careers. Cicero's blindness to the real importance of the occasion is the less excusable, since he had had Divitiacus as his guest in Rome, at the time when the Æduan was pleading the cause of his people and urging the necessity of supporting Rome's partisans among the Gauls. It was fortunate for Rome that one of her own statesmen was more able than Cicero to understand the importance of the friendly tribes in Gaul, and the imminence of the German danger, when these matters were put before him.*

How completely Cicero looked at the Gallic question from the point of view of home politics is seen from his next reference to it, about two months later; the report that peace was assured only elicits the remark that the consul Metellus Celer was 'displeased, as he had wished for war and a triumph.' In his letter of a few days later (about June 1) Cicero is less certain; he only 'hopes for peace in Gaul.' His general attitude to Gaul is well shown in a casual reference in a contemporary letter to his brother Quintus:† 'Had it fallen to your lot to govern Africans, Spaniards or Gauls, nations savage and barbarous, it would only be your duty, as an educated man, to think of their interests'; the contempt here displayed is a striking proof how little Cicero realised that the Græco-Roman civilisation he loved was to find a new home and a new life among these 'barbarians.'

Cicero had indeed attended as prætor, six years before, the lectures of the Gallic rhetorician, Gnipho, the tutor of Cæsar; but they were a mere incident in his intellectual life, while to Cæsar they had been an inspiration.‡

* Cæsar, B. G., I, 31. † Q. F., I, 1, 27, T. 30.

‡ I borrow this point from Mr Warde Fowler's admirable 'Life of Julius Cæsar' (pp. 13–14).

We may probably attribute to them some of the insight into the real state of affairs on the Rhine frontier, which marked the great proconsul's policy throughout. The literary world at Rome had not grasped the great distinction between Gaul and German; even twenty years later, the historian Sallust could still speak of the Cimbri as 'Gauls.'* But Cæsar had realised the fundamental difference between the races, which still, twenty centuries later, is a leading motive in European politics. He established a claim on Gallic sympathy by driving the intruders across the Rhine in his first campaign; he never swerved from his determination to keep that river as a political and a racial boundary. Yet with admirable daring, in 52 B.C., he ventured to call in his beaten enemies, the Germans, to aid him in holding down those very Gauls, in whose cause he had fought against the Germans. Only a great soldier and a great statesman could have ventured on so bold a step. The best parallel to it in history is when John Lawrence enlisted thousands of those Sikhs, who had given us so hard a struggle at Chillianwallah and Gujerat only eight years before, to fight against our old comrades, the mutinous Sepoys.

Of such a step Cicero would never have been capable, for Gaul and its problems lay outside his sphere of interests; and, though we have some seventy of his letters distributed over the next four years (60–57 B.C.), there is not a word of reference to Gaul. This is the more surprising, since the beginning of the period saw the interest of Roman politicians keenly concentrated on Gaul. While Cæsar was securing by popular vote that sphere of duty on the Gallic frontier which Roman interests required, but of which the Roman Senate was seeking to deprive him, his political opponents were not shrinking from communication with Rome's deadliest enemies. There is no reason to doubt the statement of Ariovistus, that he was informed by 'special envoys' from 'leading men' in Rome, that Cæsar's death would be a welcome event, and that he could earn their gratitude by defeating the army of their countrymen.†

* Jugurtha, 114.

† Cæs. B. G., I, 44. I have not attempted to deal with the reconstruction of the events of the year 59 B.C., and of Rome's policy in Gaul, which is put forward by Signor Ferrero in his History (vol. ii, Appendix D, pp. 336 f.).

This indifference (or worse) to Rome's real interests, and this willingness to sacrifice everything to the narrowest party spirit, are characteristic of the senatorial party throughout the last days of the Republic. It is the same spirit which, when the Civil War actually broke out, allowed the Roman nobles to purchase Juba's support in Africa by sacrificing Roman civilisation to Numidian barbarism, and which made the 'noble' fugitives after the Civil War take refuge with, and fight for, the Parthians, Rome's deadliest enemies in the East. This preference of party to patriotism is well shown in a passage in a letter to Cælius, though this is some years later in date: *

'As for Cæsar, numerous rumours arrive which are not at all favourable; at any rate they are whispered about. Some say he has lost his cavalry, which I think is certainly a fiction; another says that the 7th legion has been well thrashed, and that Cæsar himself is blockaded among the Bellovaci, and cut off from his main force. So far there is nothing confirmed, and even these unconfirmed rumours are not current generally, but they are openly told as secrets in the clique you know of; while Domitius, putting his finger to his lips—'

The *aposiopesis* which ends this quotation expresses admirably the attitude of the teller of alarmist rumours, who has been such a familiar figure in England for the last three years.

In view of this party bitterness, we need not attach much importance to the condemnation at Rome of Cæsar's proceedings in Gaul, which is from time to time recorded. The evidence for this is furnished mainly by Suetonius; his life of Julius Cæsar is clearly based in great part on the speeches and memoirs of Cæsar's opponents in the Senate. He says that Cæsar waged war on every

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It has been crushingly refuted by Rice Holmes in the 'Classical Quarterly' (iii, 203 f.), and must be looked upon simply as one more of the unprovable and improbable hypotheses with which 'criticism' encumbers the study of Ancient History. Ferrero attaches great importance to the statement of Pliny (Nat. Hist., ii, 170) that Ariovistus negotiated with Metellus Celer, the consul of 60 B.C.; but the story, which rests on the respectable authority of Cornelius Nepos, is discredited by the impossible detail that, among the presents sent to Rome, were 'Indians who had been driven ashore on the coast of Germany.'

* May 51 B.C.; Ad Fam., VIII, 1, 4, T. 192.

occasion, 'however unjust and dangerous, attacking without provocation tribes in alliance with Rome, as well as hostile and barbarous tribes, so that the Senate voted to send a commission to inquire into the condition of Gaul, and some proposed that Cæsar should be given up to the enemy.' The reference is undoubtedly to Cato's protest against Cæsar's dealing with the Germans who had crossed the Rhine in 55 B.C. According to the *chronique scandaleuse* of Tanusius Geminus,* he (Cato) considered that Cæsar's 'breach of faith' was so grave as to call down the anger of heaven on Rome; and, to avert this, he proposed the surrender of the proconsul to the Germans. Cato in home politics was looked upon as embodied Justice; but our own experience tells us how easily the most virtuous persons can bring themselves to see only the facts on their own side, and not even to see these right.

The nobles at Rome condemned everything Cæsar did, at once from remembrance of his past attacks on the Senate, and from a well-grounded, though only half-realised, dread of the use he would make of his power, if completely victorious. Cicero may be acquitted of this extreme anti-patriotism; but it is difficult to think that the silence in his letters at this period is purely accidental, or merely due to eccentricity in selection on the part of the editor, Tiro. There are in them, as will be seen, brief allusions to Gaul; but they are purely personal and do not concern the main interests of Rome on the north-western frontier.

This aristocratic indifference to the great struggle is the more remarkable, since it is clear that there was somewhere a large class of Roman citizens who appreciated, though somewhat unintelligently, the successes in north-western Europe. The brief notices with which Cæsar ends his accounts of his second and fourth campaigns are significant. In 57 B.C. he writes, 'On receipt of Cæsar's despatches, a thanksgiving of fifteen days was voted, an honour which no one had previously enjoyed.' Two years later he ends his account of the first campaign against Britain thus: 'Two British States sent hostages, the rest failed to do so. After these campaigns, on

* Plutarch, Cæsar, c. 22.

receipt of Cæsar's despatches, a thanksgiving of twenty days* was voted by the Senate.' It is impossible not to see a touch of humour at his own expense in the last record; the 'unprecedented honour' of 57 B.C. is actually increased two years later, for a campaign which, as Cæsar frankly records, was almost a failure, and which we may add, was nearly a disaster. But, as will be seen later, Britain had a real fascination for Roman imagination, which obscured a more sober judgment.

Such honours would never have been voted, had there not been somewhere in Rome a real appreciation of the Gallic struggle. The strength of this is best judged from Cicero's own description of the successes of Cæsar in the 'De Provinciis Consularibus.' Perhaps he never spoke so well as in that speech; certainly there is no passage in all his works which appeals so much to modern imagination as the famous one beginning 'C. Cæsaris longe aliam video fuisse rationem'; for once the orator had a subject of real world-importance, not one merely concerning the political parties and the petty personalities of his own time. A part of it must be quoted, even with the certainty of doing injustice to its sonorous periods:

'Senators of Rome! in old days we enjoyed but a right of way through Gaul; all the rest of that country was inhabited by tribes either hostile to our empire, or untrustworthy or unknown, or at any rate savage, uncivilised and warlike. Every one always desired that these nations should be crushed and subdued; every one who had any wise policy for our State, ever since our empire began, thought that Gaul was an especial danger to it. But such was the strength and the extent of those nations that never, before our own time, did we venture on a general war with them; our policy was always mere resistance to attack. Now the result has been achieved that the boundary of our empire and of those lands is one and the same. Nature had of old given to Italy the rampart of the Alps; in this we see the working of Divine Providence; had Italy lain exposed to the savagery and the overwhelming hordes of the Gauls, Rome would never have become the home and seat of the greatest of empires. Now the Alps may disappear; there is nothing for Italy to dread, from those lofty mountains to the Ocean.'

* B. G., II, 35, IV, 38; a similar honour was voted also in 52 B.C. (ib., VII, 90) after the defeat of Vercingetorix.

The climax anticipates the boast of Mazarin that 'the Pyrenees were no more'; but the political prevision of the Roman orator surpassed that of the French cardinal in accuracy as much as it did in the greatness of its scope.

Cicero was carried by his subject beyond himself, yet it is significant that he was ashamed of this speech. It is doubtful whether it can be identified (as Mommsen argued) with the 'somewhat humiliating apology' which he told Atticus 'that he had such difficulty in swallowing'; but at any rate it is an expression of the change of front in politics which he felt as a bitter humiliation. The same inconsistency is seen in his letters; the proposals, which were made early in 56 B.C., formally to recognise Cæsar's successes and to legalise the measures by which he had raised his forces, seemed to Cicero 'outrageous'; and, when later they were voted by the Senate, he suppressed, in his letter to Lentulus Spinther, the fact that he himself had supported them. Cicero's political attitude during these four years is the best possible indication of the fact that in Rome at this time there were two nations, one clinging to the old Rome of the past, and hating every change, however necessary, that widened its limits, the other looking forward to the new Rome of the future, whose extension was to preserve all that was best in the old.

It has already been said that Cicero's letters during the early years of Cæsar's campaigns in Gaul say nothing about the great struggle. The rolling-back of the tide of German invasion in the first campaign, the breaking of the power of the great northern confederacy in the second, the dramatic conquest of the Atlantic seaboard in the next year, the invasion of Britain in 55 B.C.—all these events are passed over in silence. One touch in Cicero's later letters shows how ignorant he was of all that was happening. 'Where are your Nervii?' he asks his brother in the winter of 54, when Quintus was quartered among them. But the name of the Nervii ought to have been as familiar to a patriotic Roman as the defeat of the Prussian Guard at Ypres to an Englishman of to-day; for there the Roman army had fought for dear life, and had won a soldier's victory by a struggle in which Cæsar himself took part like a common soldier. It was these same Nervii, of whom Cicero is

contemptuously ignorant, who almost robbed him of the brother whom he really loved. The contrast between Cæsar and Cicero is well seen when we compare the indifference of the orator with the burning chapters of the fifth book of the 'Gallic War,' in which Cæsar drops his usual cold style, and lets himself go in praise of his legionaries and of Quintus Cicero, their commander.

The silence of Cicero as to the all-important Gallic campaigns between 59 and 54 B.C. is the more significant when we notice that Gaul not infrequently appears in his correspondence at this time; but it is in a quite different connexion. The general who was conquering it was a politician, and his soldiers were voters; hence it is mentioned, but only when it has some influence on the city politics which were all-absorbing to Cicero. The visit of his friend Sestius to Cæsar in the winter of 58 B.C., to secure the orator's own recall from exile, is not mentioned in the letters; but we may be sure that Appius Claudius was not the only candidate for office who went to the all-powerful proconsul to secure his influence for the consular elections;* the matter was so notorious that it was made a subject of jests in the Senate. Moreover, the Roman politicians did not find the same difficulty in taking the army vote as did His Majesty's late Government. A convenient tribune† would postpone the elections at Rome till the campaigning season was over, and then the legionary electors were marched to Rome under their own commanders; they counted doubly, for they not only voted themselves, but they also prevented any one else voting against their candidates. It was in this way that the election of Pompey and Crassus as consuls was secured in 56 B.C.; young Crassus, fresh from his victories in Aquitaine, brought a band of Cæsar's soldiers to Rome to secure the election of his father and Pompey;‡ and blood was actually shed before their opponent, the stubborn Domitius, would give way.

* Q. F., II, 4, 6, T. 105: Appius, however, went in the winter, when Cæsar was at any rate south of the Alps. Whether this is the same visit as that referred to in Q. F., II, 13, 3 (T. 141), it is impossible to say for certain; but probably it is not the same, as in the later letter the object of Appius is said to be to secure the patronage of Cæsar for others, not for himself.

† E.g. C. Cato in 56 B.C.

‡ Dio Cass., 39, 31.

Elections at Rome at this time were decided by steel or by gold; the Gallic campaigns were as influential through the latter metal as through the former. Cæsar set himself steadily to use the spoils of Gaul to buy support in Rome. The definite statement of Suetonius to this effect is well illustrated by Cicero's letter to Atticus * in 54 B.C.:

'So we, friends of Cæsar—I mean myself and Appius; you may split yourself with anger if you like—have sent 500,000*l.* flying, on the public work you used to be so enthusiastic over, I mean the opening up the Forum and clearing it right away to Liberty Hall. We could not settle private claims for less. We shall do the business splendidly; for, in the Campus Martius, we intend to build of marble the polling-booths for the Comitia Tributa, and to roof them and surround them with a lofty colonnade a mile in extent.'

Down to 54 B.C., as has been said, the evidence which Cicero's letters give as to events in Gaul is mainly negative; it is quite otherwise in that year, thanks to the presence of Q. Cicero and Trebatius on Cæsar's staff. Of these correspondents, it is not necessary to speak at length. Quintus Cicero can only be called interesting for his brother's sake; as for Trebatius, it must suffice to say that he is somewhat interesting for himself, as one of the founders of the science of Roman Law, though many will think him even more important as the friend of Cicero and of Horace. It argues in him tact as well as good fortune that he managed to survive two Civil Wars and the proscriptions of 43 B.C. Like the Abbé Siéyès, after the Revolutionary Terror, he might have said 'J'ai vécu'; and it would have been no light boast. But in some ways Trebatius is even more interesting as a type than he is in himself; he was one of the many young men who flocked from Rome to Cæsar in Gaul, in order to have their fortunes made. Cicero's letter of introduction for him is a model of what a testimonial should be; and no doubt the orator, in several other cases,† took full advantage of Cæsar's friendly invitation to send him such aspirants for fortune. Cæsar's humorous exaggeration, 'I will make the man you recommend a king in Gaul,' really meant something substantial.

* IV. 16, 8, T. 144.

† Q. F., III, 1, 10, T. 148, for Curtius as another instance.

Cicero's *protégé* in this instance did not at first do him credit. Trebatius had hardly gone before he wanted to be back in Rome; and his patron's early letters are full of friendly rebukes. Cicero quotes the 'Medea' of Ennius to show that 'Home-keeping youths have ever homely wits,' and gently rebukes his 'headlong haste' to have his fortune made. He reminds him that a letter of recommendation is not 'a draft at sight,' while he points out that friendship with Cæsar is worth, in actual hard cash, more than 'drafts' on certain Eastern potentates. The conduct of Trebatius was all the more unreasonable, because Cæsar offered him his commission without requiring any military duties. There was certainly a danger that he would turn out to be one of Rome's 'gilded youth,' of whom Cæsar had to make a clean sweep from his army after the disgraceful panic in the first German campaign. But the great commander bore with Trebatius, at first for the sake of his patron, and then for his own, since the young lawyer proved, in the end, to have good stuff in him. Before the year was out, Cæsar writes that he is content; and it is significant that Trebatius remained faithful to his leader's fortunes to the end.

Even now, with two correspondents at the front, public interests are the last thing in Cicero's mind. It is true that in one letter (April, 53) he asks for news of the 'campaign,' telling Trebatius in friendly banter that he will have most confidence in the report of so 'chicken-hearted' a correspondent; but his more usual attitude can be judged from his remark to his brother (Sept. 54), touching the second British campaign: 'I gather from your letter that there is no occasion for fear or for pleasure.' This remark as to the retirement from Britain might well have summed up the feelings of many Englishmen after the evacuation of Gallipoli; but this one sentence is the only reference, in one of Cicero's longest letters, to the army at the front. The campaign claims a line and a half in a letter of 217 lines; the rest gives interesting details on Q. Cicero's estates, family affairs, and politics at Rome. The attitude of Cicero to things military is seen in his remark to Trebatius, written about the same time: 'I am glad you did not go to Britain; you were spared the trouble, and I suppose I should have had to hear about the campaign there.'

Yet references of a certain sort to Britain are much more common than references to Gaul; Cicero shared that interest in the 'out-of-the-way island,' which made his countrymen vote so splendid a thanksgiving for the most indecisive of Cæsar's campaigns. Even then men knew that Britain was 'proudly ramparted with rocks'; Cicero has to the full that dread of the sea, which has so often warded off continental attacks from our island. On the principle that the grapes were sour, he is 'well informed that there is not a pennyworth of silver in the island,' and that the prospect of slaves is not encouraging. But he cannot keep Britain out of his letters. Its 'war chariots' play as prominent a part in his jokes as they used to do in the school histories of English boys, when those books were more picturesque and less scientific than they now are. He tells Trebatius that, had he gone to Britain, he would have been easily the 'best lawyer in the island,' and that as a 'British lawyer' he will be a 'comic part' in Roman farces, if he returns penniless. He congratulates his brother on having such a splendid subject for verse in the tribes and the customs of Britain, not to mention the campaign and Cæsar himself; he is willing to give his assistance in the composition of the verses, though he modestly tells Quintus that Marcus, in helping him with poetry, would be 'teaching his grandmother.' Shortly afterwards he writes to his brother that he has actually composed a poem to Cæsar, 'very attractive, as I think.'

This prominence of Britain in the contemporary view of Cæsar's conquests is seen also in the works of Catullus. Only in one poem * does he refer definitely to the great proconsul's campaigns; and three of the references in it, and those the most distinct, are to our island. The most definite of these is contained in the lines beginning

> 'Eone nomine, imperator unice,
> Fuisti in ultima occidentis umbra?'

The rest of the passage, attacking Cæsar and Muræna, is unquotable and, still more, untranslatable. Catullus,

* 29, 11–12; the three other poems (54, 57, 93), which may refer to Cæsar contain no definite geographical allusions.

as a Gaul by descent, might have been expected to appreciate the greatness of the work of Cæsar; but he had adopted to the full the prejudiced tone of the aristocratic circles at Rome.

Perhaps it is not surprising that the interest of Cicero in the Gallic campaign was largely literary, when we see how great a part literature played in the life of some of those actually serving at the front. Quintus Cicero wrote to his brother that he had actually composed four tragedies in sixteen days; Cicero naturally assumes that he had only translated them. Quintus Cicero's original tragedy, the 'Erigone' was lost on its way to Italy, 'the only thing that had not a safe journey while Cæsar was general.' Whether other members of Cæsar's staff were equally literary, we do not know; but the commander-in-chief himself, apart from his Commentaries, which he composed probably in his last year in Gaul, found time to write a work in two books on Grammar—the 'De Analogia'—which he dedicated to Cicero. It would be hard to find a more splendid and a more well-deserved compliment than that which Cæsar paid to the great orator: 'Quanto plus est ingenii Romani terminos in tantum promovisse quam imperii.'* This from the conqueror of Gaul, who was adding the fairest gem to Rome's crown, was a compliment worth having. Cæsar knew the value of moral and intellectual force better than his panegyrist, Mommsen, whose character of Cicero is a typical instance of German insight. Mommsen writes: 'He [Cicero] was in fact so thoroughly a dabbler that it was pretty much a matter of indifference to what work he applied his hand; by nature a journalist in the worst sense of the term.' Cæsar, on the other hand, recognised in the prose of Cicero a work as glorious and enduring as his own conquests.

But probably most of the Roman officers in Gaul amused themselves in other ways than by literature. Even Quintus Cicero combined erudite conversation with dinners; and no doubt the gaiety at Samarobriva,

* Pliny, Nat. Hist., VII, 118. I have borrowed this point from Boissier's charming 'Cicéron et ses Amis,' p. 263, from which I may have unconsciously taken other suggestions.

which makes Cicero chaff his friend Trebatius about turning Epicurean, had a good deal of the material side of that philosophy, which appealed so keenly to the Roman mind. The winter quarters of 54 B.C. were probably gayer than usual, for Cæsar himself in that year stayed north of the Alps, owing to the disturbed state of Gaul. There is no reason to doubt the story of Suetonius that the commander-in-chief found the Gallic ladies very attractive;* but it is not necessary to believe in the gross buffoonery which some commentators would read into the allusion to the Sophoclean play of the 'Banqueters.'

Of all this we would gladly have learned something, but the letters from Gaul have not been preserved; and Cicero himself is far too self-centred to have much room for comment on the news he receives. The Ædui, the connexion with whom was the very basis of the Roman empire in Gaul, he jestingly says, were to him as nothing compared to a meeting with Trebatius, in which they might 'deep thought resolve to drench in mirth.' The Treviri, whose name was to be perpetuated in a city which would be the centre of Roman civilisation in the North four centuries later, a city the Roman antiquities of which still surpass those of many towns in Italy itself, are to him only the material for a frigid legal pun.†

It is not uninteresting to compare Cicero's letters with those of Horace Walpole during the Seven Years' War, when Britain, under the Whig obligarchy, was enjoying a series of victories which may rival the most glorious conquests of Rome. The Englishman had not a brother or a close friend at the front as the Roman had; he professed, with some reason, that 'Europe is a dull magnificent subject to one who knows little and thinks less about Europe. Even the King of Prussia, except on post days, doesn't occupy a quarter of an inch in my memory. He must kill a hundred thousand men a fortnight to put me in mind of him.' But references

* Julius, 51; but Tacitus (Hist., IV, 55) declines to accept the scandal in the case of Cæsar's pretended great-grandson, Sabinus.

† Fam., VII, 13, 2, T. 171. 'Vites Treviros censeo. Audio capitalis.' The Cambridge mistranslation is much more amusing than the original joke: 'I give my vote for the wines of the Treviri; I hear they are capital.' But its unfortunate author was 'ploughed' in his Tripos.

to successes abroad are frequent in Horace Walpole, and overwhelming in number when compared to the Roman orator's references to his countrymen's victories in Gaul.

The result, then, of a careful reading of Cicero's correspondence at this time is negative, so far as Gaul is concerned. We learn absolutely nothing about the course of military affairs; the references to Roman successes are of the scantiest; even the personal exploits of his correspondents are not alluded to, though Marcus must surely have written to congratulate Quintus on the heroic defence of his camp against the Eburones. Yet Cicero was a typical Roman of the governing classes; alike in education, in sympathies, in policy, he represented the best elements of the Senate. We can only infer that the spirit and wisdom which had built up the Republic were dead. But fortunately there was coming into existence a new Rome, to carry on the old tradition and to extend it. The thanksgivings for Cæsar's victories, already referred to, show that some elements in Italy at any rate were keenly interested in affairs in Gaul. The Commentaries were written to stimulate that interest; but they would never have been written, had there not been a public which was likely to appreciate the importance of the Gallic campaigns.

This public was made up of the Roman middle class, the traders and the financiers who had penetrated into Gaul, even before Cæsar took it as his province,* and who flocked thither in far greater numbers in the track of his victorious armies. It was this class, we may be sure, which furnished Cæsar's soldiers, whether they came from old Italy or from the valley of the Po. It is certain that his officers came largely from a new social stratum; his best marshal† was connected with a country district, Picenum; and the head of his Army Service Corps had come to Rome as a slave from the same part of Italy.‡ Of seven at least of his army-corps commanders we know nothing till they appear in his Commentaries, while even of those who bear the great names of Rome's past, hardly any had any special position

* Cic. Pro. Font., 11. † Labienus; cf. Cæs. B. G., I, 15.
‡ Ventidius; cf. Aul. Gell., XV, 4, and Juvenal, Sat., VII, 199.

before they served under Cæsar. The two sons of Crassus (the 'triumvir') and Q. Cicero are exceptions that prove the rule; there were special family circumstances to associate all three with Cæsar. And it is significant that Cæsar's own personal friends belong largely to the middle class of Rome. His financial agents, Oppius and Balbus, were naturally drawn from it; but no such business connexion can be traced in the case of Matius, the wealthy *eques*, whose letters on the death of Cæsar show a real feeling, which few or none of the 'noble' politicians display.

Everything points to the fact that Rome's greatest conquest was the work of the classes which found in the Empire a new opportunity. It is true that 'liberty' at home was sacrificed for development abroad; perhaps Rome herself lost by the change, but certainly Europe and the world gained by it. Cæsar founded the Empire in more senses than one. He not only broke down the power of the senatorial families; he introduced into political life, and provided careers for, the new citizens whom Rome had taken to herself; this was the consistent policy of most of the rulers who succeeded him. Gaul as a province was especially connected with the Roman democratic party; its conquest was completed by the man in whose work Roman democratic principles were carried to their full conclusion and finally absorbed; Gaul was the field in which their contributions to civilisation were most strikingly developed.

J. WELLS.

Art. 7.—WAR POETRY (1914–1918).

1. *The Muse in Arms.* Edited by E. B. Osborn. John Murray, 1917.
2. *Philip the King, and Other Poems.* By John Masefield. Heinemann, 1914.
3. *The Winnowing Fan.* By Laurence Binyon. Elkin Mathews, 1915.
4. *Battle.* By W. W. Gibson. Elkin Mathews, 1916.
5. *Children of Love.* By Harold Monro. The Poetry Bookshop, 1915.
6. *A Highland Regiment.* By E. A. Mackintosh. John Lane, 1916.
7. *Marlborough, and Other Poems.* By C. H. Sorley. Cambridge University Press, 1916.
8. *Georgian Poetry* (1916–1917). Edited by E. M. The Poetry Bookshop, 1917.
9. *Fairies and Fusiliers.* By R. Graves. Heinemann, 1917.
10. *The Lily of Malud, and Other Poems.* By J. C. Squire. Martin Secker, 1917.
11. *Ardours and Endurances.* By Robert Nichols. Chatto & Windus, 1917.
12. *The City of Fear.* By Gilbert Frankau. Chatto & Windus, 1917.
13. *The Old Huntsman, and Other Poems. Counter-Attack, and Other Poems.* By Siegfried Sassoon. Heinemann, 1917, 1918.

And other works.

THE experience of the present war ought surely to have taught believers in prophecy a trenchant lesson. Never in the history of the world can there have been a time when the prophets have proved more consistently wrong; and nowhere have they wandered further astray than in those doleful predictions which foretold the temporary overthrow of literature and literary interests. In the first months of the war it seemed generally agreed by critics and creative artists alike that the genius of expression itself was doomed to disappear in the immediate future. Works of imagination, we were assured, must cease to trouble the mind of man; no poetry worthy of the name was likely to be written during the next twenty years. It was a depressing prospect; but

fortunately the prophecy was no sooner uttered than the event asserted its fallacy. A torrent of poetry began at once to pour from the press; and the voice of criticism found itself obliged to swing round to the opposite pole. The war, we were then told, had become a very forcing-ground of poetry; it was recreating the poet's heart out of its own fires; we were face to face with an almost miraculous renaissance of the poetic spirit. This access of enthusiasm has also faded in its turn; and its wild confidence is shown to have been no less deceptive than the vain depression which preceded it. We are beginning, in short, to arrive at a more equable condition of judgment, and to see things in more accurate perspective.

The time therefore appears propitious for taking stock of the influence which the war has exercised upon contemporary poetry, and, conversely, for considering the contribution which this poetry has of its own initiative made towards an understanding of the true meaning and significance of War. Of the two considerations, the second is likely to prove the more fruitful. For it would seem to be not so much a fact that the war has made poetry, as that poetry has, now for the first time, made War—made it in its own image, with all the tinsel and gaud of tradition stripped away from it; and so made it perhaps that no sincere artist will ever venture again to represent War in those delusive colours with which Art has been too often content to disguise it in the past. From that dual point of view, at any rate, it is proposed in the following pages to consider the best of the war poetry of the last four years, and to attempt to estimate its spiritual effect upon the character of the nation.

It has been widely argued that the war must have been an inspirer of poetry because so many volumes of verse have been published during the last three years, written by young officers who have fallen in active service. It is the war alone, we are asked to assume, that has of its own creative power forced these otherwise 'mute, inglorious Miltons' into song. But every one who has owned friends among public-school and University men must know that the impulse to record emotion in verse is one of the commonest attributes of educated adolescence. As a

rule these youthful exercises languish in the privacy of the author's bureau; and it is only the perfectly worthy ambition of bereaved parents, to raise some personal memorial to a dead son, that has recently haled so many of these manly tributes into the light of publicity. Many of them bear witness to very creditable metrical proficiency; most of them are distinguished by highly meritorious sentiment. But it would be the falsest of compliments to pretend that they make any real addition to the poetry of War. For the most part they record pleasant memories of school and college, breathe a boyish loyalty to grey cloisters and green glades, but touch the essence of life no deeper than is possible to the soldier's honest determination to go out and do his best. Their mental and spiritual attitude to war, in short, is radically conventional; and they are thus entirely separated from the really significant poetry of the present war, of which the outstanding characteristic is its absolute freedom from convention, demonstrated in an eager, almost passionate determination to picture War as it reveals itself, not to the outsider, but to the enlightened combatant himself.

And here, at the outset, we find ourselves face to face with the differentiating quality of the best new poetry of War. It is written, not by lookers-on, but by the soldiers themselves. The relation between war and poetry, of course, is as old as either war or poetry itself; and we stand in no need of the picturesque *pastiches* of Sir Walter Scott to remind us of those wandering minstrels who strayed from castle to castle, singing by the fireside of the doughty deeds of dead heroes, to the end that the young men might be stirred to go out and fight, and the maidens' hearts preserved from breaking while their lovers were away. Most of the war poetry of the past has been the legitimate descendant of these glib eulogists, of whom the first thing to remember is that their whole business is to encourage and to praise, to set romance twittering among the leaves—in short, to tell noble lies about War, that the purpose of the country may be served. Poetry, in fact, has to plead guilty to misrepresenting War, in the cause either of politics or of art—of misrepresenting it as something intrinsically splendid, beautiful, and inspiring. It has persistently

confused the issue with the process. Splendid things are done in war, of course; but they are the issue of war, not its process.

For the mere process of warfare is indisputably a vile, inhuman, devilish abomination, plunged in squalor and filth. It is approached through seas of mud, and pursued amid vermin and all uncleanness. It degrades the body of man; more than that, it would destroy his very soul itself, were it not for the divine fire that burns at the heart of humanity, and consumes even the weapons of war in the white heat of its truth. And in the present war, when, for the first time since the nation became articulate, fighting has ceased to be the business of a professional class, and has become perforce the bitter duty of the whole manhood of the race, we have had something approaching its true meaning revealed to us in poetry; not because war had any virtue in it that would 'make a poet out of a man,' but simply because the poet has himself turned soldier, and concentrated upon the ugly and monotonous business of war the keen searchlight of interpretation. The professional soldier is inevitably an unimaginative product; of all classes of the community, he is, perhaps, most completely the victim of tradition. His 'not to reason why'; his, in the very nature of things, to do what he is told, and to do it as quickly and as effectually as possible. But, now that war has ceased to be the concern of a professional class, its secrets have been revealed to the world at large. And so, for the first time, we have had the clear lights of intellect and interpretation playing upon the battlefield; and, whatever may be thought of the gain or loss to poetry, there can at least be no question about the extraordinary actuality of this new presentment, about its sincerity, or about the arresting revelation which it affords of the evil and the horror of modern warfare between civilised communities.

The contrast is the more vivid because of the high ideals and the exalted purpose with which the yoke of battle was at first accepted by the nation at large. It has been repeated so often as to have grown tedious that no nation ever entered upon war with a cleaner conscience than Britain in the summer of 1914. And repetition does not dull the edge of that truth; it is

indisputably true. No one could accuse Mr Thomas Hardy, for example, of sentimentalising a situation of this kind. If there had been an atom of false pretence about it, his searching gaze would have tracked it down in its secret corner. But for once, as the drums are heard in the village street, the old poet is stirred out of his cynicism, and stands, as it were, to attention at the window in the dim light of the early dawn, proud of his fellow-countrymen, and confident in their cause.

'What of the faith and fire within us
Men who march away
Ere the barn-cocks say
Night is growing gray,
To hazards whence no tears can win us?
What of the faith and fire within us
Men who march away? . . .

'In our heart of hearts believing
Victory crowns the just,
And that braggarts must
Surely bite the dust,
March we to the field ungrieving,
In our heart of hearts believing
Victory crowns the just.'

This sense of a just cause, almost of a sacred crusade, may be said to have inspired all the war poetry written during the closing months of 1914. In Mr Laurence Binyon's rich and high-hearted 'For the Fallen' it is presented as the one sure amulet of consolation.

'With proud thanksgiving, a mother for her children,
England mourns for her dead across the sea.
Flesh of her flesh they were, spirit of her spirit,
Fallen in the cause of the free. . . .'

Something of the same sentiment, too, broods over the harvest-fields in Mr John Masefield's 'August, 1914,' linking to the present sacrifice all those sons of the soil who in the past have left home and loved ones and hope, for the sake of an immortal dream of freedom:

'And died (uncouthly, most) in foreign lands
For some idea but dimly understood
Of an English city never built by hands,
Which love of England prompted and made good.'

This was the universal sentiment of our poetry at the outset of the war; but it was a sentiment which, in the nature of things, would scarcely survive the insistent claim of personality. In particular, it could not be expected to survive the ordeal of individual experience. It was detached, remote—the sentiment, in a word, of the onlooker. It was once more the true descendant of the old ballad poetry, made by men who stood outside the fiery trial of battle. It philosophised the situation, but it did not embody it realistically.

Now, as it happened, the chief tendency in English verse for several years before the outbreak of the war had been a tendency towards crude realism, finding its inspiration in themes which had hitherto, perhaps, been considered impossible to the idealising spirit of poetry. The younger generation, perceiving that the idyllic school of verse had inevitably exhausted its capacities, appeared to have set its heart upon proving that no subject lies intrinsically outside the limits of poetic treatment, and that poetry can draw to its service, and ennoble by its interpretation, even the most uncouth and hideous circumstance. The war, therefore, may be said to have afforded our young realists the richest possible opportunity for concentrating their art upon the vital moments of life and death. It was an opportunity at once pictorial and psychological. Its appeal was equally to the eye and to the heart; and it was immediately accepted with the eager frankness characteristic of our younger writers, and with the prevalent determination to speak the truth about the ugly things of life, and to strip suffering bare of all concealing veils of sentimentality and pretence. The work of revelation has been undertaken with untrammelled honesty; and its completion raises a very important problem. How far, we must ask, can poetry proceed in the vivid portrayal of death and destruction, and yet remain what poetry must always be, if it is to be worthy of its traditions—a spiritual interpretation of the soul of man in conflict with his environment?

The first stage, at any rate, of the poet's initiation in the school of war brings with it no difficulty at all; it is purely and intimately introspective. It follows tradition with unfaltering step; and the first change to be observed is a rather startling retrogression from the universal to

the purely personal point of view. It is comparatively easy for the onlooker to be eloquent in behalf of a cause; but the man who is swept into the field of action becomes, at the first onset, disconcertingly conscious of his own individuality and of his immediate personal risk. The young man trained to an intellectual life, with the plans for his future career plain before him, can scarcely break with so many associations unmoved by a sense of sacrifice; and the first poems to be written by soldier-poets were almost inevitably touched by a certain irresistible sense of self-pity. Rupert Brooke's sonnet 'The Soldier' is the natural utterance of a young man who is leaving behind him everything that made life worth living, and who, faced by the prospect of an untimely death, seeks his consolation in bringing the future into some sort of permanent relation with the past. Wherever he falls, he will carry with him some spirit of his home, some tribute to his training, some memorial of his love. And other poems, like Mr Robert Nichols's 'Farewell,' and the 'Into Battle' of Julian Grenfell, are inspired by the same vague uncertainty, the same tremulous trust that a man may be remembered as having shown the courage which all the education of his youth was designed to breed.

> 'They shall not say I went with heavy heart:
> Heavy I am, but soon I shall be free,
> I love them all, but oh, I now depart
> A little sadly, strangely, fearfully,
> As one who goes to try a mystery.'

And again:

> 'The kestrel hovering by day,
> And the little owls that call by night,
> Bid him be swift and keen as they,
> As keen of ear, as swift of sight.
>
> 'The blackbird sings to him, "Brother, brother,
> If this be the last song you shall sing,
> Sing well, for you may not sing another;
> Brother, sing."'

In these first moments of solitude it is perhaps inevitable that a man should be thinking of himself, but the mood passes with extraordinary rapidity; and the next change in the poet's attitude to War can be traced in almost every one of the young writers who have actually

been into the front lines. The sense of a cause vanishes; the sense of self vanishes; and over all spreads an impenetrable, absorbing prepossession that War is after all merely another form of toiling, moiling business, beset with detail, loaded with obligation, in which the individual soldier is of no more significance than the proverbial cog in a vast mass of labouring machinery.

Men, as Mr Gilbert Frankau sees them clearly, have become the slaves of the guns.

'These are our masters, the slim
Grim muzzles that irk in the pit;
That chafe for the rushing of wheels,
For the teams plunging madly to bit
As the gunners swing down to unkey,
For the trails sweeping half-circle-right,
For the six breech-blocks clashing as one
To a target viewed clear on the sight—
Dun masses, the shells search and tear
Into fragments that bunch as they run—
For the hour of the red battle-harvest,
The dream of the slaves of the gun.'

In these Kiplingesque lines the creak of the machine has practically drowned the voice of poetry altogether; but the authentic note sounds less uncertainly in Mr Robert Nichols's 'On the Way Up.'

'The battery grides and jingles,
Mile succeeds to mile;
Shaking the noonday sunshine,
The guns lunge out awhile
And then are still awhile.

'We amble along the highway;
The reeking, powdery dust
Ascends and cakes our faces,
With a striped, sweaty crust.

'Under the still sky's violet
The heat throbs in the air . . .
The white road's dusty radiance
Assumes a dark glare.

'With a head hot and heavy,
And eyes that cannot rest,
And a black heart burning
In a stifled breast,

'I sit in the saddle,
I feel the road unroll,
And keep my senses straightened
Towards to-morrow's goal.'

These pieces, which are grouped together in Mr Osborn's suggestive anthology, under the general title of 'The Approach,' may be said to bridge the gulfs that separate the three stages in the poet's initiation. In the first, where the battery has halted by the wayside, a sudden paroxysm of fear attacks the soldier. For a moment he is absorbed once more in himself. In the next, he has become a part of the machinery of war; the battery itself is the unit, and community of task the whole duty of life. In the third, community of task has opened out into human sympathy. 'Men I love about me!' The machinery of war has revealed itself as composed of an infinity of human atoms, every one with a history, and a significance of its own. The man has passed out of himself into the heart of others; and, while life is seen to be made up of an endless sequence of little things, nothing in life, now so perpetually at odds with death, appears to be unworthy of care and consideration. This is, perhaps, the one and only helpful lesson that war brings home to the common soldier's heart, and it is instilled in a variety of different guises.

The life of the soldier lumbers along, revealing itself in broken glimpses through a mist of grey monotony. One thing which home-keeping age finds it difficult to realise is the interminable dulness which slowly settles down upon what once promised to be an heroic campaign. There are stretches of irksome inaction, during which the mind labours to reconcile itself with its uncongenial occupation. Weary detail, uninspired vigil, perpetual repetition of duties only half understood, throw the mind back upon itself and feed it with memory. In such lonely hours the impressions of the past become importunate, and flashes of the old life penetrate through the most unlikely environment. Wyndham Tennant describes this poignantly in 'Home Thoughts in Laventie.'

'Hungry for spring, I bent my head,
The perfume fanned my face,

And all my soul was dancing
In that little lovely place,
Dancing with a measured step from wrecked and shattered towns
Away—upon the Downs.

'I saw green banks of daffodils,
Slim poplars in the breeze,
Great tan-brown hares in gusty March
A-courting on the leas;
And meadows with their glittering streams, and silver scurrying dace,
Home—what a perfect place!'

And gradually the very contrast between the broad calm of the past and the infinite restlessness of the present draws the man out of himself into some sort of philosophic resignation.

'Here there are the great things, life and death, and danger,
All I ever dreamed of in the days that used to be,
Comrades and good-fellowship, the soul of an army,
But oh, it is the little things that take the heart of me.

'For all we knew of old, for little things and lovely,
We bow us to a greater life beyond our hope or fear,
To bear its heavy burdens, endure its toils unheeding,
Because of all the little things so distant and so dear.' *

Many of the soldier-poets recur naturally to their school-days, fighting old battles over again on field and in class-room. In this context in particular there emerges the new type of student-in-arms, the bookman, the classical scholar, the meditative yet virile public-school product, bred on good literature and good sport, who carries Homer in his haversack, and dreams of Achilles in the trenches. Of this type a brave and stimulating example is afforded by Charles Hamilton Sorley, whose imagination seems to flood the squalid present with the picturesque heroism of the past. He carries the sunlight of ancient Sparta into the drab, drenched flats of Flanders, and sees the end of conflict in an ideal city of dreams, built 'half in heaven' and half upon the windy Marlborough downs.

* 'A Highland Regiment.' By E. A. Mackintosh.

'Soon, O soon, I do not doubt it,
With the body or without it,
We shall all come tumbling down
To our old wrinkled red-capped town.
Perhaps the road up Ilsley way,
The old ridge-track, will be my way.
High up among the sheep and sky,
Look down on Wantage, passing by,
And see the smoke from Swindon town;
And then full left at Liddington,
Where the four winds of heaven meet
The earth-blest traveller to greet.
And then my face is toward the south,
There is a singing on my mouth:
Away to rightward I descry
My Barbury ensconced in sky,
Far underneath the Ogbourne twins,
And at my feet the thyme and whins,
The grasses with their little crowns
Of gold, the lovely Aldbourne downs,
And that old signpost (well I knew
That crazy signpost, arms askew,
Old mother of the four grass ways).
And then my mouth is dumb with praise,
For, past the wood and chalkpit tiny,
A glimpse of Marlborough ἐρατεινή!
So I descend beneath the rail
To warmth and welcome and wassail.'

So Rupert Brooke, in a well-known poem, dwells with love and longing on the calm beauty of Grantchester, familiar to generations of Cambridge men.

Dreams like these mingle inextricably with the rough-and-ready consolations of companionship. Life has run to waste in a tangle of things imagined and things seen; in the confusion of values the mind grasps at any kind of respite or relief, and, when the pressure is relaxed, and the company is back in billets, as in Captain Charles Scott-Moncreiff's cheery ballad, the simplest, silliest jests have a savour, merely because they help the soldier to forget the perpetually-brooding cloud that lies ahead. Here is no longer, it must be recognised, any dream of heroism, of a cause or a crusade, of broidered banners or a watchword. As dreams merge into reality, men, and men alone, become the material of life; and through

the machinery of war the young officer is drawn into sympathy with all who are part and parcel of the same machine. There is no sentimentality about it. The communion of endurance makes them all kin.

Mr Siegfried Sassoon, perhaps, has expressed better than any one else this emancipation of the soldier's heart from the taint of selfishness. It is the animating spirit of his vivid little piece of realism, 'In the Pink.' The young subaltern, who records the impression, has entered into the very soul of the private, as he scrawls a letter home to his rustic sweetheart, comforting her with consolations which his own environment belies.

'So Davies wrote: "This leaves me in the pink."
Then scrawled his name: "Your loving sweetheart, Willie,"
With crosses for a hug. He'd had a drink
Of rum and tea; and, though the barn was chilly,
For once his blood ran warm; he'd pay to spend.
Winter was passing; soon the year would mend.

'He couldn't sleep that night. Stiff in the dark
He groaned and thought of Sundays at the farm,
When he'd go out as cheerful as a lark
In his best suit to wander arm-in-arm
With brown-eyed Gwen, and whisper in her ear
The simple, silly things she liked to hear.

'And then he thought: to-morrow night we trudge
Up to the trenches, and my boots are rotten.
Five miles of stodgy clay and freezing sludge,
And everything but wretchedness forgotten.
To-night he's in the pink; but soon he'll die.
And still the war goes on; *he* don't know why.'

The war goes on, moreover, through a panorama of cruel inequalities, which serve to strip militarism of its last vestiges of glamour. David, as Captain Graves reminds us, no longer triumphs picturesquely over his towering giant. Brute force is stronger than the human heart.

The inevitable response to such experiences is, on the one hand, an honest, deep, and undemonstrative sympathy with the men who suffer; and, on the other, an intolerant contempt for the false sentiment with which ignorant people at home so fatuously invest the horrors of war. Sometimes, as in the late Lieut. Mackintosh's touching

'In Memoriam,' the sentiment wavers towards an almost feminine air of protectiveness. The young officer pictures himself as filling a parental relation to his men, losing something of his own life with every man who falls.

'Oh, never will I forget you,
My men that trusted me,
More my sons than your fathers',
For they would only see
The little helpless babies
And the young men in their pride.
They could not see you dying,
And hold you while you died.'

The same feeling, revealed in a scene of the finest dramatic quality, animates Mr Robert Nichols's 'Comrades,' where the dying subaltern, Gates, struggles back to the trenches, mortally wounded, every movement an accentuation of his suffering, out of sheer determination to die among the men for whom he is responsible.

'Inch by inch he fought, breathless and mute,
Dragging his carcase like a famished brute. . . .
His head was hammering and his eyes were dim,
A bloody sweat seemed to ooze out of him
And freeze along his spine . . . then he'd lie still
Before another effort of his will
Took him one nearer yard.
. . . . . .
The parapet was reached.
He could not rise to it. A look-out screeched,
"Mr Gates!"
Three figures in one breath
Leaped up. Two figures fell in toppling death;
And Gates was lifted in. "Who's hit?" said he.
"Timmins and Jones." "Why did they that for me?
I'm gone already!" Gently they laid him prone
And silently watched.
He twitched. They heard him moan,
"Why for me?" His eyes roamed round and none replied.
"I see it was alone I should have died."
They shook their heads. Then, "Is the doctor here?"
"He's comin', sir, he's hurryin', no fear."
"No good . . . Lift me." They lifted him.
He smiled and held his arms out to the dim,
And in a moment passed beyond their ken,
Hearing him whisper, "O my men, my men!"'

So powerful indeed does the immediate influence of a common life become that by degrees all other associations fade before its white-hot vehemence. The present detaches the soldier altogether from the past. Home, love, even the one loved above all, are forgotten. Tenderness seems like a far-away memory; the soldier's concern is with the soldier's life alone.

'Faces cheerful, full of whimsical mirth,
Lined by the wind, burned by the sun;
Bodies enraptured by the abounding earth,
As whose children, brothers we are and one.

'And any moment may descend hot death
To shatter limbs! pulp, tear and blast
Belovèd soldiers who love rough life and breath
Not less for dying faithful to the last.

'O the fading eyes, the grimèd face turned bony,
Oped, black, gushing mouth, fallen head,
Failing pressure of a held hand, shrunk and stony!
O sudden spasm, release of the dead!

'Was there love once? I have forgotten her.
Was there grief once? grief still is mine.
O loved, living, dying, heroic soldier,
All, all my joy, my grief, my love, are thine!'

To those whose life has for months been riddled with visions such as these it is no wonder that a return to home, and the sudden recognition of its false sentiment and falser humour should assault the mind with the sting of intolerable resentment. The old, familiar glosses upon war are indeed effectually held up to scorn by our young realists. Mr Siegfried Sassoon's 'They,' with its bitter arraignment of episcopal platitude, is well-balanced by the same poet's almost vindictive cameo of a London music-hall in war-time.

'The House is crammed; tier beyond tier they grin
And cackle at the Show, while prancing ranks
Of harlots shrill the chorus, drunk with din;
"We're sure the Kaiser loves the dear old Tanks!

'I'd like to see a tank come down the stalls,
Lurching to rag-time tunes, or "Home, sweet Home,"—
And there'd be no more jokes in Music-halls
To mock the riddled corpses round Bapaume.'

The reflective attitude of modern poetry to war can hardly go further. Sympathy has merged itself in a furious detestation of all those false pretences which in the past have presented the military spirit as a sort of enclosed garden of the poets' fantasy. The men who have seen the thing as it is have left the rest of us in no sort of doubt upon one indisputable fact. The poetry of the future will hardly venture to sentimentalise an experience which can prompt so sincere and so overwhelming an indignation. And indeed it is already to be noted that among those poets also who have not themselves made personal trial of war a new and restrained spirit may be recognised.

The truth has come home to the civilian no less than to the soldier. Mr Harold Monro's picture of the family gathering the night before the soldier returns to the front labours under no vain illusion with regard to the compensating glory of loss. Every moment, viewed from the stay-at-home's standpoint, is heavy with apprehension; every tick of the clock is like the warning of a death-watch. Suffering has become personal, intimate, homely, as all deep suffering always is. And when the news of loss comes home, as in Mr J. C. Squire's exquisitely poignant poem 'To a Bull-Dog,' it is no longer decorated with conventional comfort, but accepted, simply and honestly, for the devastating thing it is. The dog and one of his masters are left alone; the other master has fallen at the front. The poet addresses his dumb companion.

'When summer comes again,
And the long sunsets fade,
We shall have to go on playing the feeble game for two
That since the war we've played.

'And though you run expectant as you always do
To the uniforms we meet,
You'll never find Willy among all the soldiers
In even the longest street,

'Nor in any crowd; yet, strange and bitter thought,
Even now were the old words said,
If I tried the old trick and said "Where's Willy?"
You would quiver and lift your head,

'And your brown eyes would look to ask if I was serious,
And wait for the word to spring.
Sleep undisturbed: I shan't say *that* again,
You innocent old thing.'

Simple, direct pathos could scarcely be expressed in simpler, more direct phrase; and yet the metrical scheme of the poem is full of subtlety, rising on the wave of the long line just as the thought rises in intensity, and sinking back into repose in the short. Expression seems to be matched quite perfectly with thought; and the sentiment, purged of all self-pity and protestation, becomes almost intolerably sincere.

Sincerity, indeed, is the essence of the light with which the poetry of the last four years has slowly and increasingly flooded the crowded theatre of war. The quotations which we have given may surely speak for themselves. They must be acknowledged as presenting a broad panorama of the soldier's life from the day he leaves England until the hour of his death upon the field of honour; and their outstanding virtue is the penetration with which they probe to the essential spirit of warfare. Springing from various and diverse temperaments, they illustrate in turn the honest soldier's fear of fear, his pilgrimage from self-consciousness to altruism, his absorption into the machinery of war, and his gradual appreciation of that complex machine as a collection of human characters, each individual and all interacting, combining at last into a unity in which self is merged absolutely in a sense of common purpose and general obligation. The comparison of this poetry with the poetry of any other war in the history of the world can hardly fail to reassure the critic that, so far as the spiritual interpretation of war is concerned, the poets have risen manfully to their opportunity, and have abundantly justified the claim to sincerity and directness which appears to be the staple ambition of modern poetry, whatever its theme and occupation.

So far, it will be noted, we have been considering the

function of Poetry in offering a representation of War, psychologically and through its influence upon the soldier's mind; there remains to be considered the value of the material which War in its turn has offered to poetry, from the actual or realistic standpoint. And here, we believe, there has been a general tendency to overrate the value of the contribution. It has been claimed, for instance, that in the sister-art of painting the war has furnished artists with inspiration of the liveliest possibility. Can this be said with equal truth of Poetry? It seems very doubtful; and in any case the ground was ready-made for Poetry long before War had been dreamt of outside the impenetrable councils of Berlin. In the years immediately preceding the war there had been, as we have already noted, a growing fashion in English verse to seek crude and violent subjects for poetry; and this fashion was perilously fostered by the popular success of such realistic exercises as Mr John Masefield's 'The Everlasting Mercy' and 'The Widow in the Bye-Street,' which may perhaps be said to display the method to its most effectual advantage.

The fashion was already exhausting itself before the autumn of 1914, but it has been adopted by a few experimentalists in an attempt to represent the outward aspects of War, condensed and vitalised to a single vivid and entirely external impression. It is noticeable, however, that the attempt has not been so much encouraged by those who had already affected this particular kind of realism, as accepted by others in a sort of faint discipleship. Such poems as Mr Masefield himself has devoted to the war have been almost entirely psychological and interpretative; and of the older of the Georgian poets it has been left to Mr Gibson to whittle poetry down to its barest core, in the effort to present a keen and undecorated outline of fact. It cannot be said that the experiment is altogether fortunate.

'This bloody steel
  Has killed a man.
I heard him squeal
  As on I ran.

'He watched me come
  With wagging head.
I pressed it home,
  And he was dead.

'Though clean and clear
I've wiped the steel,
I still can hear
That dying squeal.'

Or again:

'I watched it oozing quietly
Out of the gaping gash.
The lads thrust on to victory
With lunge and curse and crash. . . .

'The lads thrust on to victory,
With lunge and crash and shout.
I lay and watched, as quietly
His life was running out.'

The consensus of critical judgment would almost certainly decide that such experiments as these are failures. They fail, because they are concerned exclusively with external facts; imagination has not got to work upon them; the poet's art has not even made the effort of fusing the fact with the idea. And the same is true of Mr Robert Nichols's 'Assault,' an elaborate attempt to give instant and compelling expression to the sights and sounds of onslaught, which nevertheless falls completely short of the true, interpretative service of poetry to life.

'I hear my whistle shriek
Between teeth set;
I fling an arm up,
Scramble up the grime
Over the parapet!

'I'm up. Go on.
Something meets us.
Head down into the storm that greets us.

A wail!
Lights. Blurr.
Gone.
On, on. Lead. Lead. Hail.
Spatter. Whirr. Whirr.'

The true test of poetry must always be the test of reading aloud. Unless a poem can bear recitation, its workmanship is condemned. And to read Mr Nichols's

'Assault' aloud is to be persuaded of a creaking chain of artistic improprieties, which strain vehemently towards effect, only to end in incoherence.

'Ha! Ha! Bunched figures waiting.
Revolver levelled: quick!
Flick! Flick!
Red as blood.
Germans. Germans.
Good! Oh, good!

Cool madness.'

This is neither metre nor *vers libre*. It has no form or true proportion; the fever of war has infected it, and left it void.

The fact is, of course, that Poetry can only be produced when imagination has fused fact; and that this fusion is possible, even to emphatically realistic verse, is proved by the impressive success of Captain Robert Graves's 'It's a Queer Time,' where the poet reproduces, with provocative fidelity, that familiar state of mind under which a man is conscious of acting with his bodily functions in one world while he is living with his brain in another. Past and present are commingled in a riot of confusion.

'You're charging madly at them yelling "Fag!"
When somehow something gives and your feet drag.
You fall and strike your head; yet feel no pain
And find . . . you're digging tunnels through the hay
In the Big Barn, 'cause it's a rainy day.
O springy hay, and lovely beams to climb!
You're back in the old sailor-suit again.
It's a queer time.

'Or you'll be dozing safe in your dug-out—
A great roar—the trench shakes and falls about—
You're struggling, gasping, struggling, then . . . hullo!
Elsie comes tripping gaily down the trench,
Hanky to nose—that lyddite makes a stench—
Getting her pinafore all over grime.
Funny! because she died ten years ago!
It's a queer time.'

This realism of the intellectual aspect of War, as

contrasted with the merely material realism of lamp-black and lightning, has indeed afforded poetry a new scope for the imagination; and particularly in the work of Captain Graves, Mr Siegfried Sassoon, and some of that of Mr Robert Nichols, it has produced verse of a quality which could not, perhaps, have found inspiration at all in times of peace and contentment. But it will be noted at once that it is a realism which depends, for its very essence, upon a transcendental interpretation. The war, in other words, has only furnished poetry with material, when Poetry has brought to its aid a secret interpretation which is, in effect, the very antithesis of War itself. The concomitants of War are noise, squalor, filth—the worst antagonists of the poet's art. So long as the poet is content with merely superficial pictures of noise, squalor, and filth, War affords him no adequate opportunity. Its entire world is too barren, too hard, too hideous to issue in poetry. Even Captain Graves goes artistically wrong with his bloated portrait of the dead Boche. The image is starkly repellent; imagination has failed to light it up. But directly imagination gets to work, it finds the soul beneath the surface, and then at last Poetry issues from the union.

A comparison of the spirit of this new poetry with that of the generation which preceded it would seem to suggest that War has most certainly not been without its purging influence upon the artistic soul of youth. For the new poetry is honest; it is strong; and it is often very beautiful. Decadence, at any rate, has vanished; triviality is no more; eccentricity has almost disappeared. And with these inadequate tricks of manner there has also disappeared a certain narrowness or selfishness of outlook upon the world around. The old formula of youth in the Ibsen period, the formula that clamoured for every man to live out his own life after his own fashion, has yielded before a realisation that no man's life can belong to himself, even for a moment; and that, when all is said and done, the individual life is of very little concern to the world at large. Sentimentality has been most healthily lived down; there is an almost universal distrust of conventional consolation. Religion, perhaps, has lost the vigour of its hold upon the imagination, and one can trace very little faith in any survival

of personality after death. But a larger and an austerer hope still finds the dead inseparable from every haunt of old association.

'Walking through trees to cool my heat and pain,
I know that David's with me here again.
All that is simple, happy, strong he is.
Caressingly I stroke
Rough bark of the friendly oak.
A brook goes bubbling by: the voice is his.
Turf burns with pleasant smoke:
I laugh at chaffinch and at primroses.
All that is simple, happy, strong, he is.
Over the whole wood in a little while
Breaks his slow smile.'*

We end, then, with the conclusion that Poetry, in spite of many tribulations, is well justified of its supreme ordeal. It has gone down into the darkness, and has carried light in its hand. Our young men, indeed, have grown old, as befits those who have been face to face with death. It may be true that the war has made Stoics of our Hedonists, but in the process it has also made men. And, being men, they have not feared to speak the truth about the bitter discipline under which they have emerged into manhood. It is a terrible truth, wounding the speaker and the hearer alike; but it is a truth that may yet help to set free the soul of humanity for nobler victories in the years of peace.

ARTHUR WAUGH.

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* 'Fairies and Fusiliers.' By Robert Graves.

Art. 8.—CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN INDIA.

1. *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, presented to both Houses of Parliament.* [Cd. 9109.] H.M. Stationery Office, 1918.
2. *India and the Future.* By W. Archer. Hutchinson, 1917.
3. *Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government.* By Lionel Carter. Macmillan, 1918.
4. *India in Transition.* By H.H. the Aga Khan. Philip Lee Warner, publisher to the Medici Society, 1918.
5. *The Future Government of India.* By K. Vyasa Rao. Macmillan, 1918.
6. *India under Experiment.* By G. Chesney. Murray, 1918.
7. *The Evolution of Mrs Besant.* By the Editor of 'Justice.' Madras: Justice Printing Works, 1918.

In the Joint Report recently laid before Parliament, the Secretary of State for India, Mr Montagu, and the Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford, have produced, together with an exhaustive survey of the existing structure of government and present conditions in India, a carefully reasoned scheme for carrying into effect the definite declaration of policy made on Aug. 20, 1917, on behalf of His Majesty's Government and in complete accord with the Government of India.

The Report begins by reciting that declaration, which it rightly describes as 'the most momentous utterance ever made in India's chequered history.' Certainly, never since Queen Victoria's proclamation in 1858 has there been any utterance of such grave import to the future of India and the British connexion as the announcement that the purpose of British policy is not only

'the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration,' but also 'the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.'

This statement was followed by the reservation that

'the British Government and the Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian people, must be judges of the time and measure

of each advance; and they must be guided by the cooperation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility.'

Nevertheless it was made clear that the declaration of policy was not to be a mere enunciation of principles.

'They [His Majesty's Government] have decided that substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible; and that it is of the highest importance, as a preliminary to considering what these steps should be, that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinion between those in authority at home and in India.'

For this purpose Mr Montagu was himself to proceed to India, in response to an invitation addressed originally to Mr Austen Chamberlain and extended, after his resignation, to his successor at the India Office.

Within the space of this article only the merest outline of a Report which covers 300 octavo pages can be given, and a few of its main features selected for not unfriendly criticism. The policy which it proposes to carry into effect is surely, one may hope, beyond recall. It went forth to India a year ago, unchallenged by a single responsible statesman in this country, with the *imprimatur* of a Government in which at a great crisis in the history of the Empire every school of political thought was formally represented. To go back upon it now would be regarded, and reasonably regarded, in India as a breach of faith which would do more to shake the foundations of British rule than would the worst consequences which its gloomiest critics foresee from persistence in it. Those consequences, should they ensue, can be dealt with and corrected in due course, but the consequences of a breach of faith would be irreparable. The policy itself, moreover, may well be regarded as an inevitable corollary of the principles for which the British Empire and its Allies have committed themselves to a life and death struggle. India herself is bearing no mean part in that struggle; and her admission at the hour of the Empire's peril to partnership in its supreme councils would have been but a hollow pretence, had it not been followed by a genuine attempt to train her

peoples in the principles of government upon which the unity and strength of the British Commonwealth of self-governing nations have been built up.

Long before the war led to any wide recognition of the need for such a policy, Sir Alfred Lyall, whose profound knowledge of India and of the Indian mind still stands unrivalled, had already outlined it with a prescience and authority which the authors of the Report have wisely called in aid at the head of the chapter they devote to 'The Conditions of the Problem.'

'It may be affirmed that the moral and material civilisation of the Indian people has made more progress in the last fifty years than during all the preceding centuries of their history. Yet it has inevitably come to pass that the differences of wealth and learning, frequent intercourse with Europe, and the saturation of the educated classes with Western ideas and political axioms, have stimulated the desire for a larger share in the government of their country among the leaders of native public opinion. An efficient administration no longer satisfies them; on the contrary, it has created ulterior hopes and aspirations. We began with great organic reforms. . . . Latterly we have undertaken the gradual introduction of representative institutions . . . we are seriously preparing for the devolution of local and provincial self-government.

'But the task of building up any substantial edifice of constitutional government in India is by no means easy, for all wide and uniform measures of reform are hindered by the immense area of the country, and especially by the number and diversity of its population; . . . It must certainly be conducted within the limitations necessary to preserve undisturbed and indisputable the fabric of British sovereignty, which is to the political machine what the iron rails are to the locomotive, the foundation and permanent way upon which all progress must move. Nevertheless some solution of this difficulty is demanded; for, now that the English have accomplished the building up, after the high Roman fashion, of an immense polyglot empire, the stability of the structure must depend upon a skilful distribution of weight, because excessive centralisation is radically insecure, and supports are useless without some capacity to resist pressure. The solution of these problems requires the sympathetic insight as well as the scientific methods of statesmanship, supplemented by the goodwill and the growing intelligence of the Indian people' (Report, p. 108).

Since Sir Alfred Lyall wrote those words, the task has become no easier, for 'the ulterior hopes and aspirations' of the educated classes have grown with their increasing influence. They monopolise practically all the liberal professions; they control almost the whole of a much more widely read press; they fill the subordinate public services; they occupy a larger proportion of important posts in the superior services; they play a much more conspicuous part in the enlarged legislative councils, and have been admitted even to the Executive Councils of the Viceroy and of the Presidency Governors. Even so conservative an Indian as H.H. the Aga Khan endorses, in his 'India in Transition,' their demand for radical changes in the Indian system of government which shall allow 'to the people themselves the right to direct policy.' To believe, with Mr George Chesney, that these classes who, whatever their shortcomings, are essentially the product of British rule and of the educational system which it has imported into India, are banded together in implacable hostility to us, and that their 'ulterior hopes and aspirations' therefore deserve no hearing, would surely be to admit the bankruptcy of our trusteeship in one of its most vital aspects. The Report, though it underrates the dangerous elements compounded of reactionary and revolutionary forces which exist amongst the educated classes, takes a much saner and truer view of the part they have come to play in the Indian polity.

'In estimating the politically-minded portion of the people of India we should not go either to census reports, on the one hand, or to political literature on the other. It is one of the most difficult portions of our task to see them in their right relation to the rest of the country. Our obligations to them are plain, for they are intellectually our children. They have imbibed ideas which we ourselves have set before them, and we ought to reckon it to their credit. The present intellectual and moral stir in India is no reproach but rather a tribute to our work. The *Raj* would have been a mechanical and iron thing if the spirit of India had not responded to it. We must remember, too, that the educated Indian has come to the front by hard work; he has seized the education which we offered him because he first saw its advantages; and it is he who has advocated and worked for political progress. . . . We owe him sympathy because he has conceived and pursued

the idea of managing his own affairs, an aim which no Englishman can fail to respect. . . . Helped by the inability of the other classes in India to play a prominent part he has assumed the place of leader; but his authority is by no means universally acknowledged and may in an emergency prove weak.'

'The prospects of advance very greatly depend upon how far the educated Indian is in sympathy with and capable of fairly representing the illiterate masses. The old assumption that the interests of the ryot must be confided to official hands is strenuously denied by modern educated Indians. They claim that the European official must by his lack of imagination and comparative lack of skill in tongues be gravely handicapped in interpreting the thoughts and desires of an Asiatic people. On the other hand, it is argued that in the limited spread of education, the endurance of caste exclusiveness and of usages sanctioned by caste, and in the records of some local bodies and councils, may be found reasons which suggest that the politically-minded classes stand somewhat apart from and in advance of the ordinary life of the country. Nor would it be surprising if this were the case. Our educational policy in the past aimed at satisfying the few who sought after English education, without sufficient thought of the consequences which might ensue from not taking care to extend instruction to the many. We have in fact created a limited *intelligentsia*, who desire advance; and we cannot stay their progress entirely until education has been extended to the masses. It has been made a reproach to the educated classes that they have followed too exclusively after one or two pursuits, the law, journalism or school teaching: and that these are all callings which make men inclined to overrate the importance of words and phrases. But even if there is substance in the count, we must take note also how far the past policy of Government is responsible. We have not succeeded in making education practical. It is only now, when the war has revealed the importance of industry, that we have deliberately set about encouraging Indians to undertake the creation of wealth by industrial enterprise, and have thereby offered the educated classes any tangible inducement to overcome their traditional inclination to look down on practical forms of energy. We must admit that the educated Indian is a creation peculiarly of our own; and, if we take the credit that is due to us for his strong points, we must admit a similar liability for his weak ones' (Report, pp. 115–116).

While anxious to do justice to the 'politically-minded' classes, the Report is not by any means unmindful of our responsibilities towards the overwhelming majority of the people of India, whom Western education has never yet directly touched. Still divided amongst themselves by deep lines of racial, sectarian and social cleavage, and often contemptuously branded as 'the voiceless millions of India,' they cannot be dismissed as voiceless or as unworthy of a hearing, because they still prefer to carry their grievances to the official whom they regard as their representative in the councils of government. Their case is not less powerfully stated.

'It is just because the Indian ryot is inarticulate and has not been directly represented in our deliberations that we feel bound to emphasise the great claim he has upon our consideration. The figure of the individual cultivator does not often catch the eye of the Governments in Simla and Whitehall. It is chiefly in the mass that they deal with him, as a consumer of salt or of piece-goods, or, unhappily too often, as the victim of scarcity or disease. But the district officer and his lieutenants know well the difficulties that beset him, and his very human needs: and in the local revenue offices these make up nine-tenths of the public business done. What matters most of all to the ryot are his relations with his landlord: but his fortunes are by no means to be disposed of by considering them solely from the standpoint of "agrarian legislation." Much of the activity of Government comes home to him eventually; and whatever helps him in his difficulties adds enormously to the happiness of the country as a whole. It is not merely a matter of securing him in possession of his plot of land, of assessing his dues equitably and collecting them with discrimination, of advancing him money in bad days and waiting till he is in a position to repay it. A simple, cheap and certain system of law is one of his greatest needs. He greatly requires to be protected against the intricacies of courts and the subtleties of law and enabled to defeat the advantage enjoyed by long-pursed opponents. The working of all the great procedure Codes, the law of usury, of registration, of limitation of contract, the Court-fees Act, the Stamp Act, is felt in the remotest village in the land. The ryot and hundreds of thousands of his kind may be lifted from penury to comfort by a canal project costing millions of pounds. One of his constant needs is protection against the exaction of petty

official oppressors. Improvements in seed or stock, manures, ploughs, wells; the building of a new road or a new railway: facilities for grazing his cattle or getting wood for his implements; the protection of his crop from wild animals, his cattle from disease, and his brass vessels from burglars; co-operative banks to lend him money and cooperative societies to develop his market; the provision of schools and dispensaries within reasonable distance—these are the things that make all the difference to his life. They have all been dispensed for him by an official government in the past; and we must always bear in mind that he will not find it easy to learn to arrange them for himself in future. He has sat on caste *panchayats;* he has signed joint petitions to official authority; but he has never exercised a vote on public questions. His mind has been made up for him by his landlord or banker or his priest or his relatives or the nearest official. These facts make it an imperative duty to assist and to protect him while he is learning to shoulder political responsibilities' (Report, pp. 114–115).

These two passages deserve to be quoted because they contain the essence of the twofold problem to which the authors of the Report have applied themselves, namely, how to meet the reasonable claim of the educated Indian to be not merely a subordinate agent but an active partner in the government and administration of his country, and at the same time to preserve in British hands, until he has proved himself fit for powers and responsibilities to which he is still untrained, the authority required for preventing any serious mischief to the peace, order and good government of India as a whole or to the interests of the vastly more numerous classes of Indians who view with great misgivings the changes for which he so insistently pleads. The problem is one of political education, which must be practical and also experimental. The 'politically-minded' classes, as the Report calls them, must be given an opportunity of learning how to govern and administer; and the other classes, which have hitherto accepted unquestioningly the government and administration given to them, must be taught to exercise the critical rights of intelligent citizenship. A sphere must be found in which Indians can be given work to do, and be held accountable to their own people for the way they do it. That sphere

must be circumscribed at first so as not to endanger the foundations of government, and yet capable of steady expansion if and in proportion as the experiment succeeds, until the process of political education is complete and Indians have shown themselves qualified for the same measure of self-government as the Dominions already enjoy within the British Empire.

From a careful examination of the existing structure of government and an exhaustive review of present conditions in India, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report deduces two definite conclusions:

(1) It is on the Central Government, i.e. the Government of India, that the whole structure rests; and the foundations must not be disturbed pending experience of the changes to be introduced into less vital parts. The Government of India must therefore remain wholly responsible to Parliament, and, saving such responsibility, its authority in essential matters must during the initial stages of the experiment remain indisputable.

(2) While popular control can be at once largely extended in the domain of local government, the Provinces provide the sphere in which the earlier steps towards the development of representative institutions and the progressive realisation of responsible government promised in the Declaration of Aug. 20, 1917, can be most usefully and safely taken.

Local self-government need not detain us, for the Report only moves in this respect along a line of advance to which the Government of India is already committed by a Resolution of 1915, largely based on the recommendations made ten years ago by the Royal Commission on Decentralisation. If greater progress has not yet been made along that line, the blame must rest in part on the educated Indian himself, who has been slow to value its importance. The most interesting, though by no means a novel feature is the stress laid in the Report upon the infusion of fresh vitality into the ancient *Panchayats* or Village Councils—a point long since and very persistently urged upon Government by such enlightened Indians as the late Mr Gokhale. The subject of local government is, moreover, one that may well be included within the scheme of devolution contemplated as the first instalment of responsible government in the

provinces; progress in the one sphere will therefore depend largely upon progress in the other.

For the great experiment in the provincial sphere, which will profoundly affect executive, legislature and administration, the eight provinces of Bombay, Madras, Bengal, the United Provinces, Behar and Orissa, the Punjab, the Central Provinces, and Assam, are deemed to be already ripe. Burma (which is not really India at all, and whose people belong to another race and to another stage of political development), the North-West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan (which for strategical reasons must remain under the direct control of the Government of India), and a few smaller areas, whose population is altogether too backward, are not to be touched at present. Even within the eight selected provinces one may doubt the wisdom of trusting the Punjab, the Central Provinces and Assam on the same footing as the other five, which have for the most part reached a considerably higher level of development.

The essential feature of the scheme is the division of the functions of the Provincial Government into two categories; the one comprising what are termed 'the reserved subjects,' i.e. those with which the maintenance of peace and order and good government is immediately bound up; and the other, those which, though less vital, very closely affect the daily life and common interests of the people, and which are called 'the transferred subjects' because it is proposed to transfer at once the largest possible measure of power and responsibility in regard to them to exclusively Indian shoulders. While all essential power and responsibility in regard to 'the reserved subjects' is to remain vested in the Governor-in-Council, i.e. the executive body consisting of the Governor and (under the new scheme) one British and one Indian member of Council, real power and responsibility for dealing with 'the transferred subjects' are to be conferred on Indian Ministers accountable to a Legislative Council in which there is to be a large Indian non-official majority, elected on the broadest possible franchise. The Provincial Government will thus itself be divided into two compartments; in the one the Governor-in-Council, responsible as heretofore to the Government of India and to the Secretary of State, i.e. the British

Parliament; in the other the Governor—but not in Council—acting with Indian Ministers responsible to an Indian legislature.

'It is our intention,' the Report says, 'that the Government thus composed and with this distribution of functions shall discharge them as one Government,' and that 'as a general rule, it shall deliberate as a whole.' The Report hopes to escape in this way the disadvantages of the more open dualism involved in a scheme known as that of the 'Joint Address,' under which the experiment of devolution to an exclusively Indian Executive and Indian Legislature would have been first made in smaller provincial areas by a subdivision of each province for the purpose into 'States' approximating to the size and importance of the States in the American Union. Mr Lionel Curtis strongly advocated this scheme in his 'Letters to the People of India,' the influence of which can be clearly traced in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, though it rejects the creation of 'State' areas as impracticable for the present. Whether the covert dualism inherent in the composite form of provincial government recommended in the Report will prove less dangerous than the overt dualism involved by the creation of subordinate 'State Government' areas within the larger area of Provincial Government, will depend in practice on the amount of goodwill required on both sides to secure the hearty cooperation of the two wings of Provincial Government, and above all on the spirit that will animate the elective bodies to which the purely Indian wing is to be made responsible.

It would be easy to point out how numerous and serious may be the occasions of friction arising out of the annual allocation of ways and means to the 'reserved' and 'transferred' subjects respectively, as well as out of administrative questions on the borderland of the 'reserved' and 'transferred' domains; and how difficult must be the position of the Governor who will have not only to run his two teams in double harness, but also to decide, in the event of conflict either with his Indian Ministers or his Indian Legislature, at what moment it will be his duty to exercise, by the 'certification' of a Bill which he deems it essential to place on the Statute Book, or in other ways contemplated by the Report, the

restraining and controlling powers still reserved to him in case of emergencies. The burden placed on a Provincial Governor's shoulders will be certainly far heavier than at present; and great discrimination will have to be shown in the selection of those sent out from home to rule over Indian provinces with a larger and more diverse population than Great Britain.

But it is premature to speculate on the working of the complex and elaborate machinery described in the Report, so long as two very important and closely interconnected questions, which it has left open for further investigation by special committees to be appointed *ad hoc*, remain unsettled.

One of these questions is that of defining in each Province the actual subjects that can at once be 'transferred' to the Indian Ministers, and those that must for the present be 'reserved' to the Governors-in-Council. The Report merely suggests in an Appendix, by way of illustration, a list of subjects considered generally suitable for immediate transfer, such as local government, excise, primary, secondary and technical education, medical, sanitary and veterinary services, cooperative credit, certain classes of forests and fisheries, minor public works, etc. On the handling of such 'transferred' subjects by Indian Ministers and Indian assemblies will depend the gradual enlargement of the list by successive additions until it finally includes all the subjects treated meanwhile as 'reserved,' and the whole executive power passes automatically under the control of the Legislative Council, to which it will then be solely responsible. Only when the Provinces have achieved complete self-government, does the Report propose to apply a similar process within the sphere of the Government of India.

The other and even more crucial question held over for inquiry is that of the constitution of the new electorates; for upon it must hinge the success or failure of any scheme, however admirable in theory, for the establishment of representative institutions in India. The methods of election introduced under the Morley-Minto reforms must be held largely responsible for their relative failure, though, it must be remembered, they were never intended even by Lord Morley to lay the foundations of parliamentary institutions or responsible

government. As Mr Curtis says, the image of oligarchy is stamped on that travesty of an electoral system; and it would be deplorable if the same image were stamped on the electoral system that will make or mar the future advancement of India.

The Report rightly considers that 'the system of indirect elections should be swept away,' for under it there can be no genuine relation between the representative ultimately elected and the original voter. It recognises the need for a careful electoral survey of the whole country before any final decision as to the new system can be reached.

'We must measure the number of persons who can in the different parts of the country be reasonably entrusted with the duties of citizenship. We must ascertain what sort of franchise will be suited to local conditions, and how interests that may be unable to find adequate representation in such constituencies are to be represented.'

The problem is admirably stated; and doubtless the terms of reference for the Committee which is about to explore it during next winter in India will be drawn up on these broad lines. It will not be in any way bound by the pious opinions to which the authors of the Report have somewhat prematurely committed themselves on such an important point as 'communal representation,' i.e. the creation of separate constituencies for various communities, which, however important or however much entitled to make their voices heard, might be submerged in constituencies based solely on territorial representation. 'Communal representation' was conceded to so powerful a minority as the Mahommedans under the Indian Councils Act of 1909; and the Montagu-Chelmsford Report admits that it cannot now be withdrawn from them, and that it may have to be conceded to other communities, such as the Sikhs. At the same time it develops at great length all the theoretical arguments against the principle, viz. that it is opposed to history, that it perpetuates class division, that it stereotypes existing relations based on traditions and prejudices which we should do everything to discourage. But theories cannot dispose of the facts set forth by another contributor to this issue of the 'Quarterly

Review' in an article entitled 'Is India a Nation?' The 'politically-minded' classes are strongly opposed to communal representation. But it lies very largely with them to shorten the period during which it may be a necessary expedient, by endeavouring much more earnestly than they have hitherto done to remove the deep lines of ancient social and religious cleavage which still constitute the gravest obstacle to genuine democratic progress and national unity.

Even the limited measure of provincial self-government which the Report contemplates, merely as a first instalment, must inevitably carry with it some relaxation of the very close administrative, legislative and financial control—especially rigid in the matter of finance—hitherto exercised by the Government of India over the Provincial Governments. Few will quarrel with recommendations already to some extent anticipated by those of the Decentralisation Commission and by the Government of India Resolution of 1915. Many will think they might with advantage go further. They still leave large opportunities of interference to the Government of India.

More questionable are some of the changes which it is proposed to make at one and the same time in the Viceroy's Executive and Legislative Councils. The Report recommends the substitution for the existing Legislative Council—in which Lord Morley decided to retain a permanent official majority—of two chambers, a lower one, largely elective, to consist of about 100 members, and to be called the Indian Legislative Assembly, and a higher one with only 50 members, to be known as the Council of State, in which alone the official element is to retain a bare majority. The qualifications for election to the Council of State are to be settled later by the Governor-General-in-Council; and the Report merely expresses the hope that, 'inasmuch as the Council of State will be the supreme legislative authority for India on all crucial questions and also the revising authority for all Indian legislation,' it will 'attract the services of the best men available,' and 'develop something of the experience and dignity of a body of Elder Statesmen'—an expression presumably borrowed, but not very aptly, from Japan, where the

Elder Statesmen have had no doubt great influence, but never any constitutional status.

It would be even more futile to speculate on the character of the Indian Legislative Assembly, as the question of the franchise for it is left over to the same Committee which is to deal with the franchise for the Provincial Councils. The Report, however, itself anticipates the possibility of serious conflicts of opinion between the Assembly and the Governor-General-in-Council, for it deems it necessary to arm him with the 'affirmative power of legislation' necessary to place on the Statute Book, after full publicity and discussion, 'measures essential to the discharge of his supreme responsibilities to which the majority of members in the Legislative Assembly are unwilling to assent.' That is one of the safeguards to be provided in accordance with the fundamental principle laid down in the Report—that in all essentials the authority of the Government of India must remain beyond dispute, until India is ripe for complete self-government. But why couple it with the irritating farce of an official majority voting to order? The Report itself subjects the official 'block' to merciless but not undeserved criticism, as one of the worst features of the Morley-Minto Reforms, and rejects it both for the Provincial Councils and for the Indian Lower House. Yet it maintains it in the Council of State. Is that the way to develop in it 'something of the dignity of a body of Elder Statesmen'? or is the prestige of Government—to say nothing of its officials—likely to be upheld by seeking to disguise behind such a transparent fiction responsibilities which, whenever it is its duty to assume them, it should assume openly and unreservedly?

The appointment of another Indian member to the Viceroy's Executive Council is less likely to arouse opposition than the abolition of the 'statutory' restrictions by which the presence on that Council of three members drawn from the Indian Civil Service has been hitherto assured. It is scarcely conceivable that any Viceroy will consent to deprive himself altogether of the only advisers who have personal knowledge and practical experience of the working of the administrative machine. But, if this recommendation means anything more than

an ostensible and quite unjustifiable concession to the Extremists who have made the extrusion of the Civil Service one of the chief features of their rabid campaign against the 'bureaucracy,' it is in direct conflict with the whole spirit of the chapter in which the Report deals with the public services and upholds the retention of a strong European element 'so far in the future as any man can foresee.'

Subject to the above criticisms, the desire expressed in the Report to secure 'greater elasticity in respect both of the size of the Government and the distribution of the work' is no less reasonable than the desire to bring the Government into closer touch with Indian opinion by placing the Indian Legislative Assembly on a broader basis, while providing at the same time a counterpoise in a Council of State representing presumably more conservative elements, which will be still further strengthened by the institution of a Council of Princes as a permanent consultative body. Here the authors of the Report break new ground. They have wisely recognised that the effects of great constitutional reforms which can be enacted only for that part of India that is under direct British administration must necessarily react upon that other smaller but still very considerable part of India which enjoys more or less complete internal autonomy under its own hereditary rulers. A growing number of questions, and especially economic questions, must arise in future, which will affect the interests of the Native States as directly as those of the rest of India; and their rulers may legitimately claim, as the Report plainly admits, to have constitutional opportunities of expressing their views and wishes and of conferring with one another and with the Government of India. The Report even suggests that, on matters of common interest, the Council of Princes may be drawn into joint deliberation with the Council of State. These far-reaching proposals are and must be subject to the spontaneous and willing assent of the Princes, who are naturally very jealous of their own treaty rights; but they are conceived in a broad and statesmanlike spirit.

It is all the more remarkable that the Report, while admitting that the control of the Government of India

over the Provincial Governments, and also the detailed control of the India Office over the Government of India within the sphere to be set apart for the beginnings of Indian responsible Government, must be relaxed, appears almost to ignore the larger issues arising out of the exercise by the British Government of its control over Indian policy. It mentions, it is true, certain cases in which the interference of the British Government has been attributed in India to 'political exigencies at home.' But it scarcely realises how damaging to the authority of government in India is the impression produced when instructions from Whitehall compel the Government of India to defend and to carry out a policy which it may be generally known to have deprecated and opposed. When that policy appears, moreover, to be dictated by a narrow conception of home interests, not only the authority of the Government of India but the confidence of Indians in the good faith of the British Government is seriously shaken.

In his 'Future Government of India,' which is the most notable contribution from any Indian writer to a constructive study of the problem, Mr K. Vyasa Rao devotes a whole chapter to this aspect of the question. He points out, with concrete instances to reinforce his argument, how anomalous is the position of a Viceroy who is the personal representative of the King-Emperor and the responsible trustee for the interests of India, but who at the same time may be compelled to defend, without even being allowed to disclaim his own responsibility, a policy imposed upon him from Whitehall which he and his Government entirely disapprove. Mr Vyasa Rao urges, in fact, as the first preliminary even to provincial autonomy, some readjustment of these relations which shall secure a reasonable measure of autonomy to the Government of India. He disclaims any desire to see the essential supremacy of the British Parliament impaired, but there lies the rub; and that is doubtless the reason why the Secretary of State and the Viceroy have shrunk from propounding any radical solution of so real and serious a difficulty.

A practical remedy might be at any rate to give the Government of India a greater latitude in the initiation and public advocacy of the measures it deems necessary

in the interests of India, while of course reserving to the Secretary of State the right of disallowance in the event of such measures being disapproved as conflicting with the main lines of British policy. The Government of India would thus be relieved from much undeserved odium, and the necessity for publicly justifying disallowance would enable the Secretary of State to resist any undue pressure brought to bear upon him in selfish or merely party interests at home. Some years ago, before the war had brought the possibility of Indian self-government within the range of what I then conceived to be practical politics, I wrote that we ought to make up our minds at any rate 'not to force upon India things which we should not dream of forcing upon our self-governing Dominions, especially in matters in which British material interests appear to be closely concerned.' Our duty in this respect is doubly clear to-day, when we have decided to set the feet of India firmly in the path towards self-government.

The relationship between the British Government and the Government of India will be more than ever one of practical and not merely theoretical importance if the brief but very pregnant observations of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy on the economic situation in India receive the consideration they deserve. They constitute a remarkably frank avowal of our past sins of omission and commission. If the Congress party had been composed of practical business men rather than of political theorists, and had preferred the study of economics to constitution-mongering, the late Mr Ranadi would not have preached to deaf ears when he pointed out, twenty-five years ago, that the economic domination of one country by another is far more formidable, because more insidious, than its political domination. Except for its annual protests against the Indian cotton excise, which was too obvious a grievance to escape its notice, the Congress never seriously addressed itself to economic questions until, as the Report points out, economic discontents merged in political agitation and found a vent in the extravagant *swadeshi* and boycott movements. Engineered by political extremists for political purposes, those movements were bound to fail, and they failed ruinously. But they were partly the unhealthy

manifestations of a real economic awakening, which Lord Curzon had done much to produce by creating a Department of Commerce and Industry, and encouraging technical and scientific education and agricultural research.

The poverty of a large part of the population of India is a lamentable fact which cannot be denied. The Congress formerly delighted to impute it to the 'drain' of Indian revenues to England—a theory which Mr William Archer, though a warm sympathiser with Indian aspirations, has thoroughly exploded in his admirable book 'India and the Future.' Many intelligent Indians have now realised that the only genuine remedy to India's poverty is the systematic development of her natural resources, the fostering of her industries (as Messrs Tata, the great pioneers of the Indian iron and steel industry, are already showing), and the improvement of her methods of agriculture, since agriculture must always remain the greatest of Indian industries. The war has abundantly proved how seriously India has been handicapped by her industrial backwardness, which, as the Report admits, Indians themselves are apt to attribute to the selfishness of British manufacturing interests. The appointment during the war of an Industrial Commission of Enquiry under the presidency of Sir Thomas Holland constitutes an important if belated recognition of the part which the economic question is going to play in future. Sir Satyendra Sinha, who has represented India in the Imperial War Conference, told a London audience before he left England that he valued the proposed measures of constitutional reform mainly as a pledge that India shall be allowed and helped to work out her economic salvation; for without the latter no political reforms would avail to make India prosperous and therefore contented. But this involves not only a complete departure from the *laisser-faire* doctrines imported from this country into India, but much greater freedom for the Government of India actively to shape its economic policy in accordance with Indian wishes and interests. In this respect a considerable relaxation of the control hitherto exercised by the British Government over the Government of India becomes imperative.

The Report, however, does not contemplate any such relaxation, unless we are to assume that it is expected

to follow from the more vigilant and intelligent interest which Parliament is exhorted to take in Indian affairs. The House of Commons is asked to appoint in future, at the beginning of each session, a select committee before which the Secretary of State for India would himself appear to answer questions and give information. Moreover, it is to Parliament that the Report would again commit the same sort of task which it used to perform in the days of the East India Company before every renewal of the Charter. It suggests that a Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry into the working of the new Indian institutions, and the general progress of the people of India, shall at stated intervals determine the further stages of advance towards the final goal of self-government. To prepare Parliament for the discharge of such responsible duties it is clearly desirable that, so soon as the Government Bill has been drafted to give effect to the recommendations of the Report, a Committee of both Houses shall be appointed to consider it. Such a Committee, armed with power to examine witnesses, would be able to probe both Indian and British public opinion in a much more searching way than can be done by impassioned and irresponsible arguments and counter-arguments in the Press and on platforms; and it would at the same time materially assist Parliament to master from the outset the many-sided problem whose progressive solution it will have constantly to watch and periodically to determine.

A Report of such magnitude and complexity must offer room for varied criticism, which, so long as the fundamental principles laid down in the declaration of Aug. 20, 1917, are frankly accepted, is quite compatible with a hearty recognition of the generous statesmanship and resourceful ingenuity displayed by its authors. They may already feel themselves in no small measure justified by the effect they have produced in India. In a significant passage of the Report, they insist that

'now that His Majesty's Government have declared their policy, reasonable men have something which they can oppose successfully to the excitement created by attacks on Government and by abuse of Englishmen, coupled with glowing and inaccurate accounts of India's golden past and

appeals to race-hatred in the name of religion. Many prominent Indians dislike and fear such methods. A new opportunity is now being offered to combat them, and we expect them to take it.'

Those expectations are already being fulfilled. The Home Rule rump of the Indian National Congress and Moslem League, whose resolutions the Report has subjected to courteous but merciless criticism and emphatically rejected, may still prefer to listen to such a fanatical Egeria as Mrs Besant, whose strange evolution is ruthlessly exposed by the leader of the Madras non-Brahmins in a volume published apparently with impunity under her very nose. They may also disregard the grave strictures unanimously passed upon Mr Tilak's political career by a semi-judicial Committee composed of eminent Indians and Europeans presided over by a Judge of the Court of King's Bench, Mr Justice Rowlatt, specially sent out to India. But the bulk of the Indian Moderates have openly taken their stand against Extremism by holding a Conference of their own, free from such compromising associations, and have testified thereby to their belief that, as Mr Vyasa Rao tersely puts it, 'to become self-governing, it is India that needs England indispensably.' In our own country, where, under the pressure of war preoccupations, changing conditions in far-distant India had attracted very scanty attention, the Report has also been, on the whole, well received by moderate men of all parties. It is only the rigid conservatives, representing the opposite pole to that of Indian extremism, who deny not only the expediency but the possibility of any policy directed towards Indian self-government, and deride the faith which has inspired both the Declaration of Aug. 20 and the scheme propounded in the Report. They might be invited to ponder the words written nearly a century ago by Sir Thomas Munro, one of the ablest and most far-sighted British administrators that India has ever known.

'What is to be the final result of our arrangements on the character of the people? Is it to be raised or to be lowered? Are we to be satisfied with merely securing our power and protecting the inhabitants? Or are we to endeavour to elevate their character and to render them worthy of filling higher stations in the management of their

country and devising plans for its improvement? . . . We should look on India not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently, until the natives shall in some future age have abandoned most of their superstitious prejudices and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves and to conduct and preserve it. Whenever such a time shall arrive, it will probably be best for both countries that British control over India should be gradually withdrawn.'

Sir Thomas Munro did not live to see the Government of India Act of 1833. But it was his ideas that bore fruit in that first great endeavour to formulate the principles of British rule on lines which, but for the catastrophe of the Mutiny, would have probably brought India by this time much nearer than she is at present to the goal that has once more been set definitely and deliberately before her. It cannot be contended that another century of British rule has rendered the task contemplated by Sir Thomas Munro impossible for us to achieve. The conditions have changed. The habits of government have become more set. Education has bred greater impatience of them among influential classes of Indians. On the other hand, the majority of Indians have acquired a reasoned faith in the permanence of the destiny which has bound India and Britain together. We on our side have learnt by experience that within the British Empire there is room for many nations to enjoy the largest possible measure of self-government without impairing its essential unity. Have we, in the light of what India has done for the Empire during the war, the right to go on assuming that she alone is incapable of self-government? That she is capable of it to-day, only Indians blinded by racial pride and hatred venture to assert. The majority are content to demand that she should be steadily trained to it, and as rapidly as possible. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report contains a carefully thought-out scheme for initiating her training to it, and for a gradual quickening of her progress within the limits of prudence and safety. That scheme may undergo amendment in a good many details, but, taken as a whole, and failing some substitute which is not at present in sight, it holds and must hold the field.

VALENTINE CHIROL.

Art. 9.—IS INDIA A NATION?

1. *General Report of the Census of India*, 1911.
2. *Royal Commission on the Public Services in India: Report of the Commissioners*, 1917.
3. *Indian Speeches*, 1907–1909. By Viscount Morley. Macmillan, 1909.
4. *Indian Nationalism.* By E. Bevan. Macmillan, 1914.
5. *India and the Future.* By W. Archer. Hutchinson, 1917.
6. *Nationalism.* By Sir R. Tagore. Macmillan, 1917.

It is more than thirty years since Sir John Seeley in his 'Expansion of England' told us that 'if there could arise in India a nationality movement similar to that which we witnessed in Italy,' British rule in India would come to an end; and he went so far as to say that all desire for its continuance ought also to be given up. The question that many persons are asking to-day is, whether the agitation that recently has caused so much excitement in India amounts to a movement of the kind that Prof. Seeley indicated. Many who are in entire sympathy with the principle recently enunciated anew by Mr William Archer,* that British rule is 'a means, not an end'—a means, namely, whereby the people of India are being trained to govern themselves—will nevertheless deny emphatically that the demand for Home Rule is to be regarded as proving that a real spirit of Indian nationality has sprung into being.

If it be 'the fashion (as Mr Archer says) to preface all accounts of India with the statement that it is not one country but a "sub-continent," and to enlarge upon the diversities of race and language contained within its boundaries,'† there are good reasons for this; among others, it is a method of representing the difficulty of the task that any one undertakes when he endeavours to form a judgment on a question affecting all India. India has a perfectly obvious unity; though many countries are packed into it, it is 'conspicuously a geographical unit'; it is also at present a political unit under the British *raj*; but, when so much has been said, its claim to unity is exhausted. Not that a further and

* 'India and the Future,' *passim.* † *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

more organic unity is entirely absent; 'we are giving India what she never had before—unity, cohesion, in a word, nationality,' says Mr Archer again; but as yet it is only a feeble growth. The following examination of the returns given in the Census Report, 1911, will show that, if the essential diversities are less than they are sometimes represented to be, they are still great enough to present formidable, though not insuperable, barriers to the creation of a nationalism representative of the whole of India.

To begin with language—it is very necessary to recall how great is its diversity, for, when the Census was taken in 1911, it was found that many educated Hindus were led by political considerations to 'belittle the great differences which actually exist between the different parts of the Empire; and it is sometimes alleged that there is only one language spoken throughout northern India.'* One is indeed at first staggered when confronted by the statement that the vernaculars of India number 220. But an analysis of the returns shows that the great majority of these 'languages' (many of them may be more properly called dialects) have very few speakers in proportion to the total population; and we find only fourteen languages that are spoken by at least five millions each, or in the aggregate by 283 millions. Of the remaining 206 languages, no less than 186 are divided among a total of sixteen millions, while twenty are divided among sixteen millions more.

There are of course in India, as in Europe, a great many persons who speak two or more languages, but here account is taken only of the mother-tongue, 'the language which each person ordinarily uses in his own home.' If the number fourteen appears less sensational than the 220 with which we set out, the smaller number is still large enough to present a serious hindrance to that freedom of intelligent communication between the various sections of the population using them which would tend to secure some approach to unity of opinion and aspiration.

Without going into the question too minutely, it may be stated roughly that nine of the fourteen languages

* Census Report, p. 320.

are spoken by the people who dwell north of a line drawn across the peninsula from Kolhapur in the west to Puri in the east,* and that these nine belong to the Indo-European family of languages. South of the line indicated are to be found the four languages of the Dravidian family. The geographical area of the representative of the Tibeto-Chinese family, Burmese, is sufficiently indicated by its name.

Another figure that quite rightly may awaken surprise is found on examining the statistics of education. The standard of literacy adopted for the Census cannot be described as high — all persons were enumerated as 'literate' 'who could write a letter (in any language) to a friend and read his reply'—yet with this low standard the whole population of India yielded only six per cent. of literates, or 18·9 millions of persons in a population of 315 millions. The Government is sometimes blamed for this backwardness, but, while it may be admitted that Government ought to have been more active in the promotion of vernacular education during the past sixty or eighty years, those who advance the criticism too often ignore certain obvious facts. One is that for the direct control of immense tracts in central and north-western India Great Britain has been responsible for only a comparatively short period of time, in some cases not much more than half a century. Another is that money is necessary for the diffusion of education, and that money means taxes. The creating of the immense army of teachers required takes time, while money is needed both for their training and for their adequate remuneration, so that the profession may be rendered sufficiently attractive to secure a steady flow of recruits. Then, again, many persons fail to realise that education is not desired by great masses of the people—the poorer peasants, for example—while among the great bulk of the population it was rare to find till the other day a female who was allowed to receive education beyond the most elementary stage. Such an indictment as that which Sir R. Tagore frames against 'the Nation' is therefore grossly unjust.

'The benefit of the Western civilisation,' he says, 'is doled

* The course of the Godaveri for some distance coincides with the line, but at its source it is too much to the north, and at its mouth too far south.

out to us in a miserly measure by the Nation, which tries to regulate the degree of nutrition as near the zero-point of vitality as possible. The portion of education allotted to us is so raggedly insufficient that it ought to outrage the sense of decency of a Western humanity.' *

This arraignment disregards all these facts, and in addition, the general neglect by intelligent, responsible Indians of the opportunity and benefits offered by the Halifax Dispatch of 1854, the tendency of certain classes to expect everything to be done for them at the public expense, and the familiar conservatism of tropical and sub-tropical races, which makes them indifferent to such advantages as education presents.

This conservatism has been most marked in the slow advance of female education, so that, though the women of certain smaller communities, such as the Parsis, Indian Christians, and Buddhists, reach a creditable average of literacy, the percentage for the whole female population amounts only to one. Setting aside the female population, the percentage of literacy for males is between 10 and 11. The number of literates is greatest, as might be expected, in the older provinces, Bengal, Bombay and Madras, in which the percentage amongst males is respectively 14, 12, and 13·8, while in the more recently acquired provinces, Punjab, United Provinces and Central Provinces, there is a fall to an almost uniform level of six per cent. The degree of literacy attained by Burma, namely 37 per cent. for males—due, we are told,† to the free instruction imparted in the Buddhist monasteries—is so high that it must, though the province has a population of only 12 millions, affect the average for all India. But Burma is so distinct from the rest of India in geographical position, in race, language and religion, that it may fairly be excluded from our further reckoning. As the political areas of higher literacy coincide with those in which a particular language is chiefly spoken, it may be concluded that literacy is highest amongst the speakers of Bengali, Marathi, and the four languages of the Dravidian family—Telugu, Tamil, Kanarese and Malayalam.

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* 'Nationalism,' p. 20.

† Census Report, p. 293.

In considering the question of the diffusion of general literacy in the provinces in which the percentage is highest, another limiting factor has to be taken account of, namely, Religion, which divides the population into distinct communities with widely varying educational attainment. Thus in Bengal the literacy of Hindu males amounts to 21 per cent., while among Mussulman males it falls to 8 per cent. This is a serious matter for Bengal as a province, for out of a population of 45·5 millions almost 24 millions are Mohammedans. In Bombay a somewhat similar state of things prevails.

If a *lingua franca* is to be sought for, it will not be found in any one of the six languages which stand high in respect of literacy. The nearest approach to such a universal language is that popularly known as Hindustani, which, in its various dialects, is now classed as either Western or Eastern Hindi. But, while one or other of its dialects may serve one indifferently well, at least along the lines of railway, over a great part of northern and central India, Hindustani will not carry one far to the south of the line Kolhapur—Puri. For the more highly educated classes throughout India it is well known that English is the common language; and it is sometimes urged that no set of figures brings out more clearly than those for literacy in English the doubtful character of the claim made by those who use this *lingua franca* that they are voicing the wishes of the peoples of India. Though a knowledge of English is spreading rapidly through the country, there were in 1911 only 1,700,000 persons in all India who were literate in English. This figure, however, may be made to appear less insignificant in relation to the total population, if again females are set on one side, and attention be concentrated on the male population of the older provinces. But even with this concession, it is found that in Bengal only 1·9 per cent. of the male population is literate in English, 1·4 in Bombay, and 1·2 in Madras. In the other larger provinces the percentage falls well below one.

Inconsiderable though the numbers of the English literates are, it has perforce to be admitted that their influence far exceeds their numerical strength. Thus the Commissioners in their Report on the Public Services in India (p. 15) point out how unwise it would be

'to ignore that growing body of Western educated opinion which is gradually creating a new atmosphere all over India. Even those who most strongly deprecate some of its manifestations realise that it has contributed largely to the great social and religious movements which are aiming at giving a new direction to old beliefs, and at harmonising ancient doctrines with the teachings of science. It is reflected in that new sense of unity which is displacing the idea of ordained separation hitherto prevalent in Indian society.'

However deplorable may be some of the 'manifestations' referred to—and in more recent times they have deserved stronger terms of reprobation than those used by the Commissioners—the 'Western-educated' section of the people is the only one that has some width of outlook and knowledge of world movements. Eighty years ago the paramount Power set itself deliberately to create this class—a decision described by Seeley as 'the greatest landmark in the history of our Empire considered as an institute of civilisation.' The momentous experiment has justified itself both in its primary object and in many other respects, though it is unfortunate that some of the consequences, not altogether unforeseen, have been allowed to take care of themselves.

So much being admitted, it does not follow that this class has developed, except here and there, anything that may be described as political wisdom or statesmanship. They can organise a clamour against the Arms Act, or, more justifiably, against Indentured Emigration, but, so far, they have shown little power of constructive statesmanship. 'They wanted,' as Sir R. Tagore puts it, 'scraps of things, but they had no constructive ideal.'

The commitments of Great Britain in India are much too great to allow the admission without reservation of the principle implied in the saying, 'good government is no substitute for self-government'; yet this is what the memorialists mean when they say, 'What is wanted is not merely good government and efficient administration, but government that is acceptable to the people because it is responsible to them.' But, when we ask who the people are whom the 'acceptable' Government is to represent and to whom it is to be responsible, the answer is not easily found.

When we ask the further question, Who are to form the

government for which the British bureaucratic oligarchy should make way? we find it already answered in the words of one of the Nineteen. Mr Srinivasa Sastri showed more courage than discretion when, in the Legislative Council at Delhi, he recently declared, 'How should a Brahman oligarchy, if oligarchy it was, rising from the soil and rooted in the soil, with interests far more permanent than those of the British oligarchy, be the less acceptable of the two?' This need not be interpreted as an avowal that the real object of the agitation for Home Rule is to have the destinies of the country transferred to the hands of a particular class of Indians; but Mr Srinivasa Sastri spoke the truth more nearly than perhaps he intended, when he suggested the alternative of a Brahman oligarchy.

The claim that, unlike the British, Brahmans such as himself 'rise from the soil and are rooted in the soil,' is a mere rhetorical way of saying that they are Indian born, though the Madras paper, 'Justice,' the organ of the non-Brahman community, no doubt thinking of the exactions of Brahman priests and lawyers, promptly replied, 'They are only parasites on those who are rooted to the soil'! But, apart from that, can it be shown that the Brahmans are the class who in all probability would supply the alternative Government, or at any rate have a preponderating influence in it? A presumption may at least be established that Brahmans would immediately secure a controlling influence in any Government formed on the principle of free election.

The first fact favouring this presumption is the high place taken by Brahman males both in general literacy and in literacy in English. Thus, in the Madras Presidency, about 70 per cent. of them can claim general literacy, while only one other caste touches 50 per cent.; and in literacy in English they far surpass every other caste, the Tamil-speaking Brahmans reaching 22 per cent. and those speaking Telugu 14·7 per cent., while no other caste touches three per cent. In Bombay again they stand highest by a long interval in literacy of both kinds; and, if in Bengal they are beaten by the Baidyas and the Subarnabaniks, it is not by much.

If these figures by themselves only show that the Brahmans have been more alive than any other class of

Hindus to the advantages to be derived from education, the Report of the Public Services Commission brings out in addition that they have benefited by their unquestioned enterprise to an extent far in excess of their numbers. There are in all India 11,064 civil appointments carrying salaries of 160*l.* a year or more. Of these 4573 are held by Indians of all communities, 3119 being held by Hindus. Brahmans, though in all India they number only 14·5 millions, hold 1455 of these posts, no other caste having half as many; while the whole Mohammedan community, numbering 66·6 millions, has to be content with 771.* Had the Commissioners pursued their investigations below the salary limit of 160*l.* a year to appointments of, say, 60*l.* a year, an even greater preponderance of Brahmans would undoubtedly have been found in the Public Services. The higher appointments have attached to them ordinarily a power, if not of direct patronage, still of selection and recommendation for the lower posts in a department; and it is but human nature—as it certainly is the Brahman nature—to use it in favour of one's own castemen.

In the profession of Law Brahmans outnumber all other classes, and frequently attain great distinction, a conspicuous instance being seen in Sir S. Subrahmanya Aiyar, K.C.I.E., who, now that he has retired from the Bench of the High Count, Madras, has taken a foremost place in the agitation for Home Rule in its most extreme form. Brahmans, again, are very numerous in the teaching profession, where, if they be politically-minded, their influence in the same direction often proves to be very great indeed; and, as is well known, they are to a large extent the controlling power of the native Press, both English and Vernacular.

It is altogether to the credit of this caste that they occupy the position they do in that modern India which is the creation of British rule. They have shown an alertness, a persistence, a suppleness and adaptability such as no other class of Indians can claim. They are the leaders of the *intelligentsia* of India, with the added advantage that, in spite of all the advance in education

* See also Census Report, pp. 429, 430.

and the influx of liberalising ideas from the West, they still exercise a subtle religious sway over all Hindus.

The class distinctions of the West are no counterpart of the Indian caste system; and it is only the veriest sophistry that would identify them. 'In India there is no common birthright.'* No Hindu can become a Brahman or obtrude himself into the prerogatives of the caste; a man is born a Brahman or not; if he is so born, he may assume such of the prerogatives as he chooses. It is not even a matter of religious confession; 'no one is interested in what his neighbour believes, but he is very much interested in knowing whether he can eat with him or take water from his hands;'† and of course also whether inter-marriage is permissible. Seeley regarded religion as 'the strongest and most important of all the elements which go to constitute nationality'; and he thought that in India Brahmanism might supply this element. It is striving hard to do so to-day, but, if it were to succeed, would it be able to secure for India 'fellowship on terms of equality with the civilised nations of the earth'? It may well be doubted, for, with the dawning of a new day for democracy, there could be no close cooperation with a Government which, based on an aristocracy of birth, would be essentially oligarchic, and which, besides, if not religiously intolerant, would secure a new lease of power for a social tyranny of the most intense type.

Mr Archer has unerringly put his finger on the real sore of India when he says with reference to caste, 'The tragic paradox of India's fate is this. She is unified by that which at the same time divides and enfeebles her.' In whatever way the origin of this or that caste may be explained, 'the spirit of exclusiveness is everywhere the same'; 'all castes are hemmed in by similar restrictions against inter-marriage and commensality';‡ they are, the 'countless compartments' of 'the magnificent cage' that India has manufactured, and worships 'with all ceremony.'§

It is therefore not easy to supply a common interest of sufficient strength to overcome the interminable

* Sir R. Tagore's 'Nationalism,' p. 123. † Census Report, p. 113.
‡ Census Report, p. 371. § Tagore's 'Nationalism,' p. 116.

cleavages produced by the system, and so to draw together that enormous mass of 217·3 millions of human beings called Hindus. If it be one of the ironies of fate that Great Britain is daily creating just such a common interest, to her own increasing embarrassment, it ought also to be regarded as being to her greater glory. Had Great Britain followed the policy of 'Divide et impera,' her own difficulties would have been fewer; instead, she has not only, so to speak, pulled India together physically, but by seeking to confer on all classes, from the proudest Brahman to the most degraded 'untouchable,' on Mussulman, Sikh, Christian and Buddhist alike, equal benefits and privileges, she has facilitated the advance of India towards the realisation of nationality.

As India is so lacking in homogeneity, it will be necessary, with a further extension of self-government, to extend also the principle of communal representation. There is not only the great religious division between Hindus and Mohammedans; there are divisions among the Hindus themselves which in this connexion probably deserve consideration. A strong anti-Brahman current has set in in the South, which may lead to a cleavage of such magnitude as to require political recognition. It has grown to great volume and influence since the demand for immediate Home Rule was launched. It is a striking indication of healthy, vigorous self-assertion to get rid of an intolerable religio-social tyranny. The non-Brahman Hindus, while not losing sight of self-government as the ultimate goal, are demanding communal representation, so that their interests may meantime be delivered from Brahman overlordship; and they recognise that it is only by the continuance of the firm and just government of Great Britain that they will be guaranteed the time necessary to fit them for that share in the government of their country to which their numbers and their wealth entitle them. Moreover, there are other religious communities which, though numerically small, have interests that deserve to be safeguarded, such as the Christians of the South, with a high percentage of literacy, and the Sikhs of the North-West, who, while probably caring little about representative government, have by the help they have rendered in

this war earned for themselves a right to generous treatment.*

Again, the landholding, the agricultural, the industrial, the commercial, and the Anglo-Indian interests, in short, the capitalist and productive interests, must be carefully protected in a representative system in which without checks of a communal kind all control would pass into the hands of professional politicians. How vastly important, for example, the agricultural interest is, may be seen from the statement in the Census Report (p. 405) that of actual workers 'in India 71 per cent. are engaged in pasture and agriculture, and only 29 per cent. in all other occupations combined.'

The facts that have been adduced amply justify the conclusion that conflicting interests are so many and so great that India cannot yet be regarded as a nation speaking with a voice of unchallengeable authority. If the balance is to be held even, so that the opposing interests may in time come into some sort of harmonious cooperation, it can only be done by the continued rule of the Power which, in virtue of its attitude of detachment, has given proof of its capacity for the task. Whatever measure of self-determination may be regarded as now due to India, it must fall far short of the extravagant demands of the extremists; for to surrender at this stage of India's development the destinies of the many inarticulate millions to a microscopic minority of individuals, congregated for most part in the cities would be a gross betrayal of a trust. As Sir Rabindranath Tagore has said, 'The narrowness of sympathy which makes it possible for us (Hindus) to impose upon a considerable portion of humanity the galling yoke of inferiority will assert itself in our politics in creating the tyranny of injustice.' That tyranny will surely not be allowed to rear its head.

J. M. RUSSELL.

* In all India there are 3·8 millions of Christians, and of these 1·2 million are in the Madras presidency, and 1·1 million more in the contiguous Native States, Travancore and Cochin. The Sikhs number 3·0 millions, almost all in the Punjab.

Art. 10.—A TAME HOUSE OF LORDS.

Report of the Conference on the Reform of the Second Chamber. Letter from Viscount Bryce to the Prime Minister [Cd. 9038]. H.M. Stat. Office, 1918.

THE Second Chamber Conference was appointed on Aug. 25, 1917. It began work on Oct. 2. During the next six months it held forty-eight sittings and it reported in April last. Its members were chosen in equal numbers from both Houses, but one member, Mr T. P. O'Connor, was throughout absent in America. The experience of the members was wide and varied. Lord Bryce, the Chairman, and Mr J. A. R. Marriott brought wide historical knowledge and a special study of constitutions and second chambers to the service of the Conference. Law was represented by Lord Loreburn. Many members had held high office at home and abroad, and all had long been trained in public affairs. Few of the Peers would be called strong House of Lords men, and some had sat in the House of Commons so long that they might have no little bias in favour of the Commons House. The other half were probably decided House of Commons men.

Of the many recommendations of the Conference two stand out conspicuous: one is the mode in which the Second Chamber is to be constituted; the other is the method in which differences arising between the two Chambers are to be composed. Even more remarkable perhaps than these recommendations, as to which there was some difference of opinion, were the preliminary assumptions, as to which it seems there was none. The Conference began by considering what functions were appropriate to a Second Chamber; and 'it was found that agreement existed' on four points. Theoretically, no doubt, this procedure was logical, but one cannot help wondering whether all those who agreed about the appropriate functions quite foresaw to what political proposals those premises would lead them in the long run. The Conference was discreetly handled. If the members had begun by going through the actual powers of the House of Lords and considering seriatim what should be taken

and what should be left, there might not have been so much unanimity.

The four functions agreed upon were these: (1) 'the examination and revision of Bills brought from the House of Commons'; (2) 'the initiation of Bills dealing with subjects of a comparatively non-controversial character'; (3) 'the interposition of so much delay (and no more) in the passing of a Bill into law as may be needed to enable the opinion of the nation to be adequately expressed upon it'; and (4) 'full and free discussion of large and important questions . . . at moments when the House of Commons may happen to be so much occupied that it cannot find sufficient time for them.' It was also generally agreed that the following 'elements' ought to find a place in the Second Chamber; (1) persons of experience in various forms of public work, and persons who possess special knowledge of Imperial Questions; (2) 'persons who, while likely to serve efficiently in a Second Chamber, may not have the physical vigour needed to bear the increasing strain which candidacy for a seat in the House of Commons and service in it involve'; and (3) 'a certain proportion of persons, who are not extreme partisans, but of a cast of mind which enables them to judge political questions with calmness and comparative freedom from prejudice or bias.'

When one contemplates this Second Chamber, including, if not consisting of, persons ripe in experience of public work, too feeble for the House of Commons, too old or too cold for prejudice or bias, occupying itself in revising other people's bills, in initiating bills of its own on subjects of comparatively non-controversial character, and in discussing quite large questions, fully and freely too, at moments when the other House happens to be busy with questions not so large or so important, one cannot help thinking that its members will have rather a quiet time of it.

The Conference then went on to describe (and still, it seems, with unanimity) the *morale* of this assembly. Its members ought not to aim at becoming rivals of the House of Commons, for which reason they ought not to have equal powers with it. Still much is asked of it. The Second Chamber should not habitually act

under the influence of party motives. It should not set itself to oppose the People's Will but rather should try to comprehend it. From the confidence which their characters and careers are fitted to inspire, its members should be able to secure for it moral authority, and, by exercising this moral authority and by evincing a superiority to factious motives, they should try to enlighten and influence the People through their debates. Certainly the Second Chamber has an uphill task before it. If it manages to rise superior to factious motives without being dull, and to attract to mere moral authority that popular attention which generally belongs only to actual power, it may induce the newspapers to report its debates, and then it may have some chance of influencing the People. Otherwise its debates will not much enlighten the People or anybody else, however earnestly the members may 'aim at ascertaining the mind and views of the nation as a whole.'

It is natural that, in prescribing the functions and character of its ideal Second Chamber, the Conference to some extent should do so by relating it to the actual House of Commons, with which it would have to work. No one proposes to reform the House of Commons; it follows that, in reforming the House of Lords, the new organ of the Legislature must be made to fit in with the peculiarities of the old one. The House of Commons, as it is and is to be, seems then to have presented itself to the mind of the Conference as possessing certain characteristics which are very material for the present purpose.

They regard the House of Commons as an organ of Legislation, whose bills stand regularly in need of examination or revision. By this is not meant mere drafting amendments by the Government's legal advisers; the revision required is that which can best be given by a large and composite deliberative assembly. The House of Commons, too, is one in which the necessity for acting 'under special rules limiting debate' is evidently to be regarded as a permanent feature. The passage of bills through it cannot be expected to be easy, for, even in the case of comparatively non-controversial subjects, a bill will find an easier passage, if it has first been fully discussed in the Second Chamber. The mere voice of

the House of Commons, even though expressed on a second and third reading, cannot be taken as in itself adequately expressing the opinion of the nation. Delay may be necessary to enable the opinion of the nation to be expressed adequately, though whether such adequate expression can be found anywhere but in a General Election does not appear. Certainly no method for expressing it is indicated.

Service in the House of Commons, to say nothing of courting and canvassing a constituency, is so arduous that it involves the possession of bodily vigour, which persons, whose brains are still good enough for the Second Chamber, cannot always hope to possess. It happens, and must be expected to happen in the House of Commons now and then, that time cannot be found for the full and free discussion of large and important matters, among which questions of foreign policy are conspicuous, although discussion of them ought to take place somewhere in the Legislature, and, like some other things, will not brook delay. It is not quite clear whether it is anticipated that the House of Commons may be too busy to give a full discussion to foreign affairs, or only incapable of giving them a free one. But, at any rate, there is one obstacle to profitable discussion in the House of Commons, from which it is thought better that the Second Chamber should be free; and that is the danger that, if a majority of the House of Commons were to speak or at any rate to vote according to its convictions, the Government might have to go out. Accordingly, it was thought that the utility of a Second Chamber as a medium of discussion, complementary to the discussions of the House of Commons, conditioned as they are by 'special rules limiting debate,' and by the fact that they may 'involve the fate of the Executive Government,' is enhanced when its proceedings may convince a Minister's reason but can have no effect in turning him out of office.

The Second Chamber being thus related to the House of Commons in permanence, and to a House of Commons of such permanent characteristics, the Conference was led at once to consider two difficult questions. Since it is part of the function of a Second Chamber in proper cases to revise House of Commons bills and to interpose

delay in passing such bills into law, plainly it is part of its duty, in proper cases, to differ from the opinion of the House of Commons and to stick to its own. Since it cannot turn out a Ministry and, if the newspapers will not report its debates, cannot appeal to the People, how is it to obtain a decision? Doggedly to throw out bills would not work; this would preserve only too well the continuity between the recent House of Lords and the new Second Chamber. There must be some machinery for settling such disputes; but, as its frequent use is hardly desirable, the composition of the Second Chamber and the mode of selecting discreet and docile persons as members of it become supremely important. On these matters the Conference have produced recommendations of great weight and of extreme ingenuity, but here they parted company with unanimity, for here they had to descend from the abstract to the concrete.

In case of a definitive difference of opinion between the two Chambers, the plan adopted for its final settlement is this. A Committee or Free Conference of the two Houses, not exceeding sixty in number, is to be chosen at the beginning of each Parliament; and to it differences between the Chambers may be referred. If this Conference fails to arrive at a compromise acceptable to both Chambers, the matter goes over to the following Session and then is taken up in the same body again. If the same compromise is then arrived at by a majority of three, it goes before both Houses again.

'If they both agreed to it, it would pass. If they both disagreed to it, or if the House of Commons alone disagreed, it would lapse. If, however, the House of Commons alone agreed to the Bill and it had been accepted by the Free Conference by a majority of not less than three of the members present and voting, it would be submitted for the Royal Assent.'

Thus it will be seen that if, in the discharge of its chief function, that of revising House of Commons Bills, the Second Chamber should adopt an amendment, in no case could that amendment be passed into law, unless the House of Commons accepted it; in no case could the Electorate be consulted or have anything to say to it, unless the Government should think fit to advise a dissolution; and in every case, in which the Commons

members of the Free Conference stood firm and obtained the concurrence or even the absence of three of the Second Chamber members, the House of Commons would get its way after a postponement merely to the next session. If so much is to depend on the discovery of three just men in the Second Chamber moiety of this Committee, the composition of the Second Chamber and the selection of its members become the crux of the scheme.

How then shall we choose these members, who are to make good the weaknesses of the House of Commons, to correct its errors, to revise its bills, to enlighten the People, to comprehend its will, if they can, and to give effect to it, when it is adequately expressed? Is it the People itself that is to choose? Is it the Crown? Neither; it is the House of Commons, but the House of Commons decently disguised.

This remarkable result was arrived at by a process of exclusion; and, so far as the Report goes, the Conference was moved more by the reasons against the five alternative plans rejected than by any stated argument in favour of the plan chosen. First, nomination by the Crown, acting through (which presumably means on the advice of) its Ministers, was rejected. Naturally so. This plan or the threat of it may do once, but after that it is exploded. It was all very well for passing the Parliament Act of 1910, but the Parliament Act has no friends now. The reason given, however, is worth noting.

'This plan appeared unlikely to find favour with the country, because it did not provide any guarantees for the fitness of the persons who might be nominated, and because it would be liable to be frequently employed as a reward for political party services.'

Apparently, in the view of the Conference, the country does not think much of Ministers.

Direct Election was then considered and rejected, less on its merits than in the interests of Ministers and of the House of Commons. Second is second, and first is first. A second chamber directly elected by the People might not know its place ; it might become the more attractive, possibly the more influential, body. That would never do. Besides, coming straight from the

People, enjoying their confidence, mirroring their views and ideas (and let us hope also fulfilling its function of comprehending them), it would inevitably become a rival of the House of Commons. That would be very awkward. 'Ministers would have two masters to serve and to fear.' No doubt one master is enough; but the Conference does not seem to think much more of Ministers than, in its opinion, does the country.

Election by Local Authorities was of course rejected. Who wants a Second Chamber of local nobodies? Nor did selection by 'some weighty, important and independent authority' find favour. It sounds well, but what it really comes to is election by a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses, and one is not surprised that it was rejected, though not unanimously. The reasoning, however, is odd.

'The majority thought it essential to provide a broader basis for the Second Chamber than election by any Commission, even one set up and renewed by Parliament, could furnish. These members sought that broader basis in the election of a Second Chamber by Parliament itself. . . . What was necessary was that it should be, as far as possible, a representative body. They held that since direct election by the voters had been ruled out by difficulties . . . which had been deemed insuperable, the nearest approach to the advantages claimed for the method of direct election was to vest the selection of the bulk of members of the Second Chamber in the persons whom the voters had chosen to represent them in Parliament.'

At this point the Conference apparently found itself confronted by that characteristic of the House of Commons, which its members seem to think regrettable but inherent, namely, its subjection to the party system and to party spirit. Enough members thought this objection insuperable, even if the panacea of Proportional Representation were applied, to lead the Conference to seek some electing body for the Second Chamber other than the House of Commons as a whole.

'An election by the whole of the House of Commons must inevitably become a purely party contest; a contest which would be managed by the party Whips and would turn upon the party pledges or party services of the persons to be elected, too little regard being paid to their personal qualifications.'

What, then, was to be done? If the House of Commons acts as a whole, its elections become party contests. What will prevent this? Why, to be sure, let the House of Commons act in parts. That this will be successful is rather assumed than proved. In itself it is not very obvious. Still, there is no doubt that a mob will do things from which individuals will recoil; and it may be that members of the House of Commons in groups may scruple to be guided by that party spirit and party system, which is supposed to govern the House as a whole and is good enough for taxing the People, making and unmaking Ministries, and so forth.

The grouping plan evolved by the Conference and adopted by a substantial majority is exceedingly ingenious. More than three-fourths of the Second Chamber (246 members) are to be elected by those members of the House of Commons who sit for constituencies in Great Britain. As for Ireland, for the present it is left out, for nobody just now can tell what to make of Ireland, but, in any view, there can be no doubt that, when enough is known of the wishes of the Irish People to make it possible to settle their rights, there will be a considerable unsettlement of the nicely balanced scheme recommended by the Conference.

Great Britain is divided into thirteen areas for the purpose of electing members of the Second Chamber; and the members for the constituencies in each area, to whatever parties they belong, are to form groups and to elect in groups their allotted number of Second Chamber members. The plan treats counties as the units; and the thirteen areas are formed by aggregations of counties. The report takes credit, and very justly so, for having contrived to invest these thirteen areas with a recognisable individuality; and, though they differ much in area, population, character and history, if the thing is to be done in this way at all, probably it could not be better done. The number of the members of the Second Chamber allotted to each area differs considerably. There is a solid Scotland with 30 members; a solid Wales (with Monmouth) has 15; London has 27; Lancashire 27; Yorkshire 24; most of the rest have 15 each. One thing is worth notice. The House of Lords, as it at present exists, is on the whole preponderantly

representative of the agricultural interest. This representation will be greatly diminished under the scheme proposed. The predominantly agricultural areas are only three out of the whole 13, with 48 members to elect out of 246; and of these East Anglia, which includes Essex, must contain many Londoners, while the South-Eastern, which includes Kent and Surrey, is in like case. Of course the agricultural interest in Scotland, Yorkshire and all the rest may make itself felt, but that entirely depends on the way in which members of the House of Commons may vote, when acting in groups and more or less freed from party associations.

The hopes and convictions of the supporters of this plan are thus summarised.

'The responsibility of Members of the House of Commons, electing in groups, to their own constituents and to the great mass of voters of the large area which they would for this purpose represent, would restrain that partisanship which was so much feared. The groups would be anxious to return persons of high political standing and also to study local sentiment. Thus they would not be subservient to the control of party managers and whips; and this responsibility would give a guarantee against the exercise of the kind of undue influence which was apprehended.'

This is a most remarkable argument. It proceeds from assumption to assumption and piles one *non sequitur* upon another. What is this responsibility, say, of the 66 Lancashire members, meeting and voting as a group in a Committee Room, that it should make of each one of them a different and a better man from what he is, when he passes through the lobbies with his fellows in the usual way? It seems to rest on their 'responsibility to their own constituents and to the great mass of voters of the large area.' Surely this is a fallacy. The constituents of a particular member are the voters in his electoral division, not the voters for the whole of Lancashire. A member, no doubt, has duties extending far beyond the limits of the constituency for which he sits, duties to the whole of the country, duties to the whole of the Empire, duties to himself and his career; and among those duties there would, if this scheme became law, be the duty of taking

a share in the selection of members for the Second Chamber. The hypothesis is that a member might in this connexion be forgetful of his duties to the nation at large and mindful only of the call of his party. If it be so, what warrant is there for crediting him with a sense of duty to a county or a group of counties, when he would be insensible to the clearer duty to the country at large? If from party blindness or party feeling a man cannot do his duty simply as a member of Parliament, he is not likely to be sensitive to it as a member of one thirteenth fraction of one part of Parliament. What magic is there to purge his eyesight or his passions in thus dividing the substance?

The matter may be looked at in another way. Nowhere do party interests assert themselves more strongly than in the selection of candidates; nowhere is party organisation more efficacious than here. If the system of selecting members of the Second Chamber by geographical groups of constituencies is to be a useful check upon party spirit, it must surely exclude the influence of the wire-puller and the party manager as much from the selection of candidates as from the choice of members. How is this to be done? We are told that the persons selected should be men of ripe experience, of known virtue, experts in the arts of administration at home and abroad. Some by age or temperament may be unfit to go canvassing; many will be too old to care much where they sit or whether they sit anywhere at all, except at home. Does any one suppose that men of this kind are to be had for the asking? Some one must hunt them up. The retired Governor, the Satrap *en disponibilité*, the proconsul *rude donatus*, the Professor Emeritus, is likely to think that the work of the Second Chamber is laborious, unimportant and dull, and that instead of seeking to undertake it he will wait to be asked. On the other hand there will be no lack of local notabilities not unwilling to serve, or of elderly politicians whom younger rivals are not unwilling to elbow gently out of the way. How are the thirteen groups to ensure the first class and eschew the other? As each group will consist of diverse and antagonistic elements, none can possess any common machinery, by which to prepare a list of suitable candidates.

The Conference expressly refrained from considering whether members of the Second Chamber should be paid or not; it does not even say what they are to be called or what the name of the Chamber is to be. These things may have some practical bearing on the readiness of candidates to come forward; but, whatever attractions of the kind there be, the members of the House of Commons, geographically grouped, will still have to exert themselves to find, in sufficient numbers, men of the kind which the scheme contemplates, so that their choice may not be too much limited to men of another sort, who, whatever their merits, do not conspicuously enjoy the distinctions of experience and comparative freedom from bias unanimously demanded in the Report. It is tolerably certain that the members of the House of Commons would take the line of least resistance, and would do, when geographically grouped, what they are accustomed to do and think it right to do, when they tax and legislate, make and unmake Ministries, and so forth. They would look to the central offices of their Party organisations at least to provide them with a list of candidates; they would not turn a deaf ear to the recommendations of their Party whips or Party leaders; and, if they recalled that, in the words of the Report, 'the Second Chamber ought not to be so strongly entrenched as to dispose it to engage in frequent contests with the House of Commons, so as to embarrass the Executive and clog the wheels of legislation,' and took care to choose safe men who would be free from such temptations, who should say them nay? Naturally room will be found for Viceroys and Field Marshals, Ambassadors and Captains of Industry; but, when these jewels have been assembled, they will find their place in a setting which, with some fine gold, will probably include a good deal of alloy.

It is proposed, however, that in addition to 246 persons elected by Members of the House of Commons grouped in territorial areas, there should be a further body of 81 persons, elected by a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses. The reasons given for this are curious.

'The large majority of the Second Chamber having been thus constituted upon a principle which was deemed such as would give a thoroughly popular character to the Chamber

as a whole, the Conference had next to consider the means by which the historical continuity of the reconstructed Second Chamber with the ancient House of Lords could be preserved.'

This is what the 81 are meant to do. They are to be chosen by a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses, say five from each. 'Such a Committee might be trusted to see to it that due representation was given to every shade of political opinion.' Again the Conference was haunted by the spectre of party spirit. If the 81 were 'chosen by the whole body of Peers' (which appears to be a precious hint at the style of the members of the future Second Chamber), it seemed that, as in the House of Commons, 'the election would be likely to fall under the control of party motives and party managers.' It is much to the credit of the uprightness of the Conference, that it should have been so scrupulous to avoid so great an evil, but it is less to the credit of its intelligence to have adopted such a method. Here is a small Committee of Selection, five from each House, expected to make such a choice of 81 persons as will give due representation to every shade of political opinion. There is no casting vote; any five acting together can prevent the election of any particular person; any six acting together can ensure it. What an opportunity for compromise! What a field for traffic! If the members of this Committee pay much attention to anything but the voice of party, they must needs be scarcely human.

The Conference recommends that, in the first instance, the whole 81 should be chosen from the Peers who were such at the passing of the Act, but that the number to be so chosen should be gradually reduced, till, after three elections, they should only be 30, though Peers are to be eligible like other people for the remaining 51 places. Thus the Peerage would always have thirty members in a House of 327. Why? Here is the answer.

'The respect which it is desirable that the nation should feel for the Second Chamber will be all the greater, if it be regarded as an ancient institution remodelled in accordance with modern views and feelings rather than as a brand-new creation. . . . The Great Council of the Nation, from which the House of Lords directly descends . . . is the oldest and most venerable of all British institutions, reaching back

beyond the Norman Conquest and beyond King Alfred into the shadowy regions of Teutonic antiquity.'

This is one reason; the other is that

'among the existing peers there are many men of distinguished ability and long experience in legislation and administration, men whose services the country would desire to retain.'

This must be very gratifying to the House of Lords, but all one can say is that, if the Nation can regard such a Second Chamber as an ancient institution remodelled, and not as a brand-new creation, or can believe that members of it, selected by members of the House of Commons, will be chosen by the People but without taint of party spirit, the Nation can believe anything.

The Second Chamber, then, starts with a complement of 81 existing peers. This is 'in order to find room for those peers who had been taking an active share in public business' before the scheme becomes law. For this purpose half as many would have sufficed, but no doubt a politic and temporary liberality of this kind was thought likely to disarm opposition and smooth the passage of the scheme. After a few years 30 peers would be chosen, and, as peers, would presumably be compellable to serve by the Sovereign's writ of summons, so as to recall to an imaginative People the memory of the most venerable of all British institutions and to reach back (as well as they can) into the shadowy regions of Teutonic antiquity. This seems to be a piece of exaggerated sentiment. Historical continuity is all very well, but this is not continuity; it is antiquarianism. This contingent of Peers would resemble the herds of indigenous cattle, long preserved at Chillingham or Cadzow, at most seasons of the year shy and inoffensive, though curious visitors are warned not to approach them without precaution. What part they may be expected to play in enlightening and influencing the people through debate is another matter; but if, with some assistance from the Spiritual Peers, they maintain a sufficient air of hoary antiquity they will, no doubt, have justified their existence.

It is in connexion with the scheme for resolving differences between the two Houses by means of a Free

Conference, that the practical significance of this plan for the composition of the Second Chamber is fully brought out, for, as observed above, the House of Commons will always get its way, if it chooses to stand firm, and will get it, too, no later than the following session, except in one unlikely event, namely that in a joint conference, not exceeding sixty in number, half chosen by the House of Commons itself from among its own members at the beginning of each Parliament, and the other half chosen by a body mainly of its own creation, a majority of three of the members present and voting cannot be got.

The procedure of this Free Conference is very remarkable. It is to debate in secret; the names of those voting are to be kept secret, unless the Conference itself otherwise orders; and even the numbers of those voting are to be secret too unless the Conference itself discloses them. In ordinary deliberations a man is so far supposed to propound his real opinion, that he is expected afterwards to make his action accord with it. Not so in this Free Conference. 'Its members ought to be at liberty to make suggestions for compromise, without prejudice to their own subsequent action in further sittings or when the matter comes before each House as a whole.' Could anything be more cynical? Except in bodies swayed by mere faction, the considered decision of a majority ought to represent what it thinks is right. Anything else is something which, in greater or less degree, it must deem wrong. The attitude of this Free Conference is quite otherwise. Decisions of two branches of the Legislature, which, though each seems right to its authors, are inconsistent decisions, are to be regarded by the Conference not as things decided and to be maintained because they are right, but as things indifferent, to be set aside in favour of something else, which, not being the same as either, must in the eyes of both Chambers be *pro tanto* wrong.

There may be another plan. One party may consent to what it thinks wrong on one point, in consideration of the other party doing the same on another. This is called Compromise. The thing is conducted in secret. It may be carried by the votes of persons whose names are never disclosed, every one of them so free to follow

his convenience or his orders, that on later occasions he will be free to vote the contrary, if his decision is to be given personally or in public. It is all very well to say that the Free Conference

'would address itself to the solution of the controversy by friendly methods, exploring the various points involved and seeking to find a way out of the difficulty either by compromise or by discovering some new plan, which might prove more acceptable to both Houses than that contained in the Bill passed by one House, or in the amendments passed by the other.'

When it is examined, it is seen to be a conclave for secret traffic. It can satisfy those alone who believe that in legislation one thing is pretty much as good as another, if only people can make up their minds to say so. It may be practical, although, if the 60 members sit at a Round Table, experience leads one to expect a negative result; but, as a plan, it hardly warrants the complacency with which its authors regard it.

As the numbers of those dissenting on the occasions, fairly numerous too, when the Conference was not unanimous, are only twice given, there is some danger of doing injustice to individuals by attributing to the Conference or to any part of it particular reasons or intentions beyond those which are expressly stated in the Report. Still it may reasonably be taken that, to some of the members at least, it was a matter of moment to enquire whether particular proposals and features would be likely to get through the House of Commons. It would be hardly censorious to suppose that on some points there was, perhaps unconsciously, a stronger desire to please the House of Commons than to select an ideal plan. At any rate the scheme adopted by the majority is carefully contrived to ensure that the Second Chamber shall be as light a fetter on the freedom of the First as it was possible to devise.

No one, however, can have thought much about the other question, namely, what would be likely to get through the House of Lords; for, except for the dubious case of the thirty peers perpetually standing with one foot in the present and the other in the shadowy regions of Teutonic antiquity, there is nothing about the scheme

to appease the House of Lords, outside of the 81 peers 'who had been taking an active share in public business.' This is intelligible, if the 'agreement which was found to exist' upon the points mentioned in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8, really was a unanimous agreement. If the fifteen peers who were members of the Conference fully accepted the 'Functions appropriate to a Second Chamber,' the 'Elements that ought to find a place in the Second Chamber,' and the 'Position which the Second Chamber ought to hold in our Constitutional System,' then the absence of any feature likely to conciliate the House of Lords, as it is, may be understood. The truth is that those Peers who accepted these paragraphs gave up the present House as hopeless and useless. Though in form a series of affirmative abstract propositions, these paragraphs were to them a General Confession. One can almost hear them murmur, 'There is no health in us.'

Still, any bill for the reformation of the House of Lords, any bill for the constitution of a Second Chamber as it ought to be, has to pass the House of Lords as it is; and it seems to have been overlooked that the House of Lords is still a co-ordinate branch of the Legislature. At present, by a majority of one of those present and voting, who might be several hundreds in number, a bill to enact this scheme could be killed. Of course there is the Parliament Act, though even under that instrument twice as great a delay can be imposed as this scheme contemplates; but the Conference's bill would hardly be a Parliament Act matter. It is not a cause to live and die for. Indeed one might surmise that a hardworked Ministry would thankfully drop any bill for the reform of the House of Lords which the Upper House rejects, and say that all pledges had now been redeemed and that, since the House of Lords preferred it, things could go on as before. The only practical points about the scheme, from the House of Lords point of view, are the provision for the inclusion of 81 peers in the Second Chamber first selected and that for including some Spiritual Peers among the 30 who are always to be members of subsequent chambers.

It is possible that parliamentary life under the Parliament Act may in the future be found more tolerable

than is generally expected. One is apt to forget that in years to come it will probably not be so very terrible after all. As it is, the House of Lords possesses real power if it chooses to use it. Over and over again during the last two years it could have forced a general election, or, if the Government of the day held strong views against the wisdom of an appeal to the People, it could have been brought to a compromise. Again and again this Parliament has passed bills for extending the statutory term of five years. If the House of Lords had thrown out one of those bills, the days of this Parliament were numbered. There was no time in which to bring the slow-moving machinery of the Parliament Act into play. Of course the country might have condemned such a step, but that is by no means certain. It would have been, to say the least of it, an arguable case, that a Parliament elected for five years, shortened in its life by two years in consideration of the great increase of its powers and elected without any mandate to prolong its own existence from time to time, ought to renew its authority from the People at the polls, all the more so because of the gravity of the times and the burden of its responsibilities. The House of Lords took no such step; probably hardly any one stopped to consider that it was constitutionally possible. It made no attempt to use the most potent implement it will ever have, or to seize the best opportunity that it will ever enjoy.

In any survey of the lines on which the present position of that House is to be altered, it ought to be remembered that the House has now shown itself to be free from faction, and that it still possesses great powers, which, till the People manifests its will to the contrary, it remains free to use. It ought also to be remembered that the Parliament Act, for all its terrors, is hardly a working weapon of war. As long as it stands, the prerogative to create voting brigades of obedient peers is laid up in lavender; and, while it stands, it can but rarely be put into use. A Ministry, which had to keep marching its supporters through the lobbies of the House of Commons session after session in order to get its bills, at long last, passed over the head of the House of Lords would find itself ridiculous.

It is easy to understand how a concurrence of two

opinions in the Conference led to its being taken for granted that the present state of things is past praying for. There is the opinion of the stout House of Commons men, who hold that the Upper House must always give way, and promptly too; and that, as the creature cannot set itself up against its creator, the result is best assured by letting the House of Commons appoint the members of the other House. There is, on the other hand, the aspiration of the eager House of Lords men, who think that the future of Peers lies in the House of Commons, and desire to be free from the pedantries which exclude them from it. To both it may well seem desirable that an Act should pass, beginning 'From and after the appointed day the assent of the Peers in Parliament assembled shall not be necessary to the enactment of any statute, but, in lieu thereof, it shall suffice if the assent be given of the Second Chamber hereby constituted and in manner hereinafter provided.' There are, however, other opinions to be considered. It is a pity that there was not a fuller representation on the Conference of persons willing to urge the view that something may still be done with the House of Lords; and that there are other ways of remodelling our ancient institutions in accordance with modern views than by making a revolution and calling it a reform.

'All political parties were represented in the Conference.' It is only one of the difficulties, which surround the whole system of these Conferences, that, whatever pains are taken to appoint representative men, true representation is hardly attainable. Conferences of this kind really have no place in our constitution, and, if resorted to as ordinary incidents of political life, would soon undermine the authority of the House of Commons and the responsibility of Ministers themselves. The questions which are referred to Conferences are precisely those whose complexity and magnitude are so great, that their examination under ordinary Parliamentary forms would occupy a large part of the time and energy available for the whole of one or, it may be, more than one Session. It is the natural desire of the members of a Conference to arrive at some agreed scheme, if possible, and at least to go hand-in-hand as far as they can. The result is apt to be an avowed

compromise, or to present a greater appearance of unanimity than really exists.

Yet the price of challenging it may be the loss of every prospect of other legislation for a couple of years to come. Thus there is a concurrent desire to accept the scheme rather than try to make a new one. Everybody admits that the conclusions of a Conference do not bind either House of Parliament; but they are pressed upon Parliament on all hands as something already agreed between all parties, admitting of little modification without almost a breach of faith, as the material of a bill which it will save a world of trouble to pass, and about which discussion will make nobody any the wiser. If the House of Commons were to let itself accept this view, it would sink to the position of a mere registering machine. It would admit that it leaves the heavy work to be done out of doors, and reserves its interest and its time for more piquant or more personal contests. Its authority would be steadily impaired. If, on the other hand, it asserts its rights, insists on full discussion and proceeds to remodel the scheme, it must do so for itself, ill fitted as it is for the origination of complicated measures. It cannot hold Ministers to the ordinary obligations of leadership in such a case. The object of a Conference is to relieve the Administration of responsibility. Ministers' attitude is 'This is not our scheme; we created a body composed of men of all parties, and it is that body which evolved this scheme; we cannot take on ourselves to produce another. Alter it, if you will, but remember, we are not responsible. We do not stand or fall by it, nor can we give it much time. We may have to drop the subject and pass to other things.' No doubt Ministers do not say so, but this is what the Conference system really means.

If Ministers are to be fully responsible to the House of Commons for projects of legislation, and if the House of Commons is to retain its full authority as representative of the People, Ministers themselves must frame these projects and make them their own, and must submit them to the full original judgment of Parliament. The humbler the position of the Second Chamber, the more important is this consideration in the interest of the House of Commons itself. Parliament

cannot afford to leave its own work to others. Devolution is intelligible; delegation is not. It is of course the right of Ministers to seek what expert assistance they will, but for that purpose these composite bodies, in which 'all political parties are represented,' are inappropriate. If they do not agree, Ministers are no wiser than before; if they do, their agreement tends to take the responsibility away from those who ought to propose, and those who have to decide upon, a bill. The party system and the party machine are framed for the purpose of giving to Ministers that power which their responsibility involves, so that they may ensure the passage of the measures for which they are responsible, or fall if they fail. Such machinery is inappropriate to ensuring the passage of measures which are not the product of the mind of those whom the majority of the House support, but are the composition of selected persons who bear no real relation to that majority at all.

It is only fair, in criticising the report of the Second Chamber Conference, to bear in mind how much its scheme must suffer from the defects inherent in Conferences in general. It is an ingenious effort, and discussion of it at any rate serves to throw light on a difficult subject, but satisfactory it cannot be called. For one thing, however, the public has cause to be grateful. 'We had to remember that a plan, which philosophers might approve, would not necessarily find like favour with the bodies by whose will it would have to pass into law.' Let us at least thank the members of the Conference for trying to be practical men and for resisting the temptation to be philosophers.

SUMNER.

Art. 11.—A GREAT NATURALIST: SIR JOSEPH HOOKER.

The Life and Letters of Sir Joseph Dalton Hooker, O.M., G.C.S.I.; based on material collected and arranged by Lady Hooker. By Leonard Huxley. Two vols. Murray, 1918.

It often happens in the progress of human thought that periods of special importance are marked, not, as rarely occurs, by the emergence of a solitary genius, but by the appearance of a group of gifted men of like habit of mind and enthusiasm for a given branch of study. Their coincidence in mental activity has been due sometimes to family connexion and local association, sometimes to the system of universities in which a professor of genius is succeeded by his pupil and he again by his, so that a 'school' originates which may spread its members and its teaching far and wide.

In the middle of the 19th century a group of naturalists appeared in this country, who were destined to bring about a momentous change in human thought, by placing on a firm basis the doctrine of 'organic evolution'—a doctrine which includes the gradual and 'natural' development of living things from non-living matter, and further the gradual and 'natural' development of man from an animal ancestry. The group we have in view has Charles Lyell (born in 1797) as its starting-point. Devoted from his earliest years to the study of natural history—his father being an accomplished botanist—Charles Lyell, when an undergraduate at Exeter College, Oxford, was attracted to geological study by the lectures of Dr Buckland. He was called to the bar, but fortunately his inherited property enabled him to abandon that profession when he was thirty years old, and to give all his energy to his favourite science.

In 1830–32 Lyell published his memorable work entitled 'The Principles of Geology: an Attempt to explain the former Changes of the Earth's Surface by Reference to Causes now in Operation.' That book and personal friendship with its author had a commanding influence upon two younger men, Charles Robert Darwin and Joseph Dalton Hooker, the former twelve years and the

latter twenty years Lyell's junior. Darwin, who had studied geology with Sedgwick of Cambridge, was away on the voyage of the 'Beagle' from 1831 to 1836, when Lyell's great book was published, but came immediately under its influence on his return, and in 1838 was closely associated, as secretary of the Geological Society, with Lyell, for whom he conceived a profound admiration and life-long regard. Hooker left England in 1839, being then twenty-two years old, to accompany Captain (afterwards Sir) James Clark Ross, the experienced Arctic navigator, on the expedition of the 'Erebus' and 'Terror' to the southern hemisphere and Antarctic polar regions. The main purpose of this expedition was to make observations on terrestrial magnetism and to determine the position of the southern magnetic pole. But Ross was an ardent naturalist and anxious to observe and collect both plants and marine animals, and accordingly managed to take young Hooker as surgeon (he was M.D. of Glasgow) to the 'Erebus' and botanist to the expedition. Ross not only gave his young surgeon every facility to collect plants in the various lands visited, but also employed him to work the towing net and make drawings of marine invertebrates when at sea. Some sixty years later a large portfolio of these beautiful and interesting drawings, which had never been published, were placed in the hands of the present writer by their venerable author, to ascertain whether, after so long an interval, they might have scientific value.

Young Hooker had Charles Darwin's example before him, and the recently published 'Journal of a Naturalist on H.M.S. Beagle' in his cabin, when he sailed on the 'Erebus,' but did not make Darwin's acquaintance until 1847, four years after his return from the Antarctic. Hooker's association with Lyell was earlier, for the Lyells of Kinnordy were intimate friends of his father; and it was from Sir Charles Lyell's father that he received the newly-issued copy of Darwin's 'Journal,' just in time to take it with him to the Antarctic. With Charles Lyell's great book he had early familiarity, and he had also read Robert Chambers's 'Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,' which appeared in 1832. Though not a very convincing work, it turned his thoughts, with very definite results, to the question of

the mutability of species—already raised by the essential nature of Lyell's geological doctrine and widely discussed at that time in consequence of the writings of Lamarck and St Hilaire.

To this group of three—Lyell, Darwin and Hooker—who were richly stored with knowledge of living things by their explorations in many parts of the globe, there was now added a fourth, T. H. Huxley. He made Hooker's acquaintance first at the British Association meeting at Ipswich in 1851, having recently returned from the voyage of the surveying ship 'Rattlesnake,' to which he had been appointed surgeon with a view to the opportunities thus provided of making studies in marine zoology. Old Sir John Richardson, the Arctic explorer, a first-rate naturalist and head of Haslar hospital, whither in those days young naval surgeons were sent on probation, had detected Huxley's abilities and secured for him the post on the 'Rattlesnake' in 1847, just as eight years earlier he had used his influence to secure for Hooker a similar position on the 'Erebus.'

These four men, Lyell, Darwin, Hooker and Huxley, were the actual 'begetters' and the chief propagators, both in the more restricted world of science and among the larger public, of the vivifying doctrine of organic evolution. The close personal ties which linked the first three were strengthened by the marriage of Joseph Hooker in August 1851 to Frances Henslow, eldest daughter of the Cambridge Professor of Botany, the man who turned Charles Darwin to a scientific career. Huxley came to them—to use Hooker's own simile—'as steel to a magnet,' and was soon admitted to the closest intimacy, giving them and receiving from them, the warmest affection. A tie of fellowship between Hooker, Darwin and Huxley was that they were all three 'old salts' and had the training and 'the knowledge of men' given by service in the Royal Navy. Huxley also met and sealed a close alliance with John Tyndall at the Ipswich gathering of the British Association in 1851, and so brought that physical philosopher into close and permanent relationship with the Darwinian 'nucleus.' He too brought Herbert Spencer into constant relation with the group; whilst young John Lubbock (afterwards Lord Avebury), who was a neighbour of Darwin's, now

settled at Down in Kent, became both by his scientific work in zoology, botany and geology and by his personal charm, a welcome associate.

In 1864 Hooker, George Busk (surgeon and naturalist), Spencer and Tyndall, who had been close friends of Huxley's ever since his return from the voyage of the 'Rattlesnake,' together with Frankland the chemist, Hirst the mathematician, old colleagues and allies of Tyndall, and Sir John Lubbock and Spottiswoode, friends of them all, founded the 'X club,' which met once a month for dinner, its purpose being, as Mr Leonard Huxley tells us,

'to afford a definite meeting-point for a few friends who were in danger of drifting apart in the flood of busy lives. But it was in itself a representative group of scientific men destined to play a large part in the history of science. Five of them [there were nine in all] received the Royal Medal of the Royal Society, three the Copley Medal, the highest scientific award; one the Rumford; six were Presidents of the British Association, three were Associates of the Institute of France; and from amongst them the Royal Society chose a Secretary, a Foreign Secretary, a Treasurer and three successive Presidents. . . . They included representatives of half-a-dozen branches of science—mathematics, physics, philosophy, chemistry, botany and biology; and all were animated by similar ideas of the high function of science and of the great Society which should be the chief representative of science in this country.'

Not unnaturally the club exercised, during its twenty-eight years of existence (it expired in 1892, owing to the dispersal of its original members and the decision not to elect new ones), a great influence on the progress of scientific organisation, an influence which assuredly was not sectarian nor exercised for party purposes. While the club, though bound up with the Darwinian movement, did not comprise the originators of that new doctrine, Lyell and Darwin himself—on account of their health and absorption in special pursuits at a distance from the town—it also, for a similar reason, did not include Alfred Russel Wallace, who had lately returned to England from his long sojourn in the tropics. His name can never be forgotten as that of one who, independently of Darwin's and while exploring in the tropics, conceived and stated the identical theory of the origin of species

by the natural selection of favoured varieties in 'the struggle for existence,' which had been more fully worked out, though held back from publication, by the elder naturalist. Wallace, as all the world knows, gladly gave all credit in the matter to Darwin, and contributed by his original observations and arguments, and by the lucid exposition given in a series of invaluable books for a period of more than forty years, to the establishment of Darwin's doctrine of organic evolution. Wallace held himself very much aloof from the London whirlpool, finding happiness and full occupation for his long life in scientific work.

It is perhaps a coincidence, but in any case a very fortunate fact, that we have a series of remarkable volumes giving in an unusually complete form the 'Life and Letters' of Lyell, of Darwin and of Huxley. Happily they wrote many letters, fortunately preserved for publication, in which their scientific work and the development of their views, as well as delightful revelations of character, of their tastes, their likes and dislikes, and of their heroic struggles and daily occupations, are recorded. These volumes can perhaps hardly be called 'biographies'; they are the materials for considered well-balanced biography. They have been gathered by loving hands and connected by a thread of narrative and explanatory notes. Now we have a similar 'Life and Letters' of Hooker, the material for which has been arranged by his widow, and presented in due order by Mr Leonard Huxley, who had already done for his father's memory what he has here, with skill and experience, done for that of his father's closest friend. The letters here given, taken with those of Darwin and Huxley and Lyell, interweave with and complete one another, giving a remarkably close picture of the growth of a great scientific theory.

We have indicated in bald outline the place which Hooker occupied in the little group of naturalists who established, in the later half of the 19th century, the doctrine of organic evolution. Since we are here concerned with the story of his life and work, it is now time to state more specifically what was his actual contribution to the science of his time; and then to point

out, as these volumes of his 'Life and Letters' enable us to do, to what native gifts of mind and character, on the one hand, and to what fortunate circumstances of training and association on the other, this contribution was due. Those are the enquiries which must always be of foremost interest when we are in possession of the detailed story of a great man's life.

Hooker was before and beyond everything else a great botanist, the greatest 'knower' of plants of his day, whether we estimate the immense number and variety of plants which he knew, or the thoroughness of that knowledge, or the vast area—that of the whole earth's surface—the vegetable population of which became familiar to him, either in the dried collections of travellers or (to an extent never achieved by any earlier or cotemporary botanist) in their living condition. The latter result was attained in two distinct ways: firstly by his prolonged and often perilous journeys to the southern hemisphere, to India and the Himalayan region, to Palestine and the Lebanon, to the Atlas mountains and to North America; and secondly by his control of the most extensive and admirably organised botanic garden in the world, where living plants were almost daily received or were raised from seed sent from every part of the earth's surface.

Probably the greatest permanent benefit conferred on mankind by Hooker—his greatest contribution to science—was his organisation, as a great and permanent State-institution, of the gardens, plantations, glass-houses, museums, laboratories and the incomparable herbarium, at Kew, together with its highly trained staff of all grades, its splendid and continuous series of publications, its world-wide correspondence and close relations with botanical institutions in the colonies and India, so as to form a vast living mechanism, working under his incessant care for the increase of botanical science. The indifference, the opposition, the sheer brutality, by which his efforts were too frequently opposed, and the ultimate triumph by which his tenacity of purpose, his honesty and unworldliness of character, were rewarded, can be realised and appreciated by the reader of this book. So also can one learn with pleasure of the fine men, both among his scientific colleagues and

the few intelligent officials with whom he had to deal, who sympathised with and helped him.

Here we may read the full story of the ignorant insolence of one Ayrton—an obscure politician who became a minister of the Crown, and proposed to make Kew into a mere pleasure-garden and to give his orders to Hooker as to a head-gardener, but was, by a timely rally of wiser statesmen and lovers of science, brought to heel like a whipped dog. Here too we read of the mean financial tricks of the East India Company, the delays of the Admiralty, the stupid parsimony of the Treasury relieved by the generosity and friendship of Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India, the goodwill of fine old Admirals and the enthusiasm of many high-placed officials (such as Bertram Mitford, Lord Redesdale) and well-tried friends who valued pure science and were spell-bound by Hooker's abilities, persistence, freedom from all desire for personal profit, and simple-minded devotion to one noble end—the building up of what were for him two inseparables, Kew and Botanical Science.

Hooker's more direct contributions to scientific botany are parallel in importance to the creation of the great institution (founded by his father and completed by the loyal help of his son-in-law and successor), wherein he worked out during many years the enormous collections of plants brought thither by himself, and amplified by official and private collections. His first scientific paper, on some new mosses, was written and published in 1837, when he was only twenty years of age; his last in 1911, on some Indian species of the Balsams (genus: Impatiens)—a large and difficult group to which he gave minute study, dissecting them under the microscope and drawing them with all the skill and assiduity of his youth, until within a few days of his death in his ninety-fifth year. The mere titles of the papers and volumes which Hooker produced in those seventy-four years of work occupy twenty pages in the 'Life.' No mere enumeration of their number can give an idea of their bulk, of the number of drawings and often coloured pictures which illustrate them, of the tireless industry which produced them, or of their scientific weight and purpose.

For the convenience of ready publication, he carried

on throughout his life (with the assistance in later years of other botanists, his chosen colleagues) 'Hooker's Icones Plantarum,' founded by his father in 1837, and the 'Botanical Magazine,' founded by William Curtis in 1787, which has appeared regularly every month during one hundred and thirty years! It was edited for forty years by Sir William Hooker, on whose death in 1865 Sir Joseph became editor and chief contributor, handing it over in 1904 to his successor as director of Kew, Sir William Thiselton Dyer. For seventy-eight years the two Fitches, uncle and nephew, were the only artists—without rivals for the perfection of their work—employed on the production of the hundreds of plates picturing new or rare plants published in the 'Botanical Magazine.' But Hooker's greatest works were published as separate volumes, usually by the aid of grants from Government departments. Such were the 'Flora Antarctica' (1844–47), 2 vols, with 198 plates; the 'Flora Novæ Zælandiæ' (1853–55), with 130 plates; the 'Flora Tasmaniæ,' with 200 plates; and the 'Flora of British India' (by J. D. H. assisted by various botanists), 1872–1897, 7 vols. A great number of important papers of smaller bulk, but always of special significance, were published by him in the Transactions of the Linnæan Society, in the journal of the Geographical Society and other journals, and as contributions to the works of other authorities, British and Foreign.

Hooker did a vast amount of work with his own hands, his own pencil and pen. The mechanical work of sorting the 'hay-stacks'—as collections of dried plants are irreverently called—the selection of specimens for description and incorporation in the herbarium and of duplicates for distribution to other botanical institutions and individuals (a proceeding by which exchanges were obtained and the completeness of the Kew herbarium assured), was always a delight to him; the mechanical labour and the mere 'handling' of plants being, as he tells us, a relief from closer work and yet conducive to thought and reflection bearing on his one great purpose. Of course he had an efficient staff and distinguished botanists as volunteer assistants, attracted by the unique conveniences for study afforded by the great herbarium, the library and the working-rooms, for which by degrees,

following out and developing the cherished scheme of his father, he succeeded in getting the reluctant officials of the Treasury and the Board of Works to disburse the necessary funds.

The great interest for Hooker in all this accumulation of knowledge touching the flora of every part of the world, over and above the mere record of new plants and their 'habitat,' was the discovery of the causes which have led to the present geographical distribution of plants. The problem continually presented itself to him in his travels. Take for instance the following passage in a letter written to his father from the Thibet frontier in 1848—

'To-day I went up the flanks of Donkiah to 19,300 feet. . . . The mountains, especially Kinchin-jhow, are beyond all description beautiful; from whichever side you view this latter mountain, it is a castle of pure blue glacier ice, 4000 (*sic*) feet high and 6 or 8 miles long. I do wish I were not the only person who has ever seen it or dwelt among its wonders. . . . I was greatly pleased with finding my most Antarctic plant, *Lecanora miniata*, at the top of the Pass; and to-day I saw stony hills at 19,000 feet stained wholly orange-red with it, exactly as the rocks of Cockburn Island were in 64° South. Is not this most curious and interesting? To find the identical plant forming the only vegetation at the two extreme limits of vegetable life is always interesting; but to find it absolutely in both instances painting a landscape so as to render its colour conspicuous in each case five miles off, is wonderful.'

How does it come about that this plant flourishes in two such widely remote regions? How can we account for hundreds of other instances of the presence of identical plants in isolated localities thousands of miles apart, and for the absence of others in regions contiguous with one in which they abound?

The great botanists preceding Hooker had believed in the 'special creation' of this endless variety of species and widely differing grades and elaboration of vegetable life, as an ultimate fact. Buffon, at the end of the 18th century, had pointed out the connexion of climate with the distribution of plants, and argued that vegetation must have commenced where the cooling globe was first cold enough to support it, i.e. at a pole. He

remarks that 'the same temperature might have been expected, all other circumstances being equal, to produce the same beings in different parts of the globe both in the animal and vegetable kingdoms.' To him also we owe the recognition of the limitation of groups of species to regions separated from one another by 'natural barriers.' Tournefort had, still earlier, pointed out the likeness between the vegetation of successive elevations, implying successive reduction of temperature, and that of successive degrees of latitude carrying the same successive change of climatic condition. Humboldt (whom Hooker met in Paris in 1845) showed that many great Natural Orders of plants (Gramineæ, Leguminosæ, Compositæ, etc.) are subject to certain laws of increase or decrease relatively to other plants in going polewards (in both hemispheres) and skywards. The construction of the 'isothermals' of the globe, which we owe to Humboldt, was a great instrument towards the advancement of Geographical Botany. Hooker regarded him (as he says in a letter to Darwin in 1881) as the greatest of scientific travellers; and in 1895 he writes of him (vol. i, p. 185), 'He was never tired of coming to ask me questions about my voyage [the Antarctic expedition with Ross]; he certainly is still a most wonderful man, with a sagacity and memory and capability for generalising that are quite marvellous.'

Lyell had shown that distribution is not a thing of the present only or of the present condition of climates and present outline and contours of lands. He also showed that our continents and oceans had experienced great changes of surface and climate since the introduction of the existing assemblages of plants and animals; that there had been a glacial period, and long before that a warm Arctic period, as proved by the abundant fossils (brought back by Arctic travellers) of plants belonging to a warm temperate zone. But these relations of flora and climate were looked upon as the outcome of direct adaptation by sudden and inexplicable acts of creation. It was Hooker's special merit and privilege to be the first to introduce into the attempt to explain the facts of the geographical distribution of plants, the conceptions already current in the scientific world of (a) the *mutability* and derivative origin of

species and (b) the *migration* of floras. This he did independently, by his own 'self-thought,' as Darwin termed it. His views are apparent in his earlier publications but are most fully set forth in his 'Introductory Essay to the Flora Tasmaniæ,' dealing with the Antarctic flora as a whole.

His study of Darwin's plants from the Galapagos Islands and their relation to those of other tropical islands and of the South-American continent brought him into close relation with Darwin, whom he visited in 1847. This was the beginning of their memorable intimacy and continuous exchange of letters (contained in these volumes and the similar 'Life and Letters' of Darwin). These letters were really conversations as to endless botanical details—enquiries made and answered, criticisms and arguments submitted by one to the other. They form a record of surpassing interest to all future generations of biologists. Hooker's stores of knowledge of fact in every department of botanical science were of essential service to Darwin, while Darwin's marvellous fecundity in original suggestions as to the explanation and the significance of facts and his remorseless criticism of those suggestions by appeal to other facts and to experiment, were a perennial stimulus to Hooker, who was himself a theorist, a generaliser—what is sometimes called 'a philosopher'—of large outlook. Lyell wrote in 1859 to Hooker of the 'Introductory Essay to the Flora Tasmaniæ': 'I have just finished the reading of your splendid Essay on the Origin of Species, as illustrated by your wide botanical experience, and think it goes far to raise the variety-making hypothesis to the rank of a theory, as accounting for the manner in which new species enter the world.' And Darwin wrote, 'I have finished your Essay. To my judgment it is by far the grandest and most interesting essay on subjects of the nature discussed I have ever read.'

Hooker was the earliest prominent naturalist to declare his adhesion to the theory of the Origin of Species by Natural Selection set forth by Darwin in his historic volume of 1859, but his complete adhesion to it was only arrived at by long and minute discussion with Darwin of his data, his arguments and inferences, extending over some years both before and after 1859,

in which the two naturalists were in constant communication. It must be borne in mind that Darwin's theory of the survival of favoured varieties by natural selection was something additional to the hypothesis of the derivative origin of species which Hooker had supported. Darwin's theory gave an *explanation* of that derivation, and showed it to be the necessary result of existing natural causes.

Hooker continued during the next twenty-two years to take a leading part in the development of an understanding of the geographical distribution of organisms on the earth's surface in the light of Darwin's great doctrine of Natural Selection. He was at times much perplexed by the attempt to demarcate natural phyto-geographical provinces and sub-provinces, as distinct from merely topographical areas; and finally he seems to have come to the same conclusion as that which he reached in the classification of the vegetable kingdom adopted by him in the monumental work which he produced in collaboration with Bentham, the 'Genera Plantarum' (3 vols, octavo, 1862–83). This conclusion was that, while we are still seeking a closer knowledge of the phyletic connexions of the floras and faunas of the world, it is, in view of *practical* purposes (that is to say, for facilitating the accumulation and orderly arrangement of our knowledge), better to adopt a frankly arbitrary series of groups and provinces agreed upon and accepted because they are traditional and serviceable for purposes of reference, than to assume prematurely that we are in a position to define the limits and connexions of all natural phyto-geographical provinces and of all phyletic groups. To do this we have not yet (he thought) sufficient knowledge, though we already see clearly much of the outlines and the needful lines of enquiry.

The means and the causes of the migration of plants were matters of extreme importance in the great problem of distribution and the closely connected problem of the changes of land and water on the earth's surface. These were the subject of speculation and enquiry by both Darwin and Hooker. Hooker had at first put forward the hypothesis of a lost circumpolar continent in order to account for the facts of plant distribution in the southern hemisphere. But Darwin favoured the view

of the persistence even from Silurian times of the great continental masses at present existing, and the radiation from the northern temperate and sub-arctic region of successive floras by spreading along the cold mountain chains which extend through the tongue-like southward projections of continental land—to-day traceable as South America, Africa, and Indo-Malaya. Transport of seeds, etc., by ocean currents, by wind and by birds and other such agencies was shown experimentally by Darwin to be possible in many cases, but the emergence and submergence of large tracts of land as bridges or connexions across the deep ocean-beds were rejected by him. Hooker writes to Darwin in 1881—

'Were you not the first to insist on this [the permanence since the Silurian period of the present continents and oceans], or at least to point this out? Do you not think that Wallace's summing-up of the proof of it is good? I know I once disputed the doctrine or rather could not take it in; but let that pass' (vol. ii, p. 224).

He goes on to say, in reference to the address which he was preparing for the British Association meeting at York, in which after many years' labour he expressed his final conclusions on Geographical Distribution,

'I must wind up with the doctrine of general distribution being primarily from north to south with no similar general flow from south to north—thus supporting the doctrine which has its last expression in Dyer's essay read before the Geograph. Society and referred to in my last R.S. address (1879).'

The conclusions at present held on this great subject, which so long occupied Hooker's attention as well as that of his friends Darwin and Wallace, are fully and admirably stated by Hooker's son-in-law and successor at Kew in his article on the Distribution of Plants in the last edition of the 'Encyclopedia Britannica'—an essay which permanently associates the name of Sir William Thiselton Dyer with those of Hooker and Darwin as a great master in this many-sided field of scientific speculation.

While Hooker never ceased to carry on by his own individual work and that of his staff the preparation

and publication of systematic 'Floras' of all parts of the British Empire, with a view to a full understanding of the origin of species and their geographical distribution (perhaps we should reverse the order of those terms), his botanical work was by no means limited to this. The 'Life' gives a full picture of his activities, which we may briefly summarise by mentioning some of his publications, while his letters, there reproduced, to his father, to Lyell, Darwin, Harvey (of Dublin), Bentham, Bryan Hodgson, Asa Gray, Huxley, Paget, and a host of other friends and fellow-workers, reveal the methods of his scientific work as well as his aims and struggles, the steps of his official aud public career and his family life. From them too we can gather his views not only on scientific problems but on art, literature, politics, education and religion.

From the long list of his works (other than those already cited) we select first that on 'The Rhododendrons of Sikkim-Himalaya' (1849–51), edited by his father from material sent home by him while he was away collecting, drawing and mapping in the Himalayas. It is a sample of the beauty of form and colour which entrances the true naturalist however austere may be his devotion (as was Hooker's) to pure science. He writes, 'It is a far grander and better book than even I expected. . . . All the Indian world is in love with my Rhododendron book.' Then we have his 'Himalayan Journals; or notes of a naturalist in Bengal, the Sikkim and Nepal Himalayas, the Khasia Mountains, etc.' (1854, re-issued 1905), a book like Darwin's 'Voyage of the Beagle' and Wallace's 'Malay Archipelago' for all to read and enjoy; his 'Students' Flora of the British Islands' (1870), which has run through three editions; and his 'Primer of Botany' (1876), which has been reprinted twenty times in three editions—'the rashest and most profitable of all my undertakings,' as he called it in a letter to Asa Gray. His paper 'On the Diatomaceous Vegetation of the Antarctic Ocean' (Brit. Assoc. Reports, 1847) was the forerunner of that study of oceanic deposits which many years later became (especially in connexion with the voyage of the 'Challenger') a great and important branch of research. Similarly his papers on Stigmaria and Lepidostrobi in the memoirs of the Geological Survey,

1848, were the starting-point of the study of the tissues of ancient fossil plants by means of the microscope. He was the first to have sections of fossils cut sufficiently transparent for that purpose, a method which in the hands of a later generation has yielded very important results.

In the domain of Physiology, besides some other contributions, there stands out his remarkable work on the attraction, capture and digestion of insects by the Pitcher Plants (Brit. Assoc. Reports, Belfast, 1874, and 'Nature,' 1870). The work was suggested by Darwin when investigating the carnivorous habits of the Sundew (Drosera). Experiments as to the digestive ferment and microscopical investigation of the glands, etc., were made by Hooker, aided by Dyer, at Kew. In the special study and exploration of remarkable morphological characters, Hooker's investigation of the root parasites known as Balanophoreæ—curiously simple in structure, without leaves or petals—formerly thought to be allied to the Fungi but shown by Hooker to be degenerate mistletoes, is a sample of his morphological work (On the structure and affinities of the Balanophoreæ, Linnæan Society Transactions, 1856). He made acquaintance with these strange plants both in New Zealand and in the Himalayas.

But the most striking thing which he did in this way was his description of the morphology, development and histology and the determination of the affinities of a weird-looking South-African plant discovered by Dr Welwitsch in dry country inland from Walfisch Bay, and sent by him to Kew. Hooker named it after its discoverer; and specimens of it (since received through other travellers) have been kept in cultivation ever since in one of the hot-houses at Kew ('On Welwitschia, a new genus of Gnetaceæ,' Trans. Linn. Soc., 1863). Hooker's triumph in this investigation was that of showing, by microscopic examination of the tissues and of the reproductive structures and their development, that this strange-looking plant is one of the Gnetaceæ, a family including the little European Ephedra and grouped with the Cycads, the Gingko trees and the Conifers in the great assemblage called Gymnosperms. In the 'Life and Letters' we have a delightful picture (which will stir the sympathy of every morphologist) of his excitement,

his hard work with the microscope, his reasoning, his results, and the reaction that followed. He writes, Jan. 20, 1862, to Huxley—

'This blessed Angola plant has proved even more wonderful than I expected—*figurez vous* a Dicotyledonous embryo, expanding like a dream into a huge broad woody brown disc, eight years old and of texture and surface like an overdone loaf, 5 feet *diam.* by 1½ high above the ground, and never growing higher, and whose two *cotyledons* become the two and only two leaves the plant ever has, and these each a good fathom long. From the edges of this disc above the two leaves, rise branched annual pannicles, bearing cones something like Pine cones, which contain either all female flowers, or all hermaphrodite flowers; the hermaphrodite flowers consist of one *naked* ovule absolutely the same as of *Ephedra*, in the organic axis of the flower, surrounded by six stamens and a four-leaved perigone. The female flower is quite different!

'Lastly, fancy my joy at discovering the key to the development of this hypertrophical embryo taking to become a plant after the fashion it does; and at my being able to show that . . . it is undoubtedly a member of the family Gnetaceæ amongst Gymnosperms, as the structure of the ovule and development of the seed and embryo clearly show. It is out of all question the most wonderful plant ever brought to this country—and the very ugliest. It re-opens the whole question of Gymnosperms as a class, and will (in the eyes of most) raise these, as I always said they would be raised, to equivalence in these respects with Angiosperms.'

At this moment he was fortunate enough to receive five splendid specimens from a Mr Monteiro of Loanda, who 'like a trump' sent down the coast at his request to get them. Much help, he says, was given by one of his staff, Prof. Oliver, who had been examining the tissues where he had left off, making 'some charming drawings that will save me a world of trouble.' The completed monograph was read at the Linnæan Society in December 1862 and published in the 'Transactions.' The reaction after a heavy and exciting piece of work set in, as so many ardent investigators know it has a way of doing. When it was finished he wrote to Darwin:

'My wife went to Cambridge and enjoyed it; I stayed at home (and enjoyed it), working away at 'Welwitschia' every day and almost every night. I entirely agree with you, by

the way, that after long working at a subject, and after making something of it, one invariably finds that it all seems dull, flat, stale and unprofitable. This feeling, however, you will observe only comes (most mercifully) after you *really* have made out something worth knowing. I feel as if everybody must know more of Welwitschia than I do, and yet I cannot but believe I have, ill or well, expounded and faithfully recorded a heap of the most curious facts regarding a single plant that have been brought to light for many years. The whole thing is, however, a dry record of singular structures, and sinks down to the level of the dullest descriptive account of dead matter beside your jolly dancing facts anent orchid-life and bee-life. I have looked at an orchid or two since reading the Orchid book, and feel that I could never have made out one of your points, even had I limitless leisure, zeal and material. I am a dull dog, a very dull dog. I may content myself with the *per contra* reflection that you could not (be dull enough to) write a "Genera Plantarum" which is just what I am best fitted for. I feel that I have a call that way and you the other.'

A splendid and illuminating revelation of a generous and too modest character.

As a concluding item in our necessarily incomplete but representative selection from the long list of Hooker's varied work in and for science, we must cite his action when President of the Royal Society in 1878 in raising a fund of 10,000*l.* (chiefly by subscription from wealthy friends of his own among the Fellows of the Society), by which new Fellows were relieved of the large entrance fee and all were in future to pay a reduced annual subscription of only 3*l.* This admirable measure, entirely due to Hooker's initiative, had the result that, as Mr Leonard Huxley writes, 'no man henceforth need be kept outside the Society on the score of money.' Of the many services in Economic Botany, which under his direction Kew rendered and continues to render to distant parts of the Empire, we have no space to say more than that they comprise the introduction from South America to India of the Quinine plant, and of the Rubber tree (Hevea), and the scientific supervision of the cultivation in the West Indies of the neglected sources of wealth—the Sugar cane, Tobacco, and Jamaica oranges.

When we examine, as the 'Life and Letters' and our

own observation of him enable us to do, the personal qualities which carried Hooker through his exceptionally long life with such splendid success, such unfailing spirit and contentment, and such lasting benefit to humanity (he was, we learn, selected by the Japanese, soon after his death, as 'one of the twenty-nine Heroes of the World that Modern Time has produced'), we find that the emergence of those qualities was not due to heredity alone but largely to the training which they received from a gifted and affectionate father, for whom he had profound sympathy and filial devotion. Hooker was born with a vigorous constitution and great physical endurance. He had an inborn tenacity of purpose and single-minded attitude to life, and was as remarkable for his frank honesty as for his courage. He inherited from his father and his maternal grandfather (both botanists) his aptitude for botanical science, but it was the teaching and example of his father which, from his earliest years, trained and developed that aptitude. He modestly, but with characteristic insight, said of himself when at the age of seventy he received the Copley Medal of the Royal Society, that he had no genius, no exceptional powers or exceptional talent, but that he possessed that inward motive power—some heat, some fervour which compels us to exercise our faculties and to ripen the fruits of our labours—which he would call 'the wish to do well,' expressed in the modest motto chosen for himself four hundred years ago by Prince Henry the Navigator, 'Talent de bien faire.'

His constant association, from boyhood onwards, with his father in the garden and herbarium created by the latter in Glasgow after his appointment as professor, made botany a part of his very existence. At the same time the aptitude for it must have been born in him. It was not inherited by his elder brother William, who, having the same opportunities, showed no liking for the subject, and, though more vivacious than his younger brother, displayed no scientific bent. From this point of view it is interesting to note that not one of Joseph Hooker's six sons has been attracted by botany or by scientific research. Sir William Hooker, a man of distinction in science and of influence in the official world, was able to communicate to his son his own tastes and

ambitions, and to secure for him that early official employment which started him on his career as an investigator and established him for life in the great centre of botanical science created by Sir William.

The intimate association of father and son, and the complete devotion of the younger man to the development of the elder's cherished projects, find a parallel in the life-work of Alexander Agassiz, who realised, on a magnificent scale, the plans for a great museum and institution of zoological research at Cambridge, Mass., designed by his father Louis Agassiz, and only in part carried into execution. Alexander Agassiz, as a young man, deliberately set to work as a mining engineer in order to procure that pecuniary independence which he decided to be necessary in the United States for one who wished to become a great zoologist. Before he was thirty years of age, a copper-mine in Michigan made him a millionaire and stood to him in the place of the official income and vast State-supported apparatus which awaited Joseph Hooker at Kew. Both men became great leaders in their science, and, in greatly developing and completing their fathers' work, left splendid monuments of their heritage and their devotion. It is interesting to note that the sons of Alexander Agassiz, like those of Joseph Hooker, though always on terms of affectionate intimacy with their father, have not become 'men of science.'

Hooker frequently acted in younger days as examiner in botany for various boards and universities. He was a member of the Senate of the University of London. Some valuable records of his views on education, which deserve special consideration at this critical moment, are to be found in these volumes. His views are of especial value because he was above all things a practical man, seeing his aim clearly and bringing his trained judgment and vast experience of men to bear on the means to be pursued in order to attain it. He was also absolutely frank and fearless in the expression of his conclusions. We quote below ('Life,' vol. ii, p. 329) a letter of his to his friend the Rev. J. D. La Touche, dated May 24, 1893. He says:

'You must not think that I oppose education of the

labouring classes, but I should like it conducted towards the future life of the average, and not to the high education of the few who can profit by the complex education of the Board Schools. Mind you, I am just as much against the higher school and College education of the *masses* of the upper classes! Surely it would be far better if much of their teaching were devoted to making them more useful members of society. . . . To return to technical education, my notion of it is that it should be begun early, at the expense of some of the Board's literature, classical English, etc., and be accompanied throughout by semi-scientific teaching; i.e. the cobbler should be taught what tanning is, what bristles are, and how developed, and so forth. If any Board School child shows a genius for the higher education, push him on by all means to school and college; but it is no use trying to "make silk purses out of sows' ears."'

From his earliest days onwards, Hooker shrank from public speaking; he disliked lecturing, and never held a professorial post. He detested newspaper discussions as well as the pomps and vanities of official ceremony. They all seemed to him as using up the time and strength which he ought to give to his one purpose—the increase of science. His natural and strong determination was to the most thorough and strenuous work in pure scientific investigation. He desired no popularity, but cared only for intimacy with and approval by the select few who were able to participate in his scientific work and thought, or were bound to him by long association. He was a man of the family, not a man of society. Nevertheless his long life, his high position and wide-reaching activities brought to him a vast number of acquaintances, inspired by admiration and affection for his kindly, frank and energetic character. With his children and numerous family connexions he found relaxation and refreshment in music and dancing and in reading works of fiction and romance. He became an enthusiastic admirer and collector of Wedgwood ware, and fully indulged in the collector's joy of picking up good pieces in the shops of second-hand dealers. He retained from early life the habit of constant, regular and uninterrupted work, and the simplest tastes in regard to food. He attributed his long life and the preservation of his health and mental power (as he said to the writer,

who visited him on his ninetieth birthday) to the fact that he had made it his practice throughout his life to dine in the middle of the day, drinking only a light wine, and to take nothing but a light tea in the evening.

Hooker was, it is true, fortunate in his friends—fortunate because he merited such fortune. We read in these volumes of their passing away one by one—until he at last was left alone, but not downcast. His mind, to the end, was full of happy memories, and he still had new plants to describe and was tended by his wife and interested in his garden. His long and fraternal association with Darwin was of vital importance to each of them. The genius and originality of his friend fed, as it were, on Hooker's immense stores of botanical knowledge; and Hooker, in turn, was stimulated by Darwin's enquiries into new lines of activity and acquired, in aiding his friend in those enquiries, a convincing proof of the decisive value of his own vast labours in building up the knowledge of plants. The 'Life and Letters' form a fascinating record of that romantic, well-nigh legendary period in the history of biological science, when great men ravished the globe of its secrets and revolutionised human thought. It was the privilege of the present writer to be personally associated—in many cases intimately so—with the heroes of this story from Lyell onwards, to grow up in their midst and to be thrilled by the daily triumphs of those mighty warriors. Many long years ago he was greeted by Hooker as 'a friend and the son of a friend!'; and it is with those words ringing in his memory that he closes the book of that great man's life.

E. Ray Lankester.

Art. 12.—LA QUESTION POLONAISE ET L'EUROPE AU COURS DE LA GUERRE.

Pour votre liberté et pour la nôtre. (Devise polonaise.)

Deux grands principes dominent la guerre que font les Alliés à l'impérialisme allemand, le droit des peuples et l'équilibre européen. A la base de l'une et l'autre de ces préoccupations, on retrouve la question polonaise. Ce peuple, debout sous l'oppression depuis plus d'un siècle, a manifesté plus qu'aucun autre son droit à l'existence. Il n'a rien perdu, sous le joug étranger, de ses fortes qualités ; il est demeuré un élément de civilisation occidentale dans l'Orient de l'Europe ; il a marché de pair avec ses maîtres, au point de vue moral, intellectuel et économique ; il a prouvé, au milieu de tribulations, sa profonde vitalité. Les raisons historiques et morales qui assignent aux Polonais une place à part au milieu des autres peuples opprimés ne suffiraient cependant pas à leur assurer un droit à l'assistance active des Alliés, s'il ne s'y joignait des motifs actuels et positifs. On ne saurait demander aux peuples de verser leur sang et de prolonger une guerre effroyable pour des intérêts étrangers. Mais le sort de la Pologne n'est étranger à aucune nation en Europe ; c'est le problème central de la politique européenne, le gage de l'équilibre, et sans équilibre il ne peut y avoir de liberté pour personne sur le continent.

L'Allemagne ne saurait être tenue en respect par les seules forces des nations occidentales ; l'existence d'un contrepoids sur la frontière orientale est une condition absolue de l'équilibre européen. Cette constatation a été la base de l'alliance franco-russe. Mais l'absence d'une Pologne indépendante, en même temps qu'elle obligeait la France à s'allier avec la seule grande puissance d'Orient, fût ce la Russie des Tsars, agissait aussi dans une direction opposée. Elle liait la Russie à l'Allemagne, par un intérêt commun, basé sur une complicité. La question polonaise a attaché la Russie, à la fois, aux deux groupements hostiles qui se partageaient l'Europe ; elle a rendu fatales et l'alliance et la défection. Aussi longtemps que la Pologne est restée en servage, l'Entente ne pouvait pas se passer contre l'Allemagne du contrepoids russe, et la Russie ne pouvait pas se passer

davantage du contrepoids allemand contre la Pologne. La question polonaise a ainsi plongé l'Europe dans le duplicité.

Maintenant que la Russie n'existe plus comme force organisée et comme élément d'équilibre en Europe, c'est à la Pologne que revient ce rôle indispensable à la paix du monde. Les circonstances peuvent changer; les apparences du continent peuvent se modifier; la question polonaise demeure l'un des termes constants de la politique européenne. C'est pour l'avoir oublié que le Congrès de Vienne a préparé à l'Europe un siècle de déchirements et à notre génération des épreuves sanglantes; et il en serait de même si les Alliés se voyaient obligés un jour de transiger sur la question polonaise, de laisser toucher à l'une des pierres angulaires de l'Europe future.

Lorsqu' éclata la guerre mondiale, tous les belligérants cherchèrent à attirer la Pologne de leur coté. Le chef des armées austro-hongroises adressa aux Polonais une proclamation leur annonçant la libération du joug russe; et le commandement allemand, de son coté, leur assura que les Allemands apportaient à la Pologne "la liberté et l'indépendance." Le 6 août, 1914, le genéral Pilsudski passa la frontière du royaume, à la tête d une compagnie des légions polonaises, qu'il avait organisées dès le temps de paix en vue de la lutte contre le tsarisme.

Elément nécessaire de toute majorité parlementaire en Autriche, fidèles serviteurs de la Couronne et détenteurs de hautes charges de cour, les Polonais font à Vienne, depuis fort longtemps, la pluie et le soleil. Dans une guerre où la Russie se fût trouvée seule en face de l'Autriche-Hongrie, les vœux des Polonais n'eussent pas été douteux. Mais l'alliance de l'Autriche avec la Prusse d'une part et de l'autre le crédit dont jouissaient en Pologne les puissances libérales, en particulier la France, vinrent rendre les sentiments des Polonais plus complexes et plus incertains.

Les Polonais ont toujours été d'accord entre eux sur les grandes lignes d'un programme minimum, comportant les trois points suivants: (a) la question polonaise est un problème international, qui échappe aux décisions internes et unilatérales de l'un des belligérants et devra être réglé

par le congrès de la paix ; (b) la Pologne doit recevoir sa complète indépendance, et devenir un Etat, l'autonomie, notion interne et subordonnée, devant être écartée comme insuffisante ; (c) la Pologne doit être unifiée et posséder un accès direct à la mer, condition de son indépendance économique et politique.

Toutefois, au début de la guerre, bien que d'accord sur la théorie, les Polonais se divisèrent sur la tactique. Dès le 8 août 1914, les députés polonais faisaient à la Douma et au Conseil de l'Empire, à Pétrograde, une déclaration de loyalisme, faisant appel à l'union des Slaves et demandant l'unité de la Pologne sous l'égide du Tsar. Le 16 août, le Grand-duc Nicholas adresse aux Polonais sa proclamation fameuse : 'L'armée russe vous apporte une assurance de réconciliation. Elle détruira les frontières qui divisent le peuple polonais et réalisera l'union sous le sceptre du Tsar de la Pologne ressuscitée, libre dans sa religion, sa langue et son autonomie.' Les représentants de la nation polonaise en Russie remercient le Grand-Duc et prennent acte de ses déclarations ; et, le 25 août, le Comité national polonais de Pétrograde déclare, dans un manifeste, que le pire ennemi de la Pologne est l'Allemagne, et que la seule idée de tous les Polonais est l'union des trois parties de leur pays. Il conjure tous les Polonais d'oublier leurs rancunes contre la Russie.

En Russie, les Polonais pensaient donc, en général, que la Pologne devait tout d'abord réaliser son unité, que l'armée russe pouvait seule lui donner, et qu'elle saurait bien conquérir ensuite son indépendance. En Autriche, au contraire, les Polonais insistaient de préférence sur le postulat de l'indépendance, l'unité leur paraissant irréalisable. Seuls les Polonais de Prusse sont toujours restés intransigeants sur l'ensemble du programme national.

Il ne s'agissait là d'ailleurs que de différences tactiques. Les Polonais d'Autriche, pas plus que ceux de Russie, n'ont jamais confondu leur cause avec celle de leurs maîtres ; et le maréchal Dankl a pu déclarer à la Chambre des Seigneurs, à Vienne : 'Nous étions en Pologne en pays ennemi, entourés et suivis, pas à pas, par la trahison. En Galicie même, nous n'avons nulle part trouvé l'appui que nous étions en droit d'attendre d'autorités autrichiennes. Les Polonais du Royaume ne se sont pas

davantage montrés enthousiastes d'être libérés du joug russe.' Ce témoignage peu suspect, au travers duquel perce une profonde déception, prouve que les Polonais de Russie, encouragés par le manifeste du Grand-Duc, se conduisirent en sujets loyaux du Tsar. Mais leur loyalisme et leur confiance furent bien mal récompensés par la suite des événements.

C'est une erreur de croire que toutes les questions posées par l'histoire et par la politique sont solubles. Au point de vue russe, la question polonaise ne l'était pas. Vouloir concilier les intérêts de Pétrograde et ceux de Varsovie, les conceptions du Tsar et celles du peuple polonais, était une entreprise chimérique et périlleuse. L'opinion publique occidentale ne le comprit pas immédiatement; elle ne vit dans la Pologne que la Posnanie, et, réalisant d'instinct la guerre sous son angle moral, elle y vit une croisade pour la Justice, pour la Liberté, pour les petites nations. Elle mesura en même temps les services que la Pologne pouvait rendre à la cause des Alliés, et sur ce point ne se trompa pas. Elle inspira indirectement la proclamation du Grand-Duc, qui fut, en un certain sens, un acte profondément politique, puisqu'il rallia, au moins dans le royaume, l'opinion polonaise à la cause russe. L'opinion occidentale n'eut pas de peine à reconnaitre dans ce document, sous quelques réserves et réticences, la pensée qui l'avait inspiré. De ce côté, l'adhésion devait être unanime et elle le fut; elle contribua à l'enthousiasme que rencontra en France, parmi les gens les plus avancés, la guerre aux cotés de la Russie absolutiste. Mais cet enthousiasme reposait sur un malentendu. Entre les conceptions occidentales et celles du gouvernement russe, il y eut, dès le premier jour de la guerre, une opposition inconsciente; et la ligne de démarcation, sur le terrain, entre les unes et les autres, passait par la Pologne.

Aux yeux des Russes de l'Ancien Régime, la Pologne n'était pas seulement, en droit, une partie intégrante et indissoluble de l'Empire; elle en était, en fait, une partie indispensable. C'est en Pologne que la Russie avait son centre industriel; et il paraissait impossible d'élever entre Lodz et Moscou une barrière douanière sans susciter à l'Empire les plus graves difficultés. Les Allemands le savaient bien lorsque, dès les premiers jours de la guerre,

ils cherchaient à mettre la main sur les trésors de Lodz et de Czenstochau, qui ne consistent pas seulement dans la Vierge fameuse. Dans une foule de métiers auxquels les Russes se montraient impropres, les Polonais jouissaient d'un véritable privilège. Il eût paru impossible de faire vivre la Russie sans les médecins, les techniciens et les fonctionnaires polonais ; tenus à l'écart des charges publiques en Pologne, les Polonais formaient, dans le reste de l'Empire, une élite intellectuelle. Le problème d'une Russie sans Pologne paraissait insoluble, au point de vue économique et administratif.

Il ne l'était pas moins au point de vue moral et politique. Ceux qui reprochaient alors au Tsar de ne pas se montrer assez généreux envers ses sujets polonais ne se rendaient sans doute pas compte des répercussions politiques infinies de chacun de ses actes dans cet immense empire, aux cent peuples hostiles. Lui-même, s'en rendait-il bien compte ? Savait-il que la moindre concession aux Polonais susciterait des convoitises, des rancunes, des revendications en Ukraine, en Lituanie, en Russie blanche, plus loin encore, jusqu'aux confins de la Sibérie et du Caucase ? L'Allemagne, du moins, comprit quelle imprudence les Allies—et le Grand-Duc, à leur imitation—avaient commise en jetant au milieu de ce chaos le principe dissolvant des nationalités ; et elle ne laissa pas perdre sa constatation.

Au point de vue russe, la proclamation du Grand-Duc, malgré l'effet immédiat favorable qu'elle eut en Pologne, fut donc une imprudence. Mais la manière dont cette promesse fut exécutée, ou plutôt annihilée, en fut une plus grave encore. Lorsque le vin est tiré, il faut le boire. Les espoirs des Polonais ayant été éveillés et même surexcités, rien ne pouvait être plus dangereux que de les décevoir brutalement. La conduite des Russes en Galicie, leur zèle à convertir de force les catholiques, auxquels ils avaient promis la liberté de leur culte, les abus et les exactions de tout genre dont s'accompagna la conquête, confinèrent à l'inconscience politique. Le 13 octobre, le comte Bobrinski déclarait dans un discours que la Galicie 'faisait partie intégrante de la Grande-Russie.' Le gouvernement du Tsar, loin de ratifier les promesses du Grand-Duc, cherchait à les noyer dans des chicanées d'avocat : 'Ces promesses (disait-on aux

Polonais) sont sans valeur, car le Tsar n'y a pas souscrit.' M. Sasonof, l'un des membres les plus polonophiles du cabinet, et qui est tombé plus tard sur un programme de réformes polonaises, disait même à un Polonais qui lui rappelait ces promesses : 'Vous parlez, Monsieur, comme si nous n'étions pas à Lwow.' La Russie avait donc une parole pour la victoire et une pour la défaite.

Puis vint la retraite, et ce fut pis encore. Les Russes se retirèrent en pillant et en saccageant tout sur leur passage, comme l'on faisait il y a un siècle, sans utilité militaire, pour la rage de détruire et de tuer. Des milliers de Polonais, chassés dans les bois, y périrent de faim. Cinq jours avant la prise de Varsovie par les Allemands, le gouvernement russe n'avait encore rien oublié et rien appris ; et il fallut qu'un Polonais de marque, le comte Wielopolski, suppliât M. Gorémykine de prononcer, dans un discours officiel, le mot d'autonomie, contenu déjà dans la proclamation du Grand-Duc. M. Gorémykine n'osait pas aller aussi loin ! *

On croit en général que la bureaucratie russe fut seule responsable de ces fautes. C'est une erreur. Il se peut bien que les fonctionnaires russes en Pologne, maintenus dans leurs prébendes malgré l'évacuation du pays, aient vu dans l'autonomie une menace à leurs intérêts. Mais la nation russe ne pensait pas autrement. Les libéraux eux-mêmes—M. Milioukof, par exemple, dont le souvenir est chargé de tant d'erreurs—se refusaient à considérer la question polonaise sous son angle international. Ils n'y voyaient qu'un problème interne de politique russe, analogue à la question juive ou arménienne ; et ils entendaient se servir des revendications polonaises dans un but de politique intérieure. Rien ne pouvait faire plus de tort aux droits des Polonais.

Entre les conceptions de la nation polonaise, basées sur la liberté, et celles de l'Etat russe, basées sur la coercition, il y avait donc contradiction insoluble. Des trois choses que réclamaient les Polonais—la reconnaissance de leur unité, de leur indépendance, et du caractère international de leur cause—le gouvernement

* Le 26 avril 1916, encore, on assiste à ce fait inouï : le ministère russe de l'intérieur publie un mémoire dirigé contre les sujets polonais du Tsar, et dont presque toutes les données, fausses pour la plupart, sont tirées de sources allemandes on autrichiennes.

tsariste n'admit la première qu'avec des réticences singulières, de nature à entretenir des soupçons légitimes sur ses intentions à l'égard de l'Allemagne ;* il ne concéda la seconde qu'après la révolution, et refusa toujours, même alors, de reconnaitre à la question polonaise un caractère international. Sur ce point la Russie se montra intraitable. Mais les Polonais ne pouvaient pas l'être moins, car renoncer à leur prétention, c'eût été se livrer, pieds et poings liés, à la générosité du Tsar et renoncer d'avance à tous leurs espoirs.

Entre ces exigences contradictoires, les Alliés se montrèrent tiraillés et impuissants, pendant les années 1915 et 1916. Dès 1915, les commissions parlementaires à Paris et la diplomatie française insistèrent pour qu'un 'pacte de Pétrograde,' joint au pacte de Londres, vînt accorder aux promesses du Grand-Duc une garantie collective ; mais la Russie refusa constamment d'entrer dans cette voie. Toute générosité à l'égard de la Pologne fut systématiquement écartée par le gouvernement russe, qui préféra laisser aux Allemands l'initiative—et, disait-il, l'odieux—de concessions nécessairement insuffisantes et décevantes pour les Polonais. Les Alliés, qui avaient des raisons de manquer de confiance dans la Russie et ne pouvaient pas alors se passer de son aide militaire, durent céder ; et c'est ainsi que les défenseurs de la liberté et du droit des peuples se laissèrent devancer, dans la reconnaissance de l'indépendance polonaise, par les puissances impérialistes.

Sans s'embarrasser de principes contraires à ses propres tendances, le gouvernement allemand a immédiatement compris que la Pologne représentait une force, tant au point de vue moral qu'au point de vue politique, économique et militaire, et qu'il était désirable de gagner cette force. C'était le seul moyen d'affaiblir la Russie et de morceler ce 'contrepoids' oriental, tout en évitant que la force nationale des Polonais ne se tende en un irrédentisme antiprussien. Le droit des peuples, proclamé par l'Entente, devint, dans les mains de l'Allemagne, une arme contre la Russie. Chaque fois que l'Allemagne eut le désir ou l'espoir de s'entendre isolément avec la Russie,

* Voir, dans la 'Revue Politique Internationale' (No. 26, avril 1917), l'article instructif et captivant de M. Simon Askenazy, sur 'la Pologne et la Paix.'

elle laissa tomber ses projets de reconstitution polonaise; elle n'hésita même pas, à diverses reprises, à proférer contre les Polonais des menaces destinées à faciliter un rapprochement avec les sphères russes. C'est seulement lorsqu'eurent échoué toutes les tentatives de paix séparée ou de rapprochement germano-russe, et lorsque l'idée de les reprendre parut chimérique, que l'Allemagne songea sérieusement à libérer la Pologne.

La politique de M. de Bethmann-Hollweg envers la Pologne a été soumise, en Allemagne, à des critiques passionnées. Les militaires, les pangermanistes, les agrariens, tous les partisans d'un rapprochement avec la Russie—il y en a encore aujourd'hui—et même des pacifistes comme le prince Lichnowski, ont prononcé, pour des raisons diverses, le même jugement. Les uns ont redouté un affaiblissement stratégique de l'Empire; les autres ont craint la concurrence industrielle de la Pologne; d'autres encore se sont imaginé que la reconstitution de la Pologne rendrait la paix plus difficile, soit à l'est, soit á l'ouest. Tous ont senti confusément qu'entre une Pologne forte et libre et la Prusse, suzeraine de trois millions de Polonais opprimés, il ne pouvait y avoir d'autre relation que l'inimitié. C'est ce qu'exprimait jadis Bismarck, lorsqu'il disait: 'Si jamais l'aigle blanc ressuscite, malheur à l'aigle noir!' Un conventionnel de 1848, Wilhelm Jordan, avait dit aussi: 'Le premier jour d'une Pologne vraiment libre serait le premier jour d'une lutte à mort contre nous!'

M. de Bethmann-Hollweg n'a pu ignorer complètement ces enseignements et ces avertissements; il n'a pu ignorer que, si la question polonaise était pour la Russie un 'noli me tangere,' elle l'était dans une mesure plus grande encore pour l'Allemagne. S'il a cependant passé outre, après mille hésitations, il a dû y être poussé par des motifs puissants. Le premier fut sans doute l'impossibilité de supprimer la question polonaise, le second la nécessité de ménager l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La question polonaise a, en Autriche, un caractère accentué de politique intérieure. Les cent-dix députés rath de la Galicie peuvent faire au Reichsrat, à leur gré, la majorité avec ou contre les Allemands, pour ou contre le gouvernement. Le besoin de les ménager, pour se les concilier, est une nécessité de l'Etat, ce qui fait du

gouvernement autrichien le porte-parole naturel des aspirations polonaises.

Les Polonais d'Autriche n'ont fait, nous l'avons dit, aux nécessités de l'alliance avec l'Allemagne qu'un seul sacrifice. Ils se sont abstenus, pendant assez longtemps, de parler de l'unité de la Pologne et de réclamer l'incorporation dans le nouvel Etat du Grand-Duché de Posen. Mais, comme leurs frères de Varsovie ou du dehors, ils ont exigé l'indépendance absolue de leur pays, et l'union sous un sceptre polonais de la Galicie et du Royaume. Ils ont ainsi posé la question polonaise avec force dans le domaine international ; et l'on est obligé de reconnaitre qu'à ce point de vue les puissances centrales se sont trouvées dans une position plus facile que les Alliés. La question polonaise était pour elles, par définition, un problème international, puiqu'elles y étaient intéressées toutes deux de façon immédiate. L'Autriche et l'Allemagne ont cependant, en apparence, tenté de résoudre isolément ce problème, mais sans doute moins pour en interdire la discussion aux Alliés que pour placer ceux-ci devant un fait accompli, et pour posséder un gage en vue des négociations ultérieures. De ces préoccupations est sorti l'acte du 5 novembre 1916.

Le proclamation des deux empereurs fut moins un acte en soi, générateur d'un Etat, que l'exposé des intentions des monarques alliés à l'égard de la Pologne. Elle prévoyait la création d'un royaume constitutionnel et héréditaire, lié aux puissances centrales pardes conventions militaires et économiques. Par une contradiction qui ressemble à une ignorance et trahit une improvisation, la proclamation, tout en instituant un *Etat*, lui garantit *l'autonomie*. Ces termes revèlent les hésitations des gouvernements. Tandis que l'Autriche réclamait la création d'un Etat souverain, réuni avec la Galicie et lié à la Monarchie par une union personnelle, c'est la solution allemande qui avait triomphé. L'Etat n'était pas créé ; il était simplement en devenir. Dans sa forme volontairement imprécise, l'acte du 5 novembre était inapte à régler une fois pour toutes la question polonaise ; il avait un caractère provisoire, et laissait en suspens les difficultés les plus importantes. Loin de résoudre la question polonaise, on peut prétendre sans paradoxe que l'acte du 5 novembre l'a seulement posée.

Son importance historique n'est cependant pas contestable. Elle résulte du fait que cette proclamation était le premier acte international reconnaissant l'existence d'une question polonaise, et aussi de ce fait que les solutions esquissées étaient évidemment un minimum, en deça duquel aucun gouvernement, aucun congrès, ne saurait demeurer.

L'opinion polonaise, avec un sens politique affiné, comprit à la foi cette importance et cette insuffisance. L'acte des monarques fut salué dans toute la Pologne avec une satisfaction que la presse occidentale eut tort de méconnaitre, mais en même temps avec une réserve marquée. Le peuple polonais comprit qu'on ne lui offrait pas un édifice tout agencé, dans lequel il aurait à s'installer, mais un sol nu sur lequel il le devait bâtir.

Les difficultés qui ne tardèrent pas à s'élever au sujet de l'application de l'acte du 5 novembre, tant entre les Polonais et les occupants qu'entre ceux-ci, sont une preuve évidente de l'insuffisance de ce document. L'acte du 5 novembre créait entre les deux puissances centrales un *condominium* de droit, avec toutes les difficultés inhérentes à ce genre de souveraineté. En pratique, il ne fit pas cesser, malgré les réclamations des Polonais, le régime des deux zônes d'occupation ; et il accentua, en diverses matières, les tendances divergentes des autorités militaires allemandes et austro-hongroises. De l'une à l'autre, des froissements, des différends continuels s'élevèrent. Moins de six mois après le 5 novembre, les difficultés devinrent si aigues que la circulation des journaux entre la zône allemande et la zône autrichienne fut interdite.

Tandis que les fonctionnaires autrichiens, polonais pour la plupart, prenaient au pied de la lettre la proclamation de novembre et faisaient de réels efforts pour gagner la population, deux tendances se manifestaient parmi les Allemands. Les uns, Hakatistes ou Pangermanistes, dont le porte-parole était le chef de l'administration civile, M. de Kries, avaient blâmé la faiblesse de leur gouvernement et faisaient tout leur possible pour en annuler les effets, en prodiguant à la population les vexations et les provocations. Les autres, plus politiques, et parmi eux, le gouverneur, le général de Beseler, s'efforçaient bien d'entrer dans l'esprit de la proclamation du

5 novembre, mais ils s'étonnaient de n'en pas voir les fruits mûrir immédiatement. Ils s'indignaient de l'ingratitude et de la froideur des Polonais. De là des frottements, dont quelques uns dégénérèrent en conflits graves, marquant rapidement la faillite et du *condominium* et de la liberté polonaise.

Les Polonais, enfin, de leur côté, s'efforcèrent de tirer le plus grand parti de la proclamation du 5 novembre. Mais des divergences se manifestèrent entre eux. Les uns, les Activistes, auraient voulu voir leur pays s'organiser immédiatement et contracter une alliance militaire avec les Empires centraux ; les autres, les Passivistes, préféraient patienter et réserver l'avenir ; ils refusèrent toute collaboration militaire aux Allemands, qui se vengèrent en mettant des obstacles infinis à l'organisation de l'Etat polonais. Très vite, on dut se convaincre de part et d'autre que les espoirs du 5 novembre avaient duré ce que durent les roses, l'espace d'un matin.

L'année 1917 s'ouvrit sur ces entrefaites. On peut dire, bien que ce ne soit pas strictement exact au point de vue chronologique, qu'elle fut marquée, pour la Pologne, par trois grands événements—l'accession au trône de Charles I^{er}, la révolution russe, et l'intervention des Etats-Unis.

L'acte du 5 novembre, si contraire en apparence aux tendances générales de la politique allemande, semble avoir causé à Pétrograde un profond étonnement et un certain désarroi. Les manifestations de la politique russe, pendant les mois qui suivirent, furent désordonnées et contradictoires. La déclaration de M. de Stuermer du 16 novembre était nettement insuffisante ; mais, le 2 décembre, M. Trepoff, qui venait de prendre la tête du gouvernement russe, déclara à la Douma que la Russie se devait 'de reconstituer la Pologne libre dans ses frontières ethnographiques.' Puis le Tsar lui-même affirma, dans un manifeste à ses troupes de terre et de mer, que l'un des devoirs de la Russie était 'la création de la Pologne libre, composée de ses trois parties, jusqu'à présent séparées.' Le 5 janvier 1917, Nicolas II reçut en audience le comte Wielopolski et lui renouvela ces assurances. 'Je suis autorisé,' déclara ensuite le comte, 'à affirmer qu'au cours de mon audience j'ai été informé

que la Pologne unie, dont parle l'ordre du jour de l'empereur, obtiendra un gouvernement parlementaire, avec une diète polonaise et une armée nationale.' Le tsar aurait même été plus précis encore ; son idée était, dit-on, de ne laisser subsister, entre la Russie et la Pologne, qu'une union personnelle.

Malheureusement, au même moment, la réponse des Alliés au président Wilson déclarait simplement que la question polonaise serait résolue ' selon les intentions de S. M. l'empereur de Russie.' C'était ravaler le problème au rang d'une question intérieure russe, et manquer la première occasion qui se présentait de donner aux Polonais des certitudes de libération. Car les intentions de S. M. l'empereur de Russie, quelle qu'en fût l'excellence, étaient soumises à trop d'influences et de fluctuations pour offrir aux espoirs de la nation polonaise une base solide. La réponse à M. Wilson a fait beaucoup de mal à la cause des Alliés en Pologne ; et le discours de M. Bonar Law, prononcé peu après, ne contribua pas à effacer cette fâcheuse impression. Heureusement l'histoire est plus forte que les hommes ; et les causes justes se défendent elles-mêmes lorsque leurs chevaliers les abandonnent. Le secours vint à l'Entente du dehors.

Les premières nouvelles de la révolution russe et l'arrivée au pouvoir de M. Milioukof, qu'on savait médiocrement disposé pour la cause polonaise, ne parurent pas, tout d'abord, extrêmement rassurantes. Mais le gouvernement provisoire, logique avec les principes dont il était né, ne tarda pas à effacer cette impression par un acte de haute politique et de haute portée, qui modifia, de la façon la plus heureuse, les bases mêmes de la politique des Alliés en Pologne. La proclamation du gouvernement provisoire du 30 mars ne laissait rien à désirer par la largeur des termes et leur précision ; elle reconnaissait un Etat polonais indépendant, souverain et unifié, ayant à déterminer lui-même, par la majorité, et ses frontières et sa forme de gouvernement. Les Alliés, enfin déliés du poids que faisait peser sur eux la politique polonaise du gouvernement tsariste, s'empressèrent d'adhérer officiellement et solennellement à la proclamation du gouvernement provisoire, afin de lui donner le caractère international et contractuel auquel les Polonais tenaient tant et pour de si bonnes raisons.

'Les Alliés (déclarait la note officielle publiée à ce sujet) ont tenu à affirmer devant l'opinion publique et devant le peuple polonais tout entier qu'ils se sentent solidaires avec la Russie dans la pensée de faire revivre la Pologne dans son intégrité.' M. Albert Thomas, en mission en Russie, déclarait de son côté, 'au nom du gouvernement français,' en présence du Comité national polonais de Pétrograde: 'Pour nous la question polonaise est une question internationale, une question européenne.'

Toutefois, le caractère éminemment provisoire du gouvernement russe n'était pas sans affaiblir la portée de ces manifestations aux yeux du peuple polonais; et, le 6 avril, le Conseil d'Etat polonais avait cru devoir, par égard pour les autorités d'occupation, protester contre la proclamation du 30 mars. Mais bientôt la situation des Alliés fut considérablement renforcée par l'appui que vint lui prêter le président des Etats-Unis.

Dès le 22 janvier, le président Wilson, dans son message au Sénat, avait parlé de la question polonaise dans des termes dont l'ampleur et la justesse dénotaient une connaissance parfaite du problème, et des revendications de le nation polonaise. L'insistance que mettait le président américain à affirmer la nécessité de l'unité polonaise commença à rendre de la force aux espoirs assombris d'une partie de la nation. Le soir où le message fut publié à Varsovie, des manifestations enthousiastes eurent lieu devant le consulat des Etats-Unis. La rupture des relations diplomatiques et la guerre entre l'Allemagne et les Etats-Unis vinrent conférer au language du président une force persuasive qui n'a cessé de s'accroître, à mesure que se développait l'effort militaire de l'Amérique. Dès ce moment, et bien davantage depuis que, sur le front d'Occident, la victoire parait sourire au drapeau étoilé, le peuple polonais acquit la certitude que son point de vue serait traduit et soutenu, au congrès de la paix, non seulement par une Russie affaiblie, une Autriche vaincue et une Allemagne hostile, mais encore par le chef d'une grande puissance aux forces inépuisables, à la volonté de fer, et pour lequel le droit des peuples et l'équilibre européen sont de véritables commandements bibliques.

Dès ce moment, on recommença à parler, même en Galicie, de l'unité de la Pologne—ce qui, dans cette lutte

morale, est l'atout des Alliés. Le 28 mai 1917, une réunion des élus de la Galicie, à Cracovie, émit une résolution qui est depuis lors la charte des Polonais d'Autriche, et dans laquelle se trouvent ces mots : 'L'effort unanime du peuple polonais tend à la restauration d'une Pologne unie et indépendante, ayant libre accès à la mer.' Dans cette formule, qui est celle même des Polonais de Russie, et qu'on n'avait jamais osé, jusqu'alors, exprimer sur le sol autrichien, est contenue une véritable déclaration de guerre à l'Allemagne. Elle est le symptôme du mouvement d'idées provoqué par la révolution russe, encouragé par l'intervention américaine et l'avènement de Charles Ier sur le trône des Habsbourg.

François-Joseph était mort le 21 novembre 1916, deux semaines après la proclamation polonaise, qui fut le dernier acte de son règne. Le jeune homme qui lui avait succédé était un inconnu, appelé à la dignité impériale par le hasard de circonstances tragiques. Il ne tarda pas à révéler le trait fondamental de son caractère, la haine de l'Allemagne, et son dessein d'imprimer un nouveau cours à la politique austro-hongroise. Charles Ier vit dans l'acte du 5 novembre signé par son grand-oncle moribond ce qu'elle était en effet—une capitulation des Habsbourg devant le Hohenzollern, une défaite de la conception autrichienne de la question polonaise. Il considérait que la Pologne devait revenir un jour à sa couronne, et ne s'accoutuma pas sans impatience à un *condominium* moral, qui lui paraissait une méconnaissance de ses droits légitimes.

Subissant fortement l'influence d'une femme ambitieuse, de culture purement italienne, le jeune empereur s'entoura de tout le personnel qui avait gravité autour de l'archiduc François-Ferdinand. Son confident intime, le comte Polzer, était purement tchèque de sentiments. Toutes les pensées et les affections de Charles Ier le portaient vers ses peuples slaves, et lui conseillaient une réorganisation fédérative de son empire.

Il fut encouragé dans cet état d'esprit par la révolution russe, qui délivra la monarchie du péril slave et manifesta, d'autre part, le danger pour les trônes d'une politique hostile aux peuples. Charles Ier rêva de faire de son pays le centre d'attraction du monde slave, et de transporter à Prague ou à Varsovie le centre moral de sa

politique. Une œuvre pareille était peut-être chimérique. Le souverain eut du moins la perception nette de ces difficultés et du moyen le plus propre à les vaincre. Il comprit que l'Autriche-Hongrie ne pouvait être régénérée que par une infusion de sang nouveau, et que ce sang devait être polonais. L'incorporation de la Pologne à la monarchie, sous quelque forme que ce fût, aurait en effet provoqué un tel ébranlement du compromis de 1867 que toute la situation constitutionelle aurait dû être réglée à nouveau. Enfin Charles Ier espérait qu'une réunion de la Pologne et de l'Autriche, en introduisant un élément de trouble dans ses relations avec l'Allemagne, en augmentant à l'intérieur la force de la population slave, en favorisant la réforme constitutionnelle, et en facilitant, par compensation, des cessions territoriales à l'Italie et à la Roumanie, permettrait à l'Autriche-Hongrie un rapprochement avec les Alliés et la signature d'une paix honorable.

Ainsi l'empereur d'Autriche considéra, dès le jour de son avènement, la solution austro-polonaise comme la base de sa politique tant intérieure qu'extérieure, et il en fit le but de ses efforts. On sera sans doute étonné, lorsqu'on connaîtra tous les documents, de voir la place que le problème polonais a tenu, pendant toute l'année 1917, dans les préoccupations de la cour de Vienne.

La solution austro-polonaise pouvait offrir aux Alliés, à condition qu'on sût l'entourer des garanties nécessaires, des avantages sérieux. L'intérêt de l'Europe et le souci de l'équilibre politique exigent que la Pologne soit aussi indépendante et aussi forte que possible. Or, l'union avec les Habsbourg, par des liens personnels ou politiques, eût assuré à la Pologne l'appui de la force militaire incontestable que représente encore, malgré toutes ses défaites, l'empire austro-hongrois ; elle réalisait immédiatement et sans secousse l'union du royaume et de la Galicie ; à l'égard de l'Allemagne, cette solution assurait, mieux qu'aucune garantie contractuelle ou juridique, l'indépendance de la Pologne ; et elle assurait à l'irrédentisme polonais une base sur la Posnanie. Ce n'est pas sans d'excellentes raisons que la 'Deutsche Tageszeitung,' parlant d'une union possible de la Pologne et de l'Autriche, a pu écrire : 'Une semblable solution de la question polonaise introduirait un tel élément de trouble dans les

relations entre l'Allemagne et l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'on devrait la considérer comme le commencement de la fin de l'alliance entre les deux empires.' Dès l'été 1917, un ambassadeur de l'Entente, et non l'un des moindres, déclarait à son gouvernement: 'Entendons-nous avec l'Autriche et donnons lui la Pologne!' Agir ainsi, ç'eût été, selon nous, asseoir à tout jamais l'irrédentisme polonais sur la Posnanie et les Bouches de la Vistule, débouché nécessaire vers la mer; c'eût été, en un mot, brouiller définitivement l'Allemagne et l'Autriche-Hongrie. L'Entente ne l'a pas voulu, ou n'a pas cru que ce fût possible; et elle a rejeté ainsi Charles Ier dans la voie des négociations avec l'Allemagne.

Pour l'Autriche, la question est vitale et pressante. Vitale, parce que la Monarchie ne possède pas une force d'attraction nationale suffisante pour disputer la Galicie à une Pologne entièrement indépendante; pressante, parceque la reconstitution de la Galicie, dévastée par la guerre, exigeait une avance de fonds immédiate de quatre milliards, et que le gouvernement autrichien tenait à savoir à qui il concédait cette avance. Le projet d'abandonner la Galicie à la Pologne, intimément lié à la solution austro-polonaise, courut pendant toute l'année. En mai, on crut que la chose était acquise, et que l'archiduc Charles-Etienne allait devenir roi de Pologne et recevoir la Galicie comme don de joyeux avènement. Mais on s'aperçut bientôt que rien n'était fait. Les négociations durèrent tout l'été. L'Autriche finit par entrer dans la voie des concessions économiques à l'Allemagne.

C'est alors que prit corps le projet d'Europe centrale. Pour abandonner la Pologne le gouvernement allemand ne demandait pas seulement l'assurance que le pays resterait lié économiquement à l'empire, il demandait en outre des privilèges économiques dans toute la Double-Monarchie. Le solution austro-polonaise, sous cet aspect nouveau, loin de demeurer un gage d'équilibre pour l'Europe, devenait au contraire une menace à l'Europe.

Ce n'est d'ailleurs pas là tout ce qu'exigèrent les Allemands. La question polonaise leur fut bonne pour tout ce dont ils eurent besoin; ils l'invoquèrent, vis-à-vis de leurs Alliés, à tout propos et hors de propos. Ils demandèrent l'envoi de troupes autrichiennes sur le front

d'Occident. Puis ils exigèrent que l'Autriche cédât immédiatement la Galicie à la Pologne, et trouvèrent pour cette prétention de l'appui auprès des partis allemands d'Autriche, trop contents d'être enfin débarrassés des cent-dix députés de la Galicie au Reichsrat, et avec eux de la majorité slave. Mais l'Autriche refusa de se lier ainsi, et dit : ' Cédez vous-même la Posnanie ! '

Après mille hésitations et mille marchandages, l'Allemagne finit par donner son adhésion à la solution austro-polonaise. Mais le haut commandement, sans qui rien ne peut se faire en Allemagne, n'avait pas été consulté par M. de Kühlmann ; et le Kronprinz demanda immédiatement la convocation d'un Conseil de la Couronne, qui se réunit au château de Bellevue, à Berlin, le 5 novembre 1917, jour anniversaire de la pseudo-indépendance polonaise. L'œuvre savamment échafaudée par MM. Czernin et Kühlmann, et dont l'Autriche se croyait déjà sûre, fut remise en question. La déception fut amère à Vienne, où l'on en garda une vive rancune. Par une coïncidence qui n'était peut-être pas fortuite, ceci se passait le jour où, à Pétrograde, les maximalistes venaient de s'emparer du pouvoir par un coup d'audace. Pendant toutes ces négociations, et à mesure que l'on approchait, en apparence, de leur dénouement, la politique allemande à l'égard de la Pologne prit un cours de plus en plus hostile, et les avanies à la population se multiplièrent.

Les Allemands ont considéré la Pologne comme une terre conquise ; ils lui ont envoyé des fonctionnaires hakatistes, comme le sinistre M. de Kries ; ils ont ruiné le pays économiquement, et ont fini par lui imposer une opération financière qui équivalait à un véritable brigandage. Ils ont traité leurs amis mêmes comme des ennemis, et ils auraient voulu pousser ce peuple à la rébellion qu'ils n'auraient pas agi autrement. Les perquisitions, les arrestations en masse se multiplièrent ; des bruits de haute trahison furent systématiquement répandus par la presse allemande, tandis qu'en Prusse le régime imposé aux Polonais devenait de plus en plus dur.

Les discours de M. de Loebell, ministre de l'intérieur, de M. Eisenhardt-Rothe, de M. de Kleist, du bourgmestre de Thorn, du prince de Salm, à la Diète prussienne, ne laissaient aucun doute sur les sentiments du gouvernement et de la caste dirigeante en Prusse à l'égard de la

nation polonaise. Les députés de la Pologne n'ont d'ailleurs cessé de protester contre cette attitude, avec un courage et une ténacité dignes d'éloges. Du chef de la fraction polonaise, on disait couramment à Berlin, 'il se conduit comme une grande puissance ennemie.' C'était bien cela, en effet; et M. Korfanty le disait aussi, dans les termes suivants: 'Sans la nation polonaise, vous n'auriez pas pu soutenir cette guerre. Si vous n'aviez pas eu les énormes approvisionnements que vous avez tirés du royaume et que vous vous êtes approprié d'une façon que je ne saurais qualifier d'une expression parlementaire, il y a longtemps que la parade allemande aurait pris fin.' Et une autre fois, le même orateur s'écriait: 'Nous ne nous étonnons point que, pendant cette guerre, vous ayez voulu traiter les Polonais comme des Albanais."

L'attitude énergique des chefs polonais eut naturellement pour premier effet d'exaspérer l'opinion allemande et de l'exciter contre le peuple polonais. C'est alors que la chambre de commerce d'Oppeln en Silésie émettait un vœu demandant la réunion à l'Allemagne du district houillier de Dombrowa, et que les organisations allemandes de Lodz adressaient au Chancelier un mémoire réclamant l'annexion à l'Allemagne des gouvernements de Kalisz, de Plock et de Piotrkov; c'est le moment aussi où les journaux pangermanistes, directement inspirés par l'état-major allemand, réclamaient à grands cris des 'sûretés stratégiques' en Pologne, c'est à dire l'annexion à l'Allemagne de la ligne de la Naref, qui permettrait à l'armée allemande de tenir Varsovie sous le feu de ses canons; le moment encore où l'un des députés les plus radicaux d'Allemagne et, en apparence, les moins enclins à l'annexionnisme, exigeait que l'Allemagne gardât, en tout cas, l'administration des chemins de fer polonais et qu'elle les joignît au réseau prussien. Le Dr Stresemann, de son côté, s'écriait, en parlant des Polonais: 'Moins il y en aura, mieux cela vaudra.' Et ainsi de suite; les sentiments vrais et profonds de l'Allemagne à l'égard de la Pologne et ses intentions se sont révélées sans fard pendant cette période, et l'idée de s'entendre avec la Russie sur le dos de la Pologne gagna des adhérents à Berlin.

Le conflit entre les autorités polonaises et l'Allemagne

devint aigu dans la question de l'armée. Le projet primitif de la proclamation du 5 novembre ne faisait pas mention, dit-on, de la question militaire. Mais le quartier-général et les pangermanistes posèrent comme condition de leur adhésion que le gouvernement allemand obtiendrait l'alliance militaire de la Pologne. Au fond, le gouvernement impérial semble s'être rendu compte immédiatement qu'il ne trouverait jamais une aide utile dans une armée polonaise. Par contre, une partie importante de l'opinion polonaise désirait ardemment l'organisation d'une armée, soit par haine de la Russie, soit pour affirmer par ce symbole la renaissance de l'Etat polonais.

Contrairement à ce qu'on crut longtemps dans les pays alliés, les obstacles au recrutement en Pologne vinrent moins des Polonais que des Allemands. Ou, si l'on veut, ils furent réciproques, parce que les deux pays n'arrivèrent pas à s'entendre sur les modalités et la portée de ce recrutement. Des raisons personnelles, comme la rivalité entre Pilsudski et Sikorski, la discussion sur les mérites des légions et ceux des milices—tout cela paralysa l'organisation de l'armée du côté polonais. Au lieu des milliers de soldats que certains militaires allemands avaient espéré tirer de la Pologne, il y eut, en tout et pour tout, 328 engagements, dans un pays occupé, avec tous les moyens de pression que cela comporte. Ce chiffre parait incroyable ; il est authentique. Des officiers polonais prisonniers en Allemagne reçurent des congés afin de s'engager dans les légions. A l'expiration du congé, tous rentrèrent dans leur camp d'internement. L'Allemagne n'eut en Pologne que des déboires, ce qui explique sa colère.

Aussi, après avoir été pressée de déterminer la formule de serment de l'armée polonaise, l'Allemagne se mit subitement à élever des difficultés et à présenter sans cesse de nouvelles exigences. Au printemps de 1917, après six mois d'efforts, la question n'avait pas avancé. Enfin, au début de juillet, une formule fut trouvée. Elle ne contenait pas d'engagement vis-à-vis des souverains centraux, comme le demandait l'Allemagne, mais les soldats polonais devaient cependant jurer 'de conserver, dans la guerre actuelle, la fraternité d'armes aux armées d'Allemagne et d'Autriche-Hongrie.' Cette phrase détermina

une crise. Sur le conseil de leur commandant, le général Pilsudski, qui, après avoir été le chef du parti activiste, avait été rejeté dans l'autre camp par la révolution russe, la plupart des légionnaires refusèrent le serment qu'on leur demandait. Le nombre de ceux qui le prêtèrent fut infime. Aussitôt les autorités allemandes internèrent les légions qui devaient former les cadres de la future armée et incarcérèrent le général Pilsudski La réponse du peuple polonais fut la révolte ouverte, et presque l'insurrection. Des manifestations eurent lieu dans les rues, et au Conseil Municipal de Varsovie ; et le Conseil d'Etat, organe provisoire de l'Etat polonais, après avoir en vain essayé de conjurer la crise, dut donner sa démission. Depuis lors, l'histoire de l'armée polonaise et des légions n'a cessé de se trainer dans les conflits et les discussions. Internées, les légions ont été ensuite vidées de tous les ressortissants austro-hongrois, puis dissoutes. L'armée polonaise se trouvait ainsi sans cadres, et elle n'a pu encore être formée. Ella figure toujours au programme du gouvernement polonais, qui voit dans la formation d'une armée le moyen d'abréger l'occupation étrangère et ses hontes, de prévenir le bolchévisme agraire, et de paraître au Congrès de la paix comme un véritable Etat. Mais l'Allemagne, qui ne peut plus ignorer maintenant l'impossibilité d'obtenir sur le terrain militaire un concours utile des Polonais, ne semble pas décidée à permettre l'organisation d'une force armée avec laquelle elle devra compter sans pouvoir compter dessus, à moins d'obtenir des garanties précises, de nature politique.

Ainsi, la politique allemande était anti-polonaise, en Prusse et en Pologne. Elle ne l'était pas moins en Ukraine et en Lituanie, où les Allemands n'ont cessé d'attiser contre les Polonais les haines nationales et sociales. Les Polonais dans ces pays limitrophes sont en général grands propriétaires terriens ; ils ont supporté presque tous le poids des troubles agraires qui ont accompagné la démobilisation de l'armée russe, d'autant plus que le mouvement national lui-même a été dirigé contre eux plus encore que contre les Russes. En Lituanie, malgré les efforts d'un nombre important de personnalités tendant à une union fédérative, l'influence de l'Allemagne s'exerça de tout son poids dans le sens

opposé. Le mémoire présenté par le baron de Ropp au commandement suprême de l'armée allemande est caractéristique à cet égard.

Le fédéralisme, c'est-à-dire une union politique, sur pied de parfaite égalité, peut seul sauvegarder l'avenir des deux peuples. La Pologne ne peut prospérer sans un débouché vers la mer, condition absolue de son indépendance économique ; et, en dehors de la Prusse, la Lituanie seule peut lui en assurer un. De leur côté, les Lituaniens, qui possèdent la côte, ne peuvent vivre sans son *hinterland*, qui appartient à la Pologne. Enfin, les deux peuples élèvent des prétentions sur le même sol, notamment sur la ville de Vilna, qu'ils se disputent à coup de statistiques. La population y est, semble-t-il, lituanienne de race et d'origine, polonaise de langue et de civilisation, ce qui rend les discussions extrêmement confuses et vaines. Ces revendications conduiront les deux peuples à une haine et à des luttes inexpiables si l'on renouvelle là-bas la faute des Balkans, et si l'on n'établit entre eux, de prime abord, des liens de droit qui rendent les guerres sinon impossibles, au moins très difficiles. De plus, leur union peut seule les rendre l'un et l'autre assez forts pour assurer à l'Europe le contrepoids oriental dont elle a besoin.

Mais c'est précisément ce que ne veut pas l'Allemagne. Diviser les peuples, les affaiblir les uns par les autres, les pousser dans des conflits qui les épuiseront, les châtrer économiquement pour les tenir tous dans sa dépendance— telle est la clé de sa politique orientale. C'est pourquoi, tandis que les autorités militaires excitaient par tous les moyens les Lituaniens contre les Polonais, les diplomates créaient entre l'Ukraine et la Pologne la question de Cholm et poussaient les Polonais à s'étendre en la Russie blanche, où ils se heurtent aux revendications russes.

Le début de 1918 vit dans l'orient de l'Europe une situation toute nouvelle. Les maximalistes, qui venaient d'arriver au pouvoir à Pétrograde par un coup de force, s'appliquaient à détruire la Russie ; et ils y parvenaient avec une rapidité surprenante. De plus, leur hostilité à l'égard de la Pologne était bien connue. A la veille du coup d'Etat, le soviet de Pétrograde avait formulé un programme de paix, qui restait en deça, en ce qui concerne

la Pologne, des plus pâles concessions du tsarisme défunt. Ainsi, de ce côté, tout contrepoids à l'Allemagne faisait brusquement défaut ; et les peuples de l'Est, sentant les Alliés lointains, hésitants et désorientés par l'écroulement brusque de la puissance russe, s'habituèrent à penser que l'Allemagne était désormais la seule force humaine qui leur pût du bien ou du mal.

Cette impression fut confirmée et accentuée par l'abaissement progressif de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Le cabinet de Vienne ressentit aussi le contrecoup de l'avènement de Lénine. Dès ce moment, une divergence croissante sépara la politique du comte Czernin de celle de l'empereur. Le ministre, acceptant le fait accompli, chercha à en tirer le plus d'avantages possibles, et il se mit à la remorque de l'Allemagne pour partager sa victoire. L'empereur au contraire, moins souple, continua sa politique personnelle, comme si rien ne s'était passé, et entra en conflit latent avec le Ballplatz.

Le fruit de la division, c'est la faiblesse. Le traité de Brest-en-Lituanie, fut un succès pour l'Allemagne et un grave échec moral, une véritable défaite, pour la Monarchie. Ce traité, conforme à toute la politique allemande, et dicté par le grand quartier-général, sacrifiait la Pologne, protégée de l'Autriche. Déjà, le comte Czernin n'avait fait aucun effort sérieux pour obtenir la participation des délégués polonais aux négociations. Des questions intéressant éminemment la Pologne et son avenir furent réglées à une portée de voix de Varsovie, sans que les autorités polonaises fussent admises à exprimer leur avis. Le résultat fut que les traités continrent deux clauses funestes pour la Pologne. L'art. III de la paix du 3 mars, entre la Russie et les puissances centrales, enlevait, en fait, à la question polonaise son caractère international, auquel les Polonais tiennent tant et à juste titre. De son côté, la paix du 9 février avec l'Ukraine séparait de la Pologne la province de Cholm, dans laquelle les Polonais forment l'élément principal de la population, et qui appartient à la Pologne par droit historique. Dans ces deux clauses combinées et éclairées l'une par l'autre, les Polonais virent non seulement une injustice, mais une menace, l'intention de préparer, selon les vues de l'Etat-Major allemand, un nouveau démembrement du leur pays.

Il faut ajouter qu'un traité secret parait en outre avoir été conclu à Brest entre l'Allemagne et les maximalistes, dont l'existence est à vrai dire contestée, mais qu'on a force raisons de croire réel. Ce traité contiendrait les clauses suivantes : 'Art. I : La politique polonaise est conduite par le gouvernement allemand. II : Le gouvernement russe se désintéresse des questions relatives à l'organisation du royaume de Pologne et s'interdit de protester contre une séparation du bassin métallurgique et houillier de Dombrova. . . .' D'autres limitations des droits de la Pologne étaient encore prévues et approuvés par les bolcheviks ; et, en retour, l'Allemagne promettait de laisser la propagande maximaliste s'exercer en Pologne.

Ce traité secret n'était pas encore connu à Varsovie au moment où fut signée la paix de Brest. Mais on le pressentait ; et les clauses publiques du traité parurent assez graves pour déterminer dans tout le pays une vive agitation et une violente explosion de colère. Les théâtres furent fermés ; les gens prirent le deuil ; l'état de siège dut être proclamé dans une grande partie du territoire ; les fonctionnaires se mirent en grève ; et, enfin, le gouvernement de M. Kucharzewski se vit obligé de donner sa démission en signe de protestation contre l'annexion du pays de Cholm à l'Ukraine.

Cette irritation se tourna en première ligne contre l'Autriche-Hongrie. De l'Allemagne, les Polonais n'ont au fond jamais rien espéré de bon ; mais il croyaient avoir dans la diplomatie autrichienne une amie et une protectrice. De là leur déception, lorsqu'ils virent que le comte Czernin ne faisait pas le moindre effort, ni pour obtenir que la Pologne fût représentée aux négociations de Brest, ni pour assurer ses intérêts les plus légitimes. Les Polonais se crurent trahis. Leur colère eut une répercussion immédiate dans la politique intérieure de l'Autriche et contribua à affaiblir la Monarchie, tant au dedans qu'au dehors. Le Club polonais de Vienne fut poussé à des méthodes d'opposition violente, et les tendances radicales prirent le dessus dans son sein. C'est alors que se forma la coalition parlementaire qui a abouti récemment à la chute du ministère Seidler.

Le traité de Brest ne fut pas, à vrai dire, la seule cause de la nouvelle attitude des Polonais envers

l'Autriche. Des questions proprement galiciennes jouèrent un rôle important en cette affaire. On estime à plusieurs milliards les dégâts qui ont été occasionnés à la Galicie par le passage réitéré des armées russes et centrales. Mais l'Autriche, n'étant pas sûre de conserver cette province, ne veut pas faire en sa faveur les dépenses urgentes. De là naquit un projet d'autonomie, dont le but principal était de faire supporter au budget provincial les frais de restauration du pays. Naturellement, les Polonais n'en voulurent pas entendre parler. Ils apprirent d'autre part que, par un traité secret avec l'Ukraine, le gouvernement austro-hongrois avait promis un partage de la Galicie entre les Polonais et les Ruthènes—partage dans lequel la ville de Lemberg eût naturellement fait partie de la Galicie ruthène. C'est là une idée à laquelle les Polonais ne sauraient s'habituer. Au lendemain du traité de Brest qui avait arraché Cholm à la Pologne, au moment où arrivaient d'Allemagne les menaces les plus précises contre l'intégrité de leur pays, les Polonais virent dans ce projet de partage l'effet d'une véritable conjuration contre eux.

En même temps, la publication de la lettre de Charles I^er^ à M. Poincaré porta au prestige et à la popularité de l'empereur un coup sensible, et rendit, par réaction, les nationalités plus hardies dans leurs revendications. Dès le lendemain de la publication de la lettre impériale on put s'attendre à la reconnaissance solennelle, par l'Entente, des aspirations nationales des peuples austro-hongrois. Cette déclaration fut différée, mais, en ce qui concerne la question polonaise, la déclaration interalliée de Versailles du 3 juin contient la satisfaction des revendications essentielles du peuple polonais. De plus, la formation d'une armée polonaise et les paroles solennelles avec lesquelles M. Poincaré lui remit les drapeaux offerts par les villes de Paris, Verdun, Nancy et Reims, vinrent prouver au peuple polonais que l'Éntente portait désormais à son sort un intérêt inaltérable.

Nous n'avons envisag jusqu'ici la question polonaise que sous son angle international. Mais on ne saurait en négliger complètement l'aspect intérieur. La Pologne n'est pas seulement, en Europe, un problème ou une pièce sur l'échiquier diplomatique. Elle est avant tout

une nation, un peuple qui veut vivre et qui vit. On ne doit pas l'oublier.

Depuis l'acte du 5 novembre 1916, il existe à Varsovie des corps constitués qui font figure et fonction de gouvernement. Les Polonais exilés se refusent, pour la plupart, à reconnaitre l'autorité de corps qui n'existent que par la volonté des occupants. Il n'est que trop vrai que les hommes d'Etat polonais ne jouissent pas de la liberté complète de leurs déterminations. Mais il y aurait à le leur reprocher et à les ignorer systématiquement de l'injustice et du danger. Une injustice, tout d'abord, parce que les hommes qui, à Varsovie, ont, dans des circonstances adverses, accepté la charge du pouvoir, l'ont fait, pour la plupart, non par sympathies germanophiles, mais pour rendre service à leur pays. On ne peut reprocher à la nation polonaise, privée depuis plus d'un siècle des libertés les plus élémentaires, de n'avoir pas repoussé les libertés encore limitées que lui offrait l'Allemagne ; on ne saurait exiger d'elle qu'elle eût laissé tomber en quenouille des biens, objets de ses vœux séculaires, uniquement parce qu'ils étaient encore incomplets. On peut raisonner avec désintéressement au loin ; mais à Varsovie, au milieu des troupes allemandes victorieuses, alors que le seul allié à portée était la Russie, décevante, oppressive et d'ailleurs vaincue, on raisonnait autrement.

Les hommes qui ont accepté, en 1917, le pouvoir des mains de l'Allemagne n'ont pas abdiqué pour cela leur patriotisme polonais. Ils ont voulu rendre service à leur pays, en lui permettant de profiter du rayon de liberté qui lui était offert ; ils ont espéré que la logique de l'histoire les agrandirait peu à peu, et qu'en luttant ils obtiendraient de nouvelles concessions. Ils ne se sont pas complètement trompés. Les hommes d'Etat polonais n'ont pas craint, à plusieurs reprises, d'entrer en conflit avec l'Allemagne. Le I^er^ mai 1917, le premier Conseil d'Etat a adressé aux autorités d'occupation un véritable ultimatum ; en juillet, il a démissionné en bloc pour manifester contre l'incarcération du général Pilsudski ; après la paix de Brest, le ministère Kucharzevski se retira pareillement pour protester contre la mutilation du territoire. Ce ne sont pas là des manières de plats valets. D'ailleurs, ces crises n'ont pas été inutiles ; elles

ont posé la question polonaise devant la conscience universelle avec une force chaque fois accrue. Le gouvernement n'a pas obtenu tout ce qu'il demandait—loin de là; mais ses conquêtes ont la grande valeur d'être définitives, car il sera impossible à l'Allemagne de revenir jamais en deça des conditions faites. A ce point de vue, les autorités polonaises ont fait, plus qu'on ne croit, œuvre durable. Elles ont reçu la Pologne grevée d'hypothèques; mais le terrain leur appartient, et les charges qui pèsent sur lui s'effritent peu à peu.

Ce qui contribue à troubler l'opinion occidentale au sujet des autorités polonaises, c'est que certains hommes ont une tendance à transporter dans le domaine international des préoccupations de politique intérieure. Il est légitime, il est nécessaire, qu'une opposition se manifeste au dedans; et cette opposition n'a pas manqué aux différents gouvernements, dans les partis de droit, dits passivistes, tout d'abord, puis dans les partis de gauche, rejetés par la révolution russe et leurs sympathies révolutionaires dans le camp des adversaires de l'Allemagne. Il se peut même que l'opposition ait rendu au gouvernement un réel service en le détournant de faire aux occupants des concessions exagérées. Mais ce serait aller trop loin que d'identifier ses vues, en toutes choses, aux intérêts de la nation. Transporter ces jugements et ces préventions, dont plusieurs se rapportent à des problèmes politiques et sociaux purement intérieurs, dans le domaine international, c'est rompre l'unité morale de la Pologne vis-à-vis de l'étranger et affaiblir son action de reconstruction nationale.

Enfin, cette œuvre n'est pas sans danger, parce que les Alliés risquent d'être égarés par cette confusion de préoccupations intérieures et extérieures et la nation polonaise risque, elle aussi, d'être trompée en retour, dans ses sentiments à l'égard de la cause alliée. On crée ainsi des malentendus réciproques, dont les conséquences pourront être funestes; on rejette sans le vouloir dans les bras de l'Allemagne, pour la défense des résultats déjà obtenus, le gouvernement, dont la position est si difficile, et, chose plus grave, la nation elle-même.

Jusqu'ici la Pologne a eu trois gouvernements. Le premier fut le Conseil d'Etat provisoire, organisé par l'arrêté du général Beseler, en date du 12 novembre, 1916,

et qui entra en fonction le 16 janvier suivant. C'est l'organe qui, le 1er mai, 1917, suspendit ses fonctions pour obliger les Puissances à élargir les compétences de l'Etat polonais, et qui finit par démissionner le 25 août, à la suite des incidents qui avaient marqué la prestation de serment des légions. A la suite de négociations laborieuses, les puissances centrales finirent par se rallier aux grandes lignes du projet d'organisation provisoire de l'Etat polonais, tel que l'avait préparé le Conseil d'Etat. Un Conseil de régence, dans lequel entrèrent le prince Lubomirski, maire de Varsovie, Mgr Kakovski, archevêque de Varsovie, et M. Ostrovski, entra en fonction en octobre 1917 et choisit un ministère responsable devant lui et présidé par M. Kucharzevski. Ce gouvernement se retira à la suite du traité de Brest, et fut remplacé par un ministère Steczkovski, qui vient de démissioner.

Au mois de décembre dernier enfin fut décidé la création d'un organe legislatif provisoire. Ce fut la troisième étape dans l'organisation politique. Ce Conseil d'Etat est composé de membres de droit, de membres élus par les conseils communaux, et de membres désignés par les régents. Ce n'est pas, à proprement parler, une représentation nationale ; mais son existence a déjà eu pour la Pologne des conséquences heureuses. D'abord le conseil des ministres est responsable devant lui, ce qui a augmenté sa force vis-à-vis des régents irresponsables et donné une influence plus grande à l'opinion publique. Ensuite, au sein du Conseil d'Etat et dans une collaboration quotidienne, un rapprochement s'est opéré entre les partis, la violence de l'opposition a diminué, et un certain nombre de députés réalistes hostiles à la politique des régents se sont peu à peu ralliés. Enfin, le Conseil d'Etat a jeté les premières bases de la future constitution. En résumé, le Conseil d'Etat ne doit pas être considéré comme une représentation sincère et adéquate de la volonté du pays, mais plutôt comme une émanation de l'opinion publique générale ; il peut, à ce titre, rendre de réels services, tant à la nation qu'au gouvernement, vis-à-vis des occupants.

Ces résultats sont minces encore, mais non négligeables ; et, lorsque les Alliés pourront à leur tour exercer une influence positive sur les destinées de la Pologne, ils devront tenir compte de ce qui existe et construire sur

ces bases l'édifice du nouvel Etat. Les ignorer serait s'exposer à des mécomptes. Si les puissances centrales ne sont pas parvenues encore à se mettre d'accord sur le chef de l'Etat, et se sont montrées avares de compétences pour les autorités polonaises, du moins ont-elles organisé une armature, créé un pouvoir exécutif et un embryon de pouvoir législatif. L'âme manque encore, mais le corps est là ; et ce sera l'œuvre généreuse des Alliés de lui infuser la vie et l'esprit.

La situation actuelle de la Pologne telle que la font apparaître les derniers évènements est pleine d'espérances et de dangers. Des puissances centrales, les Polonais ne peuvent attendre une véritable et pleine résurrection. L'Autriche-Hongrie est de plus en plus affaiblie, et son appui diplomatique a perdu, entre les mains du comte Burian, la plus grande partie de sa valeur. La solution austro-polonaise ne présente d'ailleurs plus les avantages que nous lui avons reconnus dans le passé, car ce ne peut être un sort enviable pour une nation forte qui aspire à de nouvelles destinées que de s'unir à un pays vieilli que menacent les crimes et peut-être la dissolution.

Le gouvernement polonais l'a d'ailleurs reconnu et s'est orienté de plus en plus, depuis quelques mois, vers l'Allemagne, avec laquelle il aspire à régler directement certaines questions litigieuses. Tel est le sens de l'entrevue que le prince Radzyvill et le comte Ronikier ont eu à Spa, le 13 août, avec les hommes d'Etat de l'empire allemand. Reprenant les termes du mémoire qu'ils ont adressé aux occupants le 29 avril dernier, les ministres polonais ont exigé et obtenu l'intégrité du territoire polonais, la neutralisation de la Vistule et de Dantzig—c'est à dire un débouché direct à la mer Baltique et certaines garanties d'ordre constitutionnel. Ils auraient obtenu aussi, à ce qu'il semble, une solution favorable de la question lituanienne.

Il est évident que les Polonais n'ont pas enregistré toutes ces concessions sans faire, de leur côté, de lourds sacrifices. L'Allemagne connait son importance en Orient ; elle tient entre ses mains les destins, non seulement de la Pologne, mais encore de la Lituanie, de la Russie-Blanche, de l'Ukraine. Elle sait ce que vaut son amitié et ce qu'elle peut la faire payer. En Allemagne,

les courants hostiles à la Pologne sont puissants. C'est aujourd'hui l'Etat-Major qui gouverne presque sans conteste. Or les militaires veulent réaliser de larges annexions dans l'Est ; ils veulent y joindre des annexions économiques et empêcher de toute façon la naissance d'un irrédentisme oriental ayant son foyer dans une Pologne forte. Ils n'hésitent même pas à introduire en Pologne la propagande maximaliste pour ruiner les bases de l'Etat et le détruire par l'anarchie. S'il est vrai que, dans ces conditions, l'Allemagne a promis à la Pologne l'intégrité de son territoire et une influence prépondérante en Lituanie, il n'y a guère de doute que les Polonais ont dû, de leur côté, donner à l'Allemagne des garanties précises de leur docilité et de leur fidélité. Les Allemands ne feraient pas une politique polonaise si la Pologne ne faisait pas, de son côté, une politique allemande.

Les membres du gouvernement polonais sont très préoccupés des dangers intérieurs qui menacent l'Etat naissant, et, en particulier, de la possibilité d'une révolte agraire. Ils tiennent, en vue de cette éventualité, à être armés et à posséder eux-mêmes la force publique nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre. C'est la raison qui les pousse à s'entendre avec l'Allemagne pour l'organisation d'une armée. Les Polonais ne croient plus à la victoire allemande. Mais ils pensent que, même vaincue, l'Allemagne demeurera leur principal marché, leur débouché naturel, leur entrepôt ; et qu'ils devront traiter avec elle. Aussi envisagent-ils, en ce moment même, la possibilité d'un accord qui répondrait chez eux surtout à des besoins intérieurs.

Cependant, il semble bien que, sur un point, les hommes d'Etat polonais aient résisté aux prétentions allemandes. Ils n'ont pas encore renoncé officiellement à la solution austro-polonaise, c'est-à-dire à la réunion de la Galicie et de la Pologne sous un même sceptre. Ils ne peuvent pas, d'ailleurs, y renoncer, sans soulever contre eux l'unanimité de la nation polonaise. La candidature de l'archiduc Charles-Etienne, quelque sympathique que soit aux Polonais la personnalité de l'archiduc, est inacceptable pour la Pologne si elle doit signifier la renonciation à la Galicie, et inacceptable pour l'Autriche-Hongrie si elle signifie le démembrement de la Monarchie. Il y a là une double impossibilité, telle que l'entente entre

l'Allemagne et l'Autriche-Hongrie apparaît extrêmement difficile.

Au reste, ces choses-là, espérons-le, n'auront pas un caractère durable. Il est évident, pour qui sait comprendre le sens profond de la guerre, que la Pologne ne peut espérer son salut véritable que de la défaite de l'Allemagne et du triomphe des puissances libérales. Les victoires de France sont, pour la Pologne, le gage le plus sûr de la résurrection. Mais les Alliés sont éloignés. Ils n'arriveront à Varsovie qu'en passant sur le corps de l'Allemagne, qui parait encore solide ; et c'est un magnifique acte de foi que l'histoire demande à la nation polonaise. Aucun peuple au monde ne fut jamais mieux préparé par son histoire à un semblable effort moral et spirituel.

P.S.—Depuis que cet article a été écrit, des faits importants d'ordre militaire et politique sont venus modifier la situation générale. Ils se sont cristallisés, en Pologne, dans la démission du ministère Steczkowski et le retour au pouvoir de M. Jean Kucharzewski. Celui-ci est considéré comme très favorable à l'Entente et passe pour le plénipotentiaire désigné de la Pologne au Congrès de la Paix. C'est dire qu'il ne fera assurément rien qui puisse compromettre sa situation personnelle vis-à-vis des Alliés. Sa politique, à l'égard de l'Allemagne ébranlée et bientôt vaincue, sera l'expectative et la temporisation. On voit que, pour les Alliés, les fruits de la victoire ont mûri rapidement sur les bords de la Vistule.

William Martin.

Art. 18.—THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

DURING the first half of July events on the western front continued to follow the unostentatious course on which they had entered when the enemy, foiled in his schemes for the overthrow of the French and Italian armies, abandoned the offensive. Superficially, the general situation exhibited no obvious change. Here and there minor enterprises, which need no detailed description, continued to give back to the Allies portions of the ground they had lost; while the Germans, resolved, to all appearance, on a purely passive defence, continued to accept these local reverses with unwonted humility.

But all the time causes were operating to effect a change in the tide of war, which was destined soon to carry the Allied armies forward on an ever-widening wave which has swept the enemy back to, and in places beyond, the low-water mark of last year's retreat. The American Army, which had already attained a high state of efficiency from the practical experience of war, was rapidly becoming formidable in numbers; and the units which, for training purposes, had originally been brigaded with British divisions, had been brought together, and organised in separate divisions and armies. The Allied forces, as a whole, were recovering the cohesion which had been sacrificed to the necessity of breaking-up formations to meet urgent calls for reinforcements in unexpected quarters. The centring of the supreme command in the hands of General Foch—now a Marshal of France—which was in itself a factor of strength, both facilitated the disentangling and re-grouping of the scattered units, and ensured the redistribution of the armies to the best advantage with a view to combined action, whether in attack or defence. The replacement of lost material was proceeding apace; and, in respect of *moral*, the Allied troops were rapidly recovering from the effects of their retreat, while the enemy suffered the discouragement incidental to failure.

As time went on, and the Germans remained inactive, it was generally supposed that they had finally relinquished the initiative; and it was somewhat a surprise when, on July 15, they opened a general attack on a front of fifty miles extending from Château Thierry to

the Main des Massiges, at the eastern limit of the old Champagne battle-field. Throwing numerous bridges over the Marne, eight divisions, under cover of smoke-clouds, forced the river between Fossoy and Verneuil, and, in the first rush, gained the heights south of Dormans, which overlook the valley. Between the Marne and the Ardre the Allied line was forced back a distance of three or four miles; and east of Reims the first line of defence was captured, including the heights of Moronvillers, which had been the scene of fierce battles last year. The Germans, however, do not appear to have made any serious attempt to follow up their advantage; and they were unable to maintain their position on the heights south of the river against the French counter-attacks, which developed on July 16 and 17, while, on the remainder of the front, their advance was brought to a standstill.

This spasmodic attack was evidently in the nature of a demonstration, the object of which is, however, a matter of conjecture. According to unofficial report, the Germans employed only thirty divisions on the fifty-mile front; and did not engage their reserves. Moreover, their heavy artillery, without which they could not hope to make any substantial progress, or even to maintain their footing south of the Marne, was left behind. The force which had crossed, being only lightly equipped, subsequently effected its retreat without serious accident —a result to which the covering fire of the heavy guns on the north bank doubtless contributed. An advance in force across the Marne would have been strategically unsound; for it would have accentuated the danger of the enemy's salient position between Soissons and Reims, by lengthening the lines of communication, which were liable to be cut by an Allied advance between the Aisne and the Marne, and by exposing the advanced force to the risk of defeat with the river in its rear.

That the Germans were fully aware of the disadvantages of the situation is proved by their persistent efforts, in the early part of June, to throw General Mangin's army back on the Soissons—Château Thierry front; and, if they had contemplated a serious offensive, they would probably again have been disposed rather to extend the occupied area north of the river than to incur

risks which, in the meantime, had been accentuated by the growth of the Allied Armies in numbers and efficiency. The positions as they existed were, indeed, hardly tenable as a line of defence; and the enemy no doubt realised that, in the end, withdrawal would be the only alternative to a successful offensive. It is possible that they had already decided to adopt the former course, rather than to wait until it should be imposed upon them; and that the widely-extended attack of July 15 was intended to disguise their design, and to facilitate the operation by inducing the French to disperse their reserves to strengthen threatened points. Or, alternatively, they may merely have intended to dislocate the plans of the Allied Generalissimo by breaking up the force which, as they were doubtless aware, he had concentrated south of the Aisne. In either case the result was ineffective; for the Allies, being forewarned of the attack, disposed of it with the troops already in the line, and proceeded to carry out their plans without delay or modification.

Before proceeding to sketch the operations which followed, it may be convenient to the reader to indicate their various phases; premising that any such division is, of course, artificial, the offensives of the different armies being episodes in one great preconcerted operation. The first phase opened between the Aisne and the Marne, where General Mangin's 10th Army, with American and British troops, began the attack on July 18; the battle subsequently extending to General Dégoutte's front south of the Marne, and involving also the eastern flank of the German salient, where General Berthelot's 5th Army was supplemented by American, British, and Italian troops. In the second phase, which began on Aug. 8, the 1st French Army (Debeney), and the 4th British Army (Rawlinson), advanced on the front Braches—Morlancourt. Four days later the offensive front was extended to the Oise by General Humbert's 3rd Army; and on Aug. 17 General Mangin co-operated by setting his left wing in movement between the Oise and the Aisne. The third phase, which was opened by General Byng's 3rd Army, was introduced, on Aug. 21, by an attack on a front of

about ten miles north of Beaumont sur Ancre; but, on the following day, the offensive spread southwards to the Somme, thus joining up with General Rawlinson's operations; while, to the north, there was a gradual extension of the battle-area to a point beyond the Scarpe, involving General Horne's 1st Army. By the end of August the battle was continuous from Lens to Reims, a front of one hundred and twenty miles.

The Allied attack on July 18 took the enemy completely by surprise; for, although the move was not unexpected, there was no preliminary bombardment to indicate that it was imminent. A strong force of British tanks contributed largely to the success of the first day's operations. Progress was most marked on the left wing, between Amblény and St Pierre Aigle, where General Mangin had made use of the period of stagnation, by a series of well-planned but unobtrusive local operations, to get clear of the forest and broken country, and so to prepare for taking the offensive. By nightfall the French were in possession of the heights which overlook Soissons on the south-west and stretch southwards to the east of Chaudun. The right wing, which was involved in the difficult country bordering the forest of Villers Cotterets, made less progress; but on the second day it fought its way against stubborn resistance, and came into line with the remainder of the army not far from the Soissons—Château Thierry main road, parts of which were under the fire of the Allied guns. On the Ourcq—Marne front good progress was made on the 18th; and in the evening the German force south of the Marne, realising the danger of the situation, began to fall back towards the river, which it recrossed during the night of the 19th, closely pressed by General Dégoutte. Strong opposition was encountered between the Marne and Reims, where General Berthelot took the offensive on July 19; and throughout the operations the enemy took full advantage of the defensive possibilities of the wooded and hilly country on this flank of the salient to hold back the advance during their withdrawal from the Marne.

On July 21 the Allies entered Château Thierry; and on the following day the capture of Epieds, eight miles to the north-east, both threatened the flank of the hostile forces which, by furious counter-attacks, were

endeavouring to stem the advance of the Allied troops between the Marne and the Ourcq, and made the Germans anxious for the safety of the road from Jaulgonne to Fère en Tardenois, which was one of their main lines of retreat from the Marne. In face of this menace, which was the more disturbing because General Dégoutte, having crossed the Marne, was pressing forward at all points, the Germans were forced to turn their attention to the region of Epieds, where they counter-attacked in force on July 24, and seized the village, which, however, was recovered by the Americans before nightfall. The fighting was also exceptionally severe on this day north of Dormans, where the main road to Fismes crosses the Marne, and in the direction of Reims, where British and Italian troops gained possession of Vrigny.

In the meantime General Mangin's advance north of the Ourcq had been retarded by the enemy's stubborn resistance; but in the evening of July 25 French troops entered Oulchy le Château and Villemontoire, the capture of which places had an important effect on the operations by securing the flanks of an easterly advance along the intervening high ground against the heights north and north-east of Grand Rozoy, which formed the main bulwark of the enemy's defence between the Ourcq and the Crise. On July 27 the Germans began to fall back on a wide front before the armies of Generals Dégoutte and Berthelot, covered on their right by stiff rearguard fighting on the Ourcq, the brunt of which was borne by the Americans; and, by the close of the day, the Allied forces arrived within three miles of that enemy's principal line of resistance in the area enclosed by the Ardre, the Vesle, and the Ourcq, which was situated on the so-called 'Tardenois plateau,' stretching from Fère en Tardenois to Ville en Tardenois. The last three days of July were signalised by fierce fighting for the possession of the plateau, in which a desperate struggle round Sergy, between an American division and two German divisions (one of the Prussian Guard), was a striking incident. The village, after changing hands repeatedly, remained in the possession of our Allies.

While these events were proceeding on his right, General Mangin was engaged in making his dispositions

for the assault of the formidable position on the Grand Rozoy heights, which the Germans were endeavouring to cover by a series of violent counter-attacks. Among the troops employed were two British divisions, which were moved forward on either side of the heights, and took a leading part in the attack on Aug. 1, fighting in the neighbourhood of Hartennes and Beugneux. The result of the battle was decisive; for, though the enemy still clung to the Tardenois plateau, they gave way to the French attacks on the following day, and the whole line made a speedy movement towards the Crise and the Vesle. Before evening French troops had entered Soissons, and the pursuit was carried beyond the line of the Crise. On Aug. 4 American troops occupied Fismes, and patrols made their way at several points to the right bank of the Vesle, where the Germans were found to be holding the heights in force. This stage marked the close of the Allied offensive south of the Aisne; for, though intermittent fighting has since taken place on the line of the Vesle, from Reims to its junction with the Aisne, and the Germans ultimately continued their retreat, the Allies made no serious attempt at the time to carry the advance further. During the operations the Germans engaged 74 divisions (out of a total of 201 divisions in France), of which ten were drawn from Prince Rupprecht's army-group, while others were brought from the Verdun front, and from Alsace and Lorraine. Their losses numbered some 40,000 prisoners and 500 guns, of which over 8000 prisoners and 130 guns were taken by the Americans.

Towards the end of July the Allies carried out two minor enterprises, north and south of the Somme, which had some bearing on the operations now to be described. The first was an attack by the French north of Montdidier, which gave them possession of the enemy's first line through Mailly Raineval and Aubvillers. Later, Australian troops, by a night attack, pushed the Germans back between Morlancourt and the Somme. The enemy, as a result of these incidents, found themselves at a disadvantage in view of the Allied offensive, which they doubtless anticipated, and they took steps to rectify their positions. On Aug. 4 they withdrew their line, on a front of ten miles northwards from Montdidier,

apparently in order to avoid being forced to fight close in front of the Avre, yielding to the French the left bank of that river from Braches to Morisel. On the Somme they elected to attempt the recovery of their lost position, and, with that view, attacked with a fresh division at dawn on Aug. 6, but with only trifling success, which was nullified by a counter-attack on the following morning.

At dawn on Aug. 8 the offensive proper was launched by Sir Douglas Haig, the 4th British Army attacking on a front extending from Morlancourt to the neighbourhood of Morisel, whence the line was prolonged southwards by the 1st French Army. South of the Somme the British troops, assisted by a large number of tanks, swept over the German lines, and reached their final objectives at an early hour. Then the cavalry, with light tanks and motor machine-gun batteries, passing through the infantry, took up the pursuit, riding down the German transport, cutting telephone-wires, surrounding and capturing villages, and taking many prisoners. North of the Somme more stubborn resistance was encountered; but after severe fighting the enemy's defence was overcome, and the appointed goal was reached before evening. On the right the French, forcing the passages of the Avre, captured Pierrepont, and made good progress further north. Before nightfall the Allied troops had reached the line Pierrepont—Arvillers—Rosières—Rainecourt—Morcourt, having captured 17,000 prisoners and over 200 guns.

On the second day of the offensive General Debeney extended his attack beyond the apex of the German salient, and striking towards Montdidier from the south and south-east, reached Faverolles. To the north Davenescourt fell to his troops; and on Aug. 10 Montdidier, being threatened with envelopment, was evacuated by the enemy. General Humbert, with the 3rd French Army, began to move forward on General Debeney's right. At the end of the day (Aug. 10) the Allied front was defined by Elincourt—Conchy—Laboissière—Andéchy—Fresnoy lez Roye—Lihons—Proyart. The Germans, threatened with the loss of Chaulnes—an important centre of roads and railways, and replete with stores of every kind—began, on Aug. 11, a series of violent counter-attacks in the region of Lihons, delivered by divisions

freshly drawn from the reserves, which, though successfully resisted, delayed the British advance for some days. General Humbert, however, made progress in the hilly country south-west of Noyon, and, on Aug. 14, captured Ribecourt; while General Debeney pressed forward to envelope Lassigny on the north and south. At the end of the first week's fighting the toll of captures amounted to 28,000 prisoners and 600 guns.

There was little change in the general situation until Aug. 17, when General Mangin captured a section of the German line near Autreches, subsequently extending his offensive to embrace the whole area between the Aisne and the Oise, and reaching, on Aug. 21, the Soissons—Noyon main road. Aided by this movement, the progress of the 1st and 3rd French Armies was expedited, the conquest of the Thiescourt forest was completed; and, on the last-named date, Lassigny fell. Two days later General Mangin was in possession of the left bank of the Oise as far as the confluence of the Ailette, and of the latter to a point opposite Coucy le Château. Subsequently there was little change in the situation south of the Somme till Aug. 27, when the enemy gave way on a wide front, yielding to the unrelenting pressure of the French armies, and influenced by the striking achievements of Sir Julian Byng, now to be described.

Shortly before 5 a.m. on Aug. 21 the 3rd Army advanced to the attack on a ten-mile front, from the Ancre to Moyenneville. No preliminary bombardment heralded the assault, which was led by a strong force of tanks, concealed by mist which hung heavily over the battle-field till mid-day. The leading troops, having penetrated deeply into the hostile positions, were relieved by fresh divisions, which passed to the front, and fought their way as far as the Albert—Arras railway, encountering strong resistance, especially about Achiet le Grand, where the Germans counter-attacked in force. On Aug. 22 the right wing came into action, recaptured Albert, and carried the German positions between the Somme and the Ancre to a depth of two miles. The third day's fighting covered the whole front from Lihons to within five miles of Arras, General Rawlinson's left wing joining in the battle, and forcing the enemy back between Herleville and the Somme. On the left General

Byng's troops overcame the hostile defence on the Albert —Arras railway north of Achiet le Grand, and reached the Bapaume—Arras road between Ervillers and Boiry Becquerelle, both of which fell to their assault. Later in the day the left centre attacked and carried the ridge above Irles, captured Achiet le Grand, and secured the intervening positions.

On Aug. 24 the advance proceeded in the face of strong hostile reinforcements. On the right Braye was taken; and the right centre, entering upon the Somme battle-field of 1916, proceeded eastwards astride of the Thiepval ridge, capturing La Boiselle, Thiepval, Grandcourt, and other well-remembered villages and farms. Opposite the left centre, Miraumont made a desperate defence, until it was outflanked on the north by New Zealand and British troops, which carried Irles, Loupart Wood, and other strongly defended localities, and reached Biefvillers and Avesnes, on the outskirts of Bapaume. Further north St Léger and Henin sur Cojeul were taken; and, beyond the Scarpe, the Germans were driven from a section of their front line north-east of Fampoux. At this stage the Germans, having assembled strong forces, counter-attacked fiercely on the 25th and 26th at various parts of the front; but, though the general advance was retarded, High Wood, on the Somme battle-field, and Monchy le Preux, south-east of Arras, were secured—points of some tactical importance which, in the past, had been hotly contested on several occasions. On Aug. 27 Sir Henry Rawlinson drove the enemy back on the whole front between Chaulnes and the Somme. South of Bapaume, Longueval, which had been taken and lost on the previous day, was captured, together with Delville Wood and other strong localities. Between Bapaume and the Scarpe progress was marked, our troops passing, at several points, beyond the line held by the Germans last spring. North of the Scarpe the battle extended nearly to Lens, Arleux being occupied, as well as Roeux, Greenland Hill, and Gavrelles—points which defined the limits of our advance last year. The enemy reacted violently, especially between the Sensée and the Somme, actuated, it would seem, more by the desire to gain time than by any expectation of stopping our advance.

For on this day, as already stated, the Germans hastened their retreat between the Somme and the Oise. A glance at the map will suggest reasons for their anxiety. It will be seen that the main roads in the region converge on St Quentin, and the railroads on La Fère. These means of communication and retreat were threatened from the south by General Humbert, advancing between Noyon and Roye, and by General Mangin, who was maintaining his pressure in the valley of the Oise and the Ailette. Rawlinson was approaching the passages of the Somme about Brie; while Byng's right was near Peronne. The Allied commanders were no further from St Quentin than were the Germans about Chaulnes, and all were steadily gaining ground. The Noyon—La Fère railway had probably already been put out of action by the guns of the 10th French Army, and that through Nesle was obviously in danger. The Germans, therefore, according to their own account, 'withdrew to a distance from the enemy, giving up, without fighting, the ruin-heaps of Chaulnes and Roye.' On Aug. 28 the French gained the heights on the west bank of the Somme north-east of Nesle, and reached the Canal du Nord between Nesle and Noyon, capturing some forty villages, and a large quantity of material. On the following day they took Noyon, in spite of a stubborn defence, and advanced some way to the east; while General Mangin crossed the Ailette in the region of Folembray. After this date there was little change for some days in the situation between the Somme and the Oise; for the Germans, feeling more secure on their straightened front, stiffened their resistance, and the Allies were too prudent to waste their resources in costly attacks. But General Mangin made some progress east of the Ailette and north and north-east of Soissons, capturing Crécy au Mont, Juvigny, and Crouy.

Meanwhile things were going well on the British front north of the Somme. On Aug. 29 Bapaume fell to the New Zealanders; and the enemy gave way on the ridge east of Longueval, where our troops reached the line Combles—Morval. On the two following days progress continued in this quarter, as well as on the Somme, where the capture of Mont St Quentin made

the fall of Péronne imminent; while, north of Bapaume, Bullecourt and Hendecourt were finally won.

The early days of September saw new developments on the flanks of the battle-front. On the 2nd the 'Drocourt—Quéant switch-line' was broken on a front of six miles astride of the Arras—Cambrai road, 10,000 prisoners being taken. Next day the Germans evacuated Lens. Continuing their advance between Quéant and Cambrai, our troops captured Inchy on Sept. 4, entered Mœuvres, and, further north, reached the Canal du Nord at several points less than seven miles from Cambrai. From the canal the front lay north-westwards through Etaing, Gavrelle, and Arleux, to Lens; and southwards along a direct line including Ytres and the River Tortille, the passages of which had been forced on a wide front. On this day the Germans gave way before General Humbert, withdrawing up the Oise to within four miles of Chauny, and abandoning Guiscard. They also began to fall back from the line of the Vesle, pressed by the Americans, who reached the Aisne between Condé and Villers. Two days later the enemy abandoned the line of the Somme above Peronne; and, by the evening, General Rawlinson's troops had proceeded seven miles east to the river on a twelve-mile front astride of the Amiens — St Quentin road. The French advanced beyond Ham, and, on the Oise, passed Chauny. Further south they occupied the Lower Forest of Coucy, and approached Landricourt and Vauxaillon.

Thereafter the retreat between the Oise and the Cambrai front proceeded for some days without any incident needing special notice; though local fighting continued intermittently, which resulted in the enemy being driven back, by Sept. 10, to the general line of defence held by them before the March offensive. Sir Douglas Haig marked the occasion by a special order congratulating the troops on the magnificence of their achievement, and announcing that, during the month's fighting, they had captured 75,000 prisoners and 750 guns. The Allies, however, were not content to rest on their laurels. The French continued their advance north of the Aisne, in the face of determined counter-attacks, capturing Vailly, and making progress east of Allemant towards the western end of the Chemin des Dames ridge.

About St Quentin they won the heights between the Crozat Canal and the Oise, and, in conjunction with Rawlinson's right wing, penetrated by enemy's positions north of the town. Further north, as far as Mœuvres, our troops gained ground in a series of engagements, of which the most important was fought on Sept. 18, when, attacking on a front of sixteen miles south of Gouzeaucourt, they forced their way into the enemy's positions on the line Pontru—Hargicourt—Lempire, advancing nearly to Bellicourt in the centre, and, on the left, reaching the outskirts of Villers Guislain.


While these events were proceeding in the south, the northern part of the front, in the neighbourhood of the Flemish frontier, was not unaffected.* The operations, though of a minor character in comparison with those on the main battle-front, need passing notice, as they resulted in our front being re-established north of the La Bassée Canal, where it had been deeply indented by the German offensive, and thus cleared the right flank of the great advance which developed in the Ypres sector towards the end of September. In the early days of August the official reports referred, on several occasions, to the activity of our patrols in the area between the rivers Clarence and Lawe, south-east of St Venant. These tentative movements soon developed into general pressure on the salient between Bailleul and the La Bassée Canal, under which, about Aug. 8 (the date of General Rawlinson's offensive) the Germans began to give way. Local fighting was also reported about Kemmel and Voormezeele, where the enemy, during the first half of the month, made several demonstrations, probably in the hope of relieving the pressure further south. On Aug. 18 a local operation between Vieux Bercquin and Bailleul, in which 700 prisoners were taken, gave us possession of several defended localities, including a village. This success was steadily followed up, in the face of counter-attacks; and the front of the advance was extended to the Lys, where our troops captured Merville after sharp fighting. The enemy then gave way on the whole front between Ypres and Givenchy. By the beginning of September

* Vide map published in the 'Quarterly Review' last July.

Kemmel Hill and Bailleul had been re-occupied; and our front was defined by the general line Voormezeele—Neuve Eglise—Steenwerck—Estaires—Givenchy. On Sept. 4 we attacked and captured Ploegsteert, and Hill 63, between that place and Messines; and, from Fauquissart to Givenchy, we regained the line held before April 9.

To bring this outline of events down to the commencement of the general attack on the defensive system within which the Germans had taken refuge. it remains to sketch the brilliant and skilful attack delivered by the 1st American Army, in conjunction with French divisions, on the enemy's positions in the region of St Mihiel. Coming, as it did, at the moment when the armies grouped under Prince Rupprecht and the German Crown Prince were, no doubt, congratulating themselves on having found a secure refuge in the Hindenburg defences, the Germans must have been disagreeably surprised at finding themselves assailed in a fresh quarter, where, for four years, they had remained practically undisturbed. It may be recalled that, in September, 1914, after several fruitless attempts to break through the chain of barrier forts which crown the heights of the Meuse from Verdun to Toul, they ultimately gained a footing at Hattonchatel, whence they pushed forward in the direction of St Mihiel, attacked the forts of Paroches and Camp des Romains, which dominated the town on the north and south respectively, and established a small bridge-head on the left bank of the Meuse, from which they failed to debouch. The sharp salient thus created seemed an inviting objective; but, though the French on several occasions made local attacks in the region of Apremont, and at various points in the Woeuvre, and gained partial successes, they have been too much occupied in other quarters to spare the forces necessary for operations on a scale large enough to secure decisive results.

The recent operation was well-planned, and carried out with precision. The weather, on the whole, favoured our Allies. A light rain, which had been falling for some days, hampered the action of the tanks; and low clouds embarrassed the airmen, who had the superiority; but the sodden state of the roads, in conjunction with the converging fire of the guns, which swept the entire


Bazonvaux
Etain
Abancourt
Conflans
Verdun
Line on Sept. 11th
Metz
Gravelotte
Ft Haudainville
Fresnes
St Hilaire
les Eparges
Chambley
Doncourt-aux-Templiers
Ft Genicourt
THE WOEVRE
Haumont
Villecey
Moselle
Hattonchâtel
Ft Troyon
Seuzey
Jaulny
Pagny
R. Meuse
Vigneulles
Thiaucourt
Norroy
Sept 11th
Line on
Ft Les Paroches
St Mihiel
Rupt de Mad R.
Pont-a-Mousson
Ft du Camp de Romains
Flirey
Xivray
Apremont
Scale of Miles
5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10

[*To face p.* 516.

salient, made it impossible for the enemy, in the short time allowed them, to save their heavy artillery and the large quantity of material accumulated behind the lines. The German troops, who, it is said, had been warned to expect attack on Sept. 15, were taken by surprise when, at 5 a.m. on the 12th, after an intense bombardment lasting four hours, the American infantry assailed their positions on a front of ten miles, from the Moselle to the Rupt de Madt at Xivray, and, encountering little resistance, made rapid progress. At the same time French troops, advancing from the region of St Mihiel, carried the heights, and covered the American flanks. Later, at 8 a.m., a third attack was made on the western flank of the salient, between Les Eparges and Seuzey, which, though strongly opposed, gained its objectives early in the afternoon. The Allied forces continued to press forward on both flanks. Thiaucourt was taken in the evening; and, by 8 o'clock on the following morning, the advanced troops operating from the south-east and north-west had joined hands at Vigneulles. 15,000 prisoners and over 200 guns were captured. On the subsequent days the advance proceeded in a north-easterly direction, meeting ineffective counter-attacks about Jaulny and St Hilaire; and the enemy's retreat became general between Bezonvaux and Norroy. By the evening of Sept. 15, the Allied forces had passed the line Villecey—Haumont—Doncourt—Fresnes—Abaucourt; and the fortress guns of Metz had come into action.

During the closing days of September events marched with breathless rapidity. On the 26th the first of a series of great combined attacks, which shook the enemy's entire front from the Meuse to the Yser, was delivered by the 1st American and 4th French armies, advancing, respectively, east and west of the Argonne Forest. General Liggett's army quickly overran the positions on the west bank of the Meuse established by the Germans during their attack on Verdun in 1916, and, by the end of the month, had penetrated the enemy's fortified zone on the entire front of attack to a depth of seven miles. West of the forest General Gouraud was equally successful, his troops making light of the obstacles which had brought the Champagne offensive of September 1915 to a standstill, and carrying their front beyond the line

Condé—Séchault—Aure—Somme Py, a general advance of six to seven miles. In the intervening region the Germans were evacuating the forest under the direct pressure of the Americans.

The second great blow followed on Sept. 27, when portions of our 1st and 3rd armies attacked in the Cambrai sector, American troops prolonging the offensive front southwards beyond Le Catelet. Two days later the 4th Army came into action between Le Catelet and St Quentin. Our troops won back the whole of the Cambrai battle-field, gained the right bank of the Canal about Crèvecour, occupied the western suburbs of Cambrai, and, further north, reached Blécourt. North of St Quentin the 4th Army fought its way as far as the line Lavergies—Estrées, three miles east of the Canal. On Sept. 30 General Debeney, cooperating with Rawlinson's right wing, attacked St Quentin and the adjoining defences. Two days earlier, General Mangin carried the heights of the Chemin des Dames as far eastwards as the Vailly—Laon road; and, by Sept. 30, the battle spread to the region between the Vesle and the Aisne, where the enemy began to fall back on the entire front west of Reims.

On Sept. 28, the Belgian Army, with General Plumer's forces, under the command of King Albert, assailed the German positions from Dixmude to Ploegsteert.* Dixmude and the whole of the Messines and Passchendaele ridges (including the Zandvoorde and Moorslede spurs) were captured, and Ledeghem was occupied, British and Belgian troops, respectively, reached the outskirts of Menin and Roulers, and, in the interval, advanced beyond the railway. Influenced by the attacks at Cambrai and Ypres, the Germans show signs of giving way on the intervening front.

Thus, at the end of September, the whole front from the heights of the Meuse to the swamps of Flanders was in violent oscillation; and the enemy, who had already suffered heavily,† was throwing division after division

* Vide maps published in the 'Quarterly Review' for January and July last.

† The British armies, alone, during July and August, took 123,618 prisoners and 1400 guns. In the last five days' fighting between the Sensee and St Quentin they defeated 36 German divisions.

into the fight, in the endeavour to maintain the stability of his positions. The Allies' combined offensive, which, in its scope and significance, is the greatest of this great war, is as yet in too early a stage to admit of its ultimate result being conjectured. The Germans rely not on a few parallel lines of defence, but on a fortified zone of unknown depth, only the fringe of which has been penetrated; and it is not to be supposed that the fighting can be maintained indefinitely at the present high pressure. In fact, victory will be won, not by the capturing positions, but by breaking the spirit of the German army and the German nation. What is apparent at the moment is that the Germans have been deprived of their lateral communications through Roulers, Douai, and Cambrai; that they have been relegated to the railway system centring on Valenciennes; and that their facilities for transporting reinforcements and distributing supplies have, in consequence, been curtailed.

The main causes of the Allies' success have already been epitomised. Chief among these have been the remarkable achievements of the United States in raising and transporting troops. According to official statements, there were 1,000,000 American troops in France at the beginning of July.* Over 300,000 men crossed the Atlantic during that month; and the rate of transport has since increased. The intervention of an entirely fresh force of such magnitude at the present stage of the war, when the original combatants are more or less exhausted, might be expected to exercise a decisive influence on the course of the campaign. In conjunction with the Austrian defeat in Italy, it probably decided the Germans to return to the defensive; and, even from the brief allusions which have been made above to the performances of the American troops, it may be seen that, without this accession of strength, Marshal Foch could hardly have hoped to take the offensive with success. The German plans were, in fact, based on a complete misconception of what America could accomplish; and not only have those plans failed, but the future course of the war has assumed a new aspect.

* It has recently been announced that the number exceeds 1,700,000.

Germany has been counting, at the worst, on the war being brought to an end by mutual exhaustion; a state of things in which she expected to have the advantage on account of the strategical and political position which she had attained in Russia and the Near East. She now knows that, as General March, the Chief of the American General Staff, has stated, she will have to deal next year with an American army four millions strong; that her dream of a decisive victory in the field has vanished; and that the best she can hope for is the termination of the war in her favour by indirect methods.

But the value of numbers depends on the power they confer being effectively controlled and directed. The influence of unity in the chief command has been manifested in various ways: in the presence of reserves where they were wanted to strengthen the defence or to confirm a success; in the prompt seizing of opportunities, and the timely delivery of blows in fresh quarters where weakness was disclosed; in the precision attained in combined operations, which did not always exist when plans were evolved as the result of discussion and agreement between commanders of equal status. It is hardly necessary to say that the defects of execution which used to appear were not attributable to the jealousy or want of accord which, in former wars, had often marred combined operations, for the Allied commanders of all grades have been conspicuous for loyalty to each other; but, when opinions differed, agreement could only be effected by discussion or mutual concession; and thus delay was inevitable, when promptitude was all-important.

A marked advance has been observable in tactical methods. For example, machine-guns have been more extensively and more effectively used in attack and pursuit. The improvement appears to have been partly due to organisation, which has enabled the guns to be employed in batteries or companies, each with an allotted rôle, in close cooperation with the other arms. Given a suitable organisation, effective action depends on tactical skill in the selection of advantageous positions; and in this respect a marked improvement is manifest. With regard to the infantry attack, the 'leap-frog' method of advance, described in the 'Quarterly

Review' for April last, seems to have been adopted. There has also been less rigidity in the advance, with the result that the normal attack has proceeded more rapidly. More distant objectives have been assigned; and, on many occasions, the attack has been carried far beyond the objectives originally appointed, without the ill results observable earlier in the war. In fact the troops have profited much from the experience gained during the German offensive; and more skilful leadership has given the attack greater flexibility, with the result that pre-arranged plans, instead of being rigidly adhered to, have been modified by the troop-leaders to meet unexpected situations. Thus strongly defended localities which would formerly have defied direct assault, or would only have fallen after severe and costly fighting, have been taken, with trifling loss, by outflanking or converging attack.

The rapid recovery of the Allied Armies after the ordeal through which they had passed in the first three months of the campaign, is one of the wonders of the war. The long and rapid retreat, the disorganisation which prevailed in some quarters, the losses sustained, and the anxieties of a situation which, on several occasions, was distinctly menacing, might well have depressed the *moral* of the best soldiery that ever took the field. Yet the troops never lost heart; and, when the occasion was ripe, they took the offensive with unsubdued spirit and undiminished confidence in themselves and their leaders. It is no disparagement to the Allied Armies to recognise that the Germans had decided to fall back from their advanced positions. When, and how far, the enemy had intended to retire is their own secret; but —apart from the pains at which inspired German apologists have been to find plausible excuses—the course of the operations provides ample evidence that they were allowed to choose neither their own time nor the manner of their retreat. On many occasions they were forced to fight desperately in defence of vital positions, the premature loss of which often disorganised the plan of retreat and led to the capture of vast quantities of material which they were given time neither to remove nor to destroy. Their movements were governed more by the will of the Allied commanders than by their

own volition. It is only necessary to compare their losses in prisoners, guns, and material with those incurred in last year's retreat, to recognise the difference between an orderly and regulated movement and one executed under compulsion. With these reservations, the retreat may be said to have been skilfully effected; and there is no evidence of panic except in minor instances, or of any abnormal disorder among the troops. The evidence points to the Germans having, on the whole, fought well—in many instances exceedingly well; and the rapidity of their retreat was due, not to demoralisation, but to the skill which characterised the Allied operations, and to the energy and bravery which animated the Allied troops.

Turning now to the situation in the east, we find that the Allied operations have been of two kinds: the first, offensive, aim at disposing of Germany's minor allies; the second, mainly defensive, are designed for the protection of threatened territory and communications.

The first event to be noticed is the Allied offensive in Macedonia. It had been believed for some time that the Bulgarians, war-weary, jealous of the Turks, and dissatisfied at having been refused the possession of Salonica, were wavering in their allegiance to their German masters. The Greek army, some 150,000 strong, being ready for the field, the occasion seemed ripe for striking a blow which might loosen Germany's grip on Bulgaria and the Balkans. Here, then, the main offensive was opened on Sept. 15 by French and Serbian troops, who attacked the Bulgarians in the frontier region of Dobropolje, east of Monastir, on a front of nine miles, which, by the extension of the flanks, was widened, on Sept. 17, to twenty miles. After three days' heavy fighting, the left wing reached the Tcherna, five miles north of Grunishta, while the right wing captured the heights north of the Gradeshnitza river. German reinforcements were put to flight; and cavalry, thrown forward on the right, approached Prilep. On Sept. 18 a fresh attack was opened on both sides of Lake Doiran, where British and Greek troops gained some ground against stubborn resistance; while the main advance made rapid progress in a northerly direction between

the Vardar and the Tcherna, the Bulgarians having, apparently, been so completely demoralised by the loss of their strong positions in the mountains that the efforts of German reinforcements failed to stay their flight. On Sept. 21 the infantry reached the Vardar in the direction of Negotin and Demir Kapu, cutting the railway communications of the enemy on the Doiran front, and outflanking their formidable positions in the bend of the Tcherna, from which they began to fall back, pressed by the Italians, who had taken the offensive on the previous day. The Bulgarian retreat then became general on a front of 100 miles, and soon degenerated into a rout, which the so-called 11th German Army (Bulgarians, with a German stiffening and German officers) was powerless to stay. The enemy's front was broken, the right wing being driven towards Albania. Prilep was occupied on Sept. 24, and Veles on Sept. 26. Greek and British troops, crossing the Belashitsa range, seized Strumnitza; and Serbian cavalry, pressing forward through Kochana, reached the Bulgarian frontier. On Sept. 30 it was reported that Bulgarian envoys had arrived at Salonica, bearing proposals for an armistice.

Almost simultaneously with the attack on the Bulgarians, the Turks in Palestine were subjected to another crushing defeat. The Turkish forces were distributed on either side of the Jordan, the 4th Army on the east, the 7th and 8th Armies on the west, where they were opposed by French and British troops on a front lying approximately east and west through El Ballutah. Preparatory to the main attack, a force advancing on the night of Sept. 18–19, between the river and the Jerusalem—Shechem road, got astride of the road from Shechem to the Jordan, thus interposing itself between the two parts of the Turkish army. On the following morning the main attack launched on a sixteen-mile front adjoining the coast, and assisted by the fire of naval guns, quickly overran the Turkish positions, and, in the afternoon, captured the enemy's advanced base at Tul Keram (on the railway, twenty-five miles north-east of Joppa)—an advance of twelve miles in as many hours. The Turks being in flight on the whole front between the Jordan and the sea, mounted troops were sent forward in two bodies, of which one, proceeding north of

Shechem, intercepted large numbers of the enemy; while the other reached the railway from Haifa to Damascus at El Afuleh, 50 miles north-east of Joppa.

These initial advantages were swiftly followed up. The passages of the Jordan were seized; and the 7th and 8th Turkish Armies, being thus deprived of their last means of escape, lost all their artillery and transport, and were virtually destroyed. East of the river, mounted troops, closely supported by infantry, seized the Hedjaz railway at Amman; while Arab forces of King Hussein occupied Maan (70 miles south of the Dead Sea) and, advancing northwards along the railway, drove before them the greater part of the 4th Turkish Army, which thus found itself between two fires. The situation of the remainder of this army, dispersed along the railway south of Maan, is equally unpromising; and it seems unlikely that any appreciable fraction of the Turkish armies in Palestine and Syria will continue to exist as a fighting force. The captures reported down to Sept. 27 amounted to 50,000 prisoners and 325 guns, besides a large quantity of material and rolling stock.

Passing to the Allies' defensive measures, it may be recalled that allusion was made, in the July number of this Review, to a movement of Kurdish irregulars towards the Caspian after the Turks had occupied the southern Caucasus. This movement subsequently developed into a Turkish advance on Baku, to oppose which, as well as to counteract German activities in the direction of Afghanistan, a force was sent from Baghdad through Persia to Enzeli, on the south-western shore of the Caspian. From this point two detachments were despatched; one eastwards, to co-operate with an Indian force which was working along the Trans-Caspian railway from Meshed; the other to aid in the defence of Baku, which was held by about 10,000 Russians and Armenians. On being closely pressed, the Armenians, numbering some 7000, deserted to their homes. The British force, after repelling determined Turkish attacks on three occasions, evacuated Baku on Sept. 14, and rejoined the main body at Enzeli.

Of more moment is the situation—as yet only vaguely defined—in northern Russia, where the Germans, with the aid of Finnish and Bolshevist troops, aim at gaining

possession of the railway communications with Archangel and Katerina; and that in Siberia, in which the dominating factor is the Siberian railway. On Aug. 2 an Allied force of French, British, and Americans landed at Archangel—at the request of the inhabitants, who had deposed the local Soviet—and moved along the railway towards Vologda, 400 miles distant, encountering Bolshevist forces, said to number 8000, which were defeated and driven back on Oboserskaya, 100 miles south of Archangel. Another force, which disembarked on the western shore of the White Sea, is reported to have occupied Kem, on the Murman railway, 250 miles from the terminus at Katerina harbour. The serious factor in the situation is the presence of strong German forces in Finland, where the enemy have been endeavouring to organise two expeditions, composed of German-led Finnish troops, with Katerina and Kem as objectives. Such, broadly, was the situation about the middle of August, since which period no information about the course of events has been published.

The conclusion of peace at Brest-Litovsk was followed by the formation, in eastern Siberia, of armed forces composed of released German and Austrian prisoners, which, with the local Bolshevists, threatened to gain control of the railways between Lake Baikal and Vladivostok, and to dominate Siberia in the German interest. To meet this menace, and to cover the rear of the Czecho-Slovaks who, under Colonel Dieterichs, were desirous of forming a junction with Colonel Gaida's force, operating west of Lake Baikal, the Allies decided, after prolonged discussion, to send a force to occupy Vladivostok. When General Otani, the commander of the Japanese contingent, and subsequently Commander-in-Chief, arrived at Vladivostok on Aug. 16, the situation was as follows. The Bolshevist forces were in possession of the Amur railway from Khabarovsk to its junction with the main line near Chita, and of the main line from Irkutsk to the Chinese frontier-station at Manchurie. The Czecho-Slovaks in the Usuri province had been driven back between Khabarovsk and Vladivostok to within 100 miles of the latter; and Colonel Semenoff, who with 2000 Cossacks, had been endeavouring to advance from Manchurie towards Chita, had been obliged to

fall back into Chinese territory. Gaida's force was in jeopardy west of Lake Baikal; and the line from thence to the Volga was in the possession of the Czecho-Slovaks, against whose main forces, on the middle Volga, German and Bolshevist troops were concentrating. It had become plain that the Allied force could not remain inactive at Vladivostok; and the British contingent had already started for the Usuri front. It was decided to send French troops forward forthwith, and to despatch part of the Japanese force as soon as it disembarked.

The gradual influx of these reinforcements resulted, after some vicissitudes, in the defeat of the Bolshevists, 8000 strong, and their retreat to Khabarovsk, which was occupied on Sept. 5 by the Allies, who found the railway bridge over the Amur intact. Meanwhile the general situation had undergone an important change. The Bolshevist forces had been attracted from all quarters to the Usuri front, where they arrived too late to influence events; while the weakening of the forces opposed to Semenoff and Gaida enabled these commanders to take the offensive. Semenoff, supported by a Japanese detachment, which had hastened to his aid *via* Kharbin, resumed his advance; and Gaida, defeating the forces opposed to him, commenced his eastward march. On Sept. 2 a junction was effected at Olovyanna, on the River Onon, completing the occupation of the railway from Vladivostok to the Volga. But, while the position in Siberia has been secured, the situation on the Volga is disquieting. Down to the middle of September the main army, under the Czech General Syrovy, held, approximately, the line Kazan—Simbirsk—Samara—Volsk. Volsk, Simbirsk, and Kazan have since been lost; and it is evident that the Germans are resolved on the destruction of the Czecho-Slovaks, who are ill-furnished with the material requirements.

The significance of these various side-shows lies in their influence on the situation in the west—the only quarter in which, since the defection of Russia, the Allies have been in contact with the enemy's main forces. That Germany finds the presence of an Allied force on the Murman coast inconvenient is admitted by her offer to abstain from attacking eastern Karelia if the Allies withdraw from that region. She already

has in Russia nearly 40 divisions, besides a number of Austrian divisions which have been fully employed on police duties, to which has now been added the burden of a campaign against the Czecho-Slovaks, the magnitude of which cannot be foreseen. Although his troops are poorly equipped for fighting, General Syrovy has the whole expanse of Asiatic Russia behind him, with complete control of the Siberian railway. While his present position is perilous, exposed, as he is, to attack from various directions by superior forces, if his army should have the manœuvring power to retire along the railway while avoiding a serious engagement, it might lead the Germans a dance from which they would derive neither pleasure nor advantage. The increasing dearth of communications would cause them to be more and more tied to the railway, restricting their manœuvring power, and limiting them to frontal attack. Assistance in the form of material, if not of men, would ultimately reach General Syrovy from the east; his forces would grow—for the inhabitants have been glad enough, when possible, to rid themselves of the Bolshevist yoke, and local governments have already raised forces at more than one centre in Siberia—and his position would become more secure. The Germans, on the other hand, would drag behind them a lengthening chain of communications, which might break at any moment unless supported by larger forces than they can spare from those at present in Russia to keep order in their rear. With such possibilities in view—for the Germans do not overlook possibilities—it is not surprising that they should be anxious to escape from further complications on the White Sea coast, to unravel which they had originally thought it necessary to invite, or requisition, the assistance of the reluctant Finns.

Since the Germans made their conditional offer to stay their hand in Karelia, the Allied attacks in Macedonia and Palestine have introduced a new factor in the problem they have to solve. Although the collapse of Russia has opened a new way to the east, the Germans have no mind to relinquish the old road *viâ* Constantinople, with the advantages it confers of commanding the exit from the Black Sea, and of threatening the Suez Canal, which Bismarck described as 'the neck of

the British Empire.' Apart from these considerations, the abandonment of their vaunted position in the Balkans would be a long step towards admitting defeat, and would be a fatal blow to their prestige in Russia, and among the small peoples who have fallen under the sway of Germany. They cannot, therefore, afford to look on at the collapse of Bulgaria and Turkey, on whose maintenance in the field their position in the Balkans depends. The shortening of their front in France by the recent retreat will enable them temporarily to withdraw a few divisions for employment elsewhere; but, with the prospect of an unrestful winter on the western front, the indefinite requirements of the situation in the east may impose a severe strain on their resources.

Events in Palestine, in the Balkans, and in France cannot, in fact, be correctly viewed as disconnected episodes. Each has its place in the general perspective; and it is impossible, at the moment, to assign to each its relative importance. It is not by accident that Germany's minor allies have been attacked at the time when the situation in the west demands all her attention. The conjecture put forward more than two years ago, that the force at Salonica might find its opportunity 'when the enemy, having been weakened and reduced to the defensive, is being driven back on the main fronts,' does not seem to have been wide of the mark.* Since this article went to press the surrender of Bulgaria has been reported; and it is an open question whether Turkey, staggering under accumulated defeats, and isolated from Germany except by way of the Black Sea, may not follow suit. Germany has lost the old road to the east; and she must either cut the loss, or attempt to retrieve it before the Allies consolidate their military position in the Balkans. Such an attempt could only be made at the expense of the position in the west; and, to offer a prospect of success, it would need a far greater expenditure of force than the Germans might have deemed sufficient had the Bulgarian army kept the field.

W. P. BLOOD.

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* 'Quarterly Review' for April, 1916.

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TO THE

TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH VOLUME OF THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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
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